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IN THE UTAH COlURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20051052-CA
vs.
RENAE REID BOLSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Appellant, RENAE REID BOLSON ("Bolson"), appeals from the denial of her
motion to arrest judgment and the May 20, 2005 Sentence, Judgment, and Order for
Commitment (R221-223; R224-226; R1351-1382; R1440-1445). This Court has
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2a-3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: The issues in this case revolve primarily around a question of
statutory interpretation, i.e., what constitutes "willful" conduct under the securities fraud
provisions set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-1 and -21 (Addendum A).
A.

Jury Instruction: Was it a manifest injustice for the trial court to (1)
instruct the jury that in the context of securities fraud, willfulness implies,
rather than requires, knowledge of the falsity of misstatements or knowl-

edge of the omitted facts; (2) to even give a "deliberate blindness" instruction in this case; and (3) to fail to instruct the jury that willfulness
also requires knowledge of the materiality of any omitted fact?
B.

Motion to Arrest Judgment and Sufficiency: Did the trial court err in
denying Bolson's Motion to Arrest Judgment and finding there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Bolson acted willfully?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The correct interpretation of a statute is a
question of law and is reviewed for correctness." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357
(Utah 1993).
A.

Jury Instruction: Because Bolson's counsel stipulated to the "willful"
instruction,1 this Court will remand only if the error constitutes a manifest
injustice, "synonymous with the 'plain error' standard. The manifest
injustice or the plain error standard requires the appellant to show that (i)
an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased
differently, [the Court's] confidence in the verdict is undermined." State

l

nBolson does not argue here that trial counsel was ineffective, because when trial

counsel diligently sought to remedy her perceived errors below, the trial court rejected
counsel's arguments such that any prejudice resulted not from trial counsel's assistance
but from the court's interpretation of the law.
2

v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, ^14-15 (citations and quotations omitted).
B.

Motion to Arrest Judgment and Sufficiency: "The standard for
determining whether a trial court correctly granted or denied a motion for
arrest of judgment is the same standard appellate courts apply in
determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient
evidence. See, State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). Under
that standard, 'a trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds
must have.entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element.' Id" State v.
Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, f20, 20 P.3d 265.
Upon review of the evidence and all inferences that can reasonably
be drawn from it, this Court will uphold the jury's decision if "some
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements
of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). In challenging the trial
court's factual findings, an appellant has the burden of marshaling all of
the evidence, after which an appellate court "will not lightly disturb a trial
court's findings of fact" unless they "are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly

3

erroneous." Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36
(Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted).
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court err in concluding that the State presented sufficient
evidence to support Bolson's convictions for Sale of an Unregistered Security and Pattern
of Unlawful Activity?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[W]hen reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, this [CJourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. It is only when the evidence as
viewed in this light is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt that it is proper to overturn
the conviction. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784-785 (Utah 1991). In challenging the
trial court's factual findings, an appellant has the burden of marshaling all of the
evidence, after which an appellate court "will not lightly disturb a trial court's findings of
fact" unless they "are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton,
863 P.2d 29 at 36 (citation omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bolson was charged by information filed in February 2002 with seven counts of
Securities Fraud, all second degree felonies, one count of Sale of Unregistered Security, a
third degree felony, one count of Sale By An Unlicenced Broker, Dealer or Agent, and

4

one count of Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a second degree felony (Rl-8). A preliminary
hearing was conducted on October 3-4, 2002, after which the trial court bound over all
counts (R80-4). Bolson filed a motion to quash the bindover on February 20, 2003
(Rl 15-80), which the trial court denied on September 16, 2003 (R303-79). Bolson filed a
petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order, which this Court denied as
untimely on November 13, 2003 (R398-99).
The parties stipulated to a jury instruction regarding the willfulness mens rea
prior to trial and again after both parties had rested. R852-904 (Instruction #37);
R1471:839, 983. That instruction states:
. . . to act willfully, it must be a person's conscious object or desire to engage in
certain conduct or cause a certain result. A person acts willfully if she acts
purposefully and not because of mistake or accident. In the context of
statements or omissions of material facts, willfulness implies knowledge of the
falsity of the misstatements or knowledge of the omitted facts. That knowledge
can be inferred if defendant deliberately blinded herself to the existence of a fact
or facts; however, defendant cannot be convicted if she was merely negligent,
careless, or foolish. She must have acted with a conscious objective or desire to
ignore a material fact or facts. R1472:1015.2
Instruction 38 relative to Counts 8-9 (sale of unregistered security by unlicenced
broker, dealer or agent) provides:
The Slate of Utah must prove that the defendant acted willfully in committing
the offenses [in counts 8-9). A defendant acts willfully if it was his or her
conscious objective or desire to engage in conduct or cause the result, not that it

Subsequent to the trial, both parties challenged this instruction for different
reasons. See, Infra. However, the trial court noted that those challenges were
unwarranted "because they each invited the error, if any." R1359.
5

was the defendant's conscious desire or objective to violate the law, nor that the
defendant knew that he or she was committing fraud in the sale of the security.
After the State rested, the defense made a motion for a directed verdict.
R1469:687-88. The trial court denied the motion except as to Count 2, securities fraud
relating to Tom Barberi. R1469:790-92; R1471:980. The trial court expressed a desire
that the question of willfulness be taken up on appeal and clarified. R1471:829, 831-32.
After the jury trial conducted June 14-18, 2004 (R828-47), Bolson was acquitted
on Counts 1 and 3, and convicted on Counts 4-7 for Securities Fraud, Counts 8-9 for Sale
of Unregistered Security, and Count 10 for Pattern of Unlawful Activity (R848-51).
Bolson filed a motion to arrest judgment on September 21, 2004 (R926-57)
(Addendum B), arguing that "the jury was improperly instructed regarding the
appropriate mens rea in this case", conceding that defense counsel had stipulated to the
jury instruction based upon her misinterpretation of the law (R1061-1348: 1-2)
(Addendum C). Based on defense counsel's subsequent analysis of State v. Larsen, 865
P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) (Addendum D), Bolson argued that "the instruction should have
advised the jury that wilfulness requires knowledge of the falsity of statements made or
the materiality of omitted facts [and] should have informed the jury that knowledge of an
omitted fact requires knowledge of the materiality of the omitted fact." R1061-1348:3
(emphasis in original). Bolson further argued that "the 'ostrich' portion of the instruction
permitting the jury to infer Ms. Bolson's mental state through deliberate blindness or
wilful ignorance was inappropriate." R1061-1348:3-4.
6

The trial court denied Bolson's motion as to most counts in its Memorandum
Decision and Order dated July 21, 2005 (Addendum E), reserving the issue as to Count 9
(R1351-82). The trial court concluded that in viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict, Bolson was a central figure through whom investors became
involved, she explained the scheme in "glowing terms" while "minimizing the risks", and
made "statements about [the principal's] capabilities and financial strength." R1353-54.
Bolson not only sold the scheme to investors, but she was the "nexus" between investors
and the scheme's creator. R1355. Bolson was also "involved in providing the financial
means and opportunity for many [] investors to buy into the program." R1355. Bolson
"acted as the clearing-house for the program's payments in connection with the
investments" (R1356). The jury could reasonably find Bolson's "role was that of an
insider, facilitator and seller of the program" (R1357).
The trial court concluded that the wilfulness instruction given "was an
acceptable statement of the law, where there was no specific Utah decision on the issue
and divergent views in other jurisdictions . . . that, if anything, the instruction was more
strict in its requirements and more favorable to the defendant than other mens rea
approaches that the State might [have] argued for . . . In other words, if the instruction
was erroneous, Ihe court believes that defendant was favored and not prejudiced. The
instruction requires knowledge of the falsity of misstatements or omitted facts, while not
permitting deliberate blindness. It expressly distinguishes deliberate blindness from mere

7

negligence, carelessness or foolishness, reiterating that the defendant 'must have acted
with a conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts.'" Rl359-60, fn. 4.
Finally, the trial court concluded that "there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could reasonably have concluded that [Bolson] made material misrepresentations and
omissions based on her knowledge. The court is not convinced that the instruction, even
if erroneous, undermines confidence in the jury's verdict." R1360, fn. 4.
After further briefing by the parties, the Court sua sponte vacated Bolson's
conviction as to Count 9 (R1440-45) (Addendum F). Defendant was sentenced on
October 24, 20053, and timely filed her Notice of Appeal (R1450-51).
STATEMENT OF FACTS4
Introduction
ReNae Bolson was convicted for being hopeful, helpful, and probably naive.
Bolson trusted a friend who, as it turned out, lied to Bolson and many others to their
collective disappointment - and to their financial detriment. However, unlike her former
untrustworthy friend and others who deliberately defrauded, Bolson was not convicted of
several felonies for lying. She was convicted of several felonies for not being savvy.
This case involves an investment scheme ("The Program") in which the
3

The trial court sentenced Bolson to 30 days on the ankle-monitor program and 300
hours of community service (R1473:41).
4

Bolson generally presents the State's evidence relative to Bolson's representations
to investors in the body, with any contrary testimony from Bolson in footnotes, unless
doing so will cause confusion or is otherwise inappropriate.
8

principals and creators, who had a perfect knowledge of their fraud, duped many people,
including ReNae Bolson. The State did not prosecute Bolson because she had knowledge
that The Program was fraudulent. Rather, the State prosecuted Bolson because she did
not avail herself of public documents that might have shown that what Bolson told
potential investors was misleading. R1469:762-63. Notwithstanding her utter lack of
knowledge, Bolson was found guilty of the very same offenses for which the principals,
who had a perfect knowledge of their fraud, were convicted.
The Evidence
The Program
This case begins with one Paul Stewart. In 1999, Stewart began an investment
scheme known as "The Program." R1469:711-12. Investors, including Bolson, were told
that if they took out a first or second mortgage and invested the proceeds, the principle
investment would sit safe and untouched in a trust account, The Program would pay the
mortgage, and after 2-4 years investors would receive back their initial investment and
own the home free and clear. R1466:52-3; R1468:336, 347, 414, 435; R1471:843-44. In
addition, investors would be paid 9% on a note for homes they sold through The Program.
R1467:176. Some investors were also told they would also earn 24% interest on any cash
they invested. R1466:54.
Consistent with Stewart's representations, investors including Bolson were
provided with written guarantees from Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund that their principle

9

investments would be held in trust and were refundable upon demand. R1467:252;
R1468: 324-25, 336, 347, 414, 435. Investors provided their investment checks to Clay
Harrison of Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund. R1468:361-62, 398, 434.
On the surface, The Program did well until late spring or early summer of 2001
when all the money began to run out and payments stopped being made. R1469:736. In
reality and unbeknownst to investors including Bolson, "horrible problems" arose toward
the end of 1999 at which time Dale McAllister of Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund used
money coming "from new investors to pay off old investors" and "[w]hatever [he] needed
to do" to keep The Program going. R1470:596, 618, 626-27. When The Program failed,
many investors lost their homes and any cash they had invested, and some filed for
bankruptcy. R1466:134; R1467:186, 219, 244-45; R1468:350, 416.
Stewart's representations to investors that The Program was risk-free
Based upon Stewart's representations and formal written guarantees from
Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund, Bolson and other investors believed that investors'
principle investments would be held in a trust account on which Stewart had no signing
authority5, and that investors could receive that money back at any time. R1471:892-94.
Dale McAllister of Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund provided investors with written
guarantees to this effect, promising that upon Stewart defaulting "on any transaction

5

Clay Harrison of Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund was in fact the only authorized
signatory, although Dale McAllister routinely accessed the account. R1470:636
10

according to escrow instructions, all funds due the [investor] will be released."
R1467:252; R1468:324-25.6 In other words, on paper there was no risk to any investor of
losing his or her principle investment.
Main Street Financial ("MSF") loan officer, Ryan Nay, heard Bolson explain to
potential investors the same understanding that Stewart had given all MSF employees that
the principle investment would never be touched, and in the worse case scenario, all
investors would receive back at least their principle investments. R1467:254-55, 264.
Everyone at MSF and all investors believed this representation to be a fact and relied
upon it. R1467:264; R1468:336-37, 354-55, 360, 414, 435; R1471:892-94.7
Stewart also represented to investors that he had significant education and
expertise in finance and banking, he was an attorney, and he knew the "constitution .. .
backwards and forwards" (R1466:53; R1470:605). When Dale McAllister of Attorney's
Title Guaranty Fund first met Stewart, McAllister was instructed that he could ask
questions about The Program but Stewart could not give any information, suggesting that
the way in which The Program made money was a secret or confidential. R1470:603.
Stewart represented that he had rare and valuable business contacts that enabled him to
6

As The Program folded and investors contacted Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund
for a refund, they were informed that there was no such account. Rl468:315.
7

However, Bolson did not recall telling any investor that The Program involved no
risk. R1471:852; see also R1470:564-66 (During a telephone interview with Michael
Hines, Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of securities, that was taped without
Bolson's knowledge, Bolson denied telling investors there was no risk but stated that
from what she had been told and observed, The Program seemed a safe investment).
11

make lucrative investments that were not available to others. R1470:605. Stewart
vaguely explained it had "something to do with bank trading debentures [and] somehow
federal banks are able to trade money during the hours that the banks aren't open and [] to
use that money to do loans other places [and] compound the interest in ways that just
normal transactions don't" (R1470:603-04). Stewart told investors that he had unique
contacts and expertise that enabled him to invest in different investments "that would
make [them] all extremely wealthy." R1470:596, 638.
Al Anderson, one of Stewart's cohorts, also assured investors that The Program
was a sound investment (R1466:55-6, 92-3) and represented to investors that their
principle investments would not be touched but would only "be used as leverage to
borrow money against" (R1466:151).
Both Stewart and Anderson alleviated potential investors' misgivings about The
Program by representing that Stewart was a person of considerable educational
background and expertise and a qualified "insider" in the investment business.
R1466:148. Stewart also represented to investors that The Program would make their
mortgage payments and they would own their homes within two years if they invested.
R 1467:219-227. Anderson was one who could take checks and other funds from

8

McAllister not only did invest in The Program, but ultimately pleaded guilty and
went to prison for his role in stacking mortgages, wiring investment monies out of the
trust account, generally mishandling investment monies under Stewart's direction, and
falsely representing to investors that their principle investments would remain safe and
untouched in that account. R1470:598, 614, 629.
12

investors to put into The Program. R1466:132-33. Stewart generally signed the real
estate contracts involved in The Program and was the person who negotiated and
structured the transactions. R1467:280, 282; R1468:302, 321-22, 326.
When The Program began failing to make payments in 2001, Bolson referred
investors to Stewart who represented that the money was in a "holding account" and there
was a "problem with trading . . . " R1467:183. Stewart also represented that they were
having some minor problems moving money around and there were temporary "snags"
that simply caused payments to be delayed. R1470:495, 617, 621.
Bolson's involvement in The Program
While conducting his business with MSF, Stewart began spending a lot of time
there and developed friendly relationships with Bolson and other MSF employees, who
allowed him to occasionally avail himself of unused office space for his personal
"paperwork". R1469:710-l 1, 714. Sometimes, Stewart would show up at MSF with
other individuals who were involved in The Program, and Bolson and other MSF
employees would overhear him discussing what was referred to as the "40/30/30"
formula. R1469:711. When Bolson and other MSF employees inquired about this
formula, Stewart explained The Program - an investment opportunity for persons who
had 30 percent equity in their homes. Stewart always carried a ledger and a folder with
him with almost a full page list of properties Stewart represented that he owned that were
under "private contract". R1469:713-14.

13

During the ensuing months, Bolson developed a friendship with Stewart and
observed him making checks to various investors in The Program. Finally, in the spring
of 2000, as a "good will gesture" motivated by her friendship with Stewart and because
Stewart was "an extremely busy man", Bolson offered to help Stewart "strictly as a
volunteer" with sending out checks to The Program investors. R1469.714-15. Bolson
had no signatory authority over Stewart's accounts and Stewart brought her the already
signed checks with instructions on how to prepare and mail them. R1469:715-16. For
the return address on the envelope, Bolson created a sticker with Stewart's post office box
to keep it separate from MSF. R1469:716. Bolson received no remuneration for these
services, not even "so much as a diet coke." R1469:716-17; R1470:565.
Bolson observed The Program for several months and saw how the investors
were being paid, after which time she was persuaded that it was an excellent investment
opportunity such that she and her mother decided to take out a second mortgage for
$25,000 on her mother's home. R1466:57-8, 144; R1471:842. Bolson and her mother
considered it a joint investment and agreed to share the profits equally. R1471:842. The
Program made the promised monthly mortgage payments beginning in January 2000 until
early to mid-2001. R1471:847.9
Bolson believed Stewart's representations and was excited about The Program.
Bolson never took any investment monies in any form, and indeed did not have the ability

9

When The Program quit making payments, Bolson made them. R1471:847-48.
14

to do so. R1471:864, 885. During trial when Dale McAllister was asked if he ever
discussed with Bolson monies going in arid out of The Program, he testified, "That wasn't
her responsibility." R1470:597-98.
When The Program failed to make scheduled payments to investors, Bolson
believed Stewart's representations that the problems were just temporary and all would
resume as it was supposed to once all of the "glitches" were worked out. R1467:258,
266. Bolson's seeming naivete frustrated MSF loan officer, Ryan Nay, and they began to
have disagreements about Stewart's veracity, with Bolson still believing in him and his
promises. R1467:257-58, 266. Nay testified that as he came to the painful realization
that he had to protect himself, Bolson seemed unable to face the prospect of losing her
investment and believed The Program would work because it had to. R 1467:257-58.
Bolson testified that she was probably one of the last investors to stop believing
in The Program. R1471:895. This occurred in about mid 2001 when Stewart and Al
Anderson finally told Bolson there was no more money and they could no longer make
payments. R1471:895-96. Even then, Stewart represented that he and Anderson were
still working to recover losses. R1471:896. Bolson was devastated. R1471:898.
Stewart's apparent creditworthiness and what Bolson did not know
In 1999, Paul Stewart became a customer of MSF when he contacted MSF loan
officers Ryan Nay or Mark Turney to obtain financing for the purchase of some
properties. R1469:700-02. As part of that application process, Bolson pulled Stewart's

15

Experion credit report in June 1999. R1471:701, 706. Stewart's credit score was more
than satisfactory and there was no indication that he had ever filed bankruptcy.
R1469:653, 655-67, 702-03. Ryan Nay10 who handled Stewart's loan testified that
Stewart's credit report showed that he was a fair credit risk and qualified for the loan he
was seeking at the time. R1467:235-36. The State presented no evidence in the record to
suggest that Nay's reliance on this credit report was unreasonable.
To ensure that their information about Stewart was at its most current, Bolson
pulled an additional credit report in July 1999, drawing information from three additional
credit bureaus. R1469:706-07. Again, Stewart's credit scores were good and there was
no indication of Stewart's previous bankruptcy, with one bureau specifically noting
Stewart had "no adverse factors". R1469:708.
On this second report, one bureau did list a judgement for child support that
Bolson required Stewart to address, which he did upon providing a copy of his divorce
decree indicating the parties had joint custody so no child support was owed. R1469:70809. Bolson even followed up by contacting the Office of Recovery Services for

10

Nay also was approached by Stewart who persuaded him to invest in The
Program. R1467:219, 221, 227-28, 243, 250-51. Bolson had no involvement in that
transaction. R1467:219-20. Nay testified that while he worked with Bolson at MSF, he
never observed her make any representations that she was Stewart's assistant or agent,
she received no money or commissions from other people investing in The Program, and
Nay never heard her trying to get others to invest. R1467:249, 269. Later, Nay did
observe Bolson helping Stewart with preparing checks for investors. R1467:252-53, 265.
However, Nay testified that he heard Bolson tell people to call Stewart to have their
questions about The Program answered. R1467:255.
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additional information and was only told that the judgment was "disputed." R1469:70809; R1471:913-14. Accordingly, the loan officer (not Bolson) determined that the
judgment was not an obstacle to Stewart's obtaining a loan at that time. R1469:708-09.
As an additional part of MSF's due diligence in verifying Stewart's creditworthiness, Stewart also provided a six-month summary of deposits to his business bank
account, Carson International, which showed the account had received monthly deposits
each ranging from $50,000 to over $200,000, which fact Bolson independently verified
with a bank representative. R1469:704-05. Stewart also provided a copy of his resume
representing many college degrees and expertise in banking and insurance. R1469:706.
A year later in June 2000, Bolson pulled another credit report for Stewart. Still,
there was no bankruptcy listed in the public records section nor any indication that the
Utah Division of Securities had issued a cease and desist order against him a few months
previous. R1469:669-70; R1471:886-87.n His credit scores, which were typically the
primary item MSF loan officers would look at as well as any public records listed on the
report, were still very good. R1471:918. In July 2000, U.S. Bank also provided to
Bolson at MSF verification that Stewart was a well-established customer and that he had
"overseas accounts of $100,000 or greater and that he [] brought several customers to
U.S. Bank who also have similar accounts [and] have been excellent customers of U.S.

1

Although this information was available on the division's public web site for
anyone who might think to look, the order was mailed only to Stewart's home and no
other person, including Bolson, was given notice of it. R1469:670-71.
17

Bank." R1471:888. The signer of this document referred to himself as Stewart's
"personal banking officer" and stated, "I personally and professionally vouch for
[Stewart's] integrity." R1471:888-89.
Again, Bolson was not a loan officer so it was not within her expertise or her
realm of responsibility to approve or decline any loan application, or to scrutinize any
loan documents. Bolson first learned that Stewart had a previous bankruptcy and a cease
and desist order issued against him after she was charged in this case. R1471:890.
Bolson's representations to potential investors about The Program
When potential investors learned about The Program often from family members
and friends who were involved, some invested without contacting Bolson12 (R1466.T21,
138-39; R1471:850) while others sought out Bolson either to simply find out how to
invest or to learn more about it. R1466:48-51, 56-7, 59, 95, 120-21, 142; R1467:171-72;
R1468:334, 336, 354-56, 360, 388-89; R1470:464-66, 503; R1471:856-950, 956.13
12

Bolson testified that although Stewart never asked Bolson if he could give
investors her name as a contact person for The Program, it appears that at some point that
happened. R1471:881-82. In a spirit of helpfulness, Bolson would explain The Program
based upon her understanding of how it was supposed to work, but always ultimately
referred investors to Stewart. R1471:882-83. Bolson never told investors that they had to
use MSF as their mortgage broker and most investors in The Program obtained financing
through other brokers. R1469:719; R1471:853.
l3

Bolson did not deny telling interested people about The Program, but she testified
that her involvement in these meetings ranged from minimal to not even being present,
that she ultimately referred persons who were interested in investing to Stewart, and that
some investors were already quite knowledgeable about The Program from their
conversations with friends, family, and associates who had already invested and thus
simply wanted to find out how to get involved. R1469:721-26, 728-29; R1471:851, 854,
18

Investor Paul Devenport testified that Bolson contacted him. R1467:175-76.l4
Investors consistently testified that Bolson explained to them that Stewart was
the person in charge of The Program. R1467:191; R1468:363; R1470:470, 506. During
meetings that included both Stewart and Bolson, Stewart "doesn't talk very much [so
Bolson] would tell [investors] as much as she thought she could or maybe even knew, but
she wasn't real forthcoming with a lot of information." R1468:394.
Bolson is a friendly person and developed friendships with some of the
investors. R1469:732. She believed in The Program and was excited about it, as were
other investors. R1471:871-72. Bolson told potential investors that Stewart was an exbanker who knew how to invest money and obtain high yields. R1468:393. Based upon
what Stewart had represented to her and everyone else, Bolson told investors her
understanding of how The Program worked and that while the principle investment was
not touched, other money was invested for land development and loaned to the federal
and foreign governments. R1466:122, 142; R1470:468, 492, 505, 510.
Bolson represented the same things that Stewart told her - that the money would
be used "not to invest but to leverage against, through the government and [] the money
wasn't going to be touched . , . " R1468:336, 347; R1470:507. Bolson told investors that
857, 859, 874-75, 877-78, 880, 950-51.
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Bolson testified that Devenport either contacted her directly or through a friend
because he had been unsuccessful in selling a house in St. George that had been listed for
sale for several months (R1467:175), that he and his sister were having to make payments
on it, and they wanted to know if The Program was willing to purchase it. R1471:858.
19

Stewart's investments involved Treasury Bills and that he did a lot of investing overseas
because "the market doesn't really affect them." R1470:508-09.15
Stewart was sometimes present at those meetings and represented that he was the
one in charge of The Program. R1466:94. Bolson told investor, Richard Priest, that he
qualified to invest in The Program. R1468:422, 471. However, Bolson was not at the
loan closing and Mark Turney who was Priest's loan officer represented to Priest that he
and some of his relatives had invested in The Program. R1470:491, 521-22.
Witnesses testified that Bolson was the one who explained The Program to them
and was "the face" of it. R1466:51-2, 96; R1470:468, 492, 505, 510.16 Bolson
represented to investors that only Stewart really understood how The Program worked
because it was "kind of a private thing . . . [if] everybody knew about what [Stewart] was
doing then everybody would want to do it" (R1466:33). Bolson never represented that
she was Stewart's agent or partner. R1468:423.
Bolson represented that The Program made "millions a month" (R1466:55).

l5

In a taped telephone interview with Michael Hines, Director of Enforcement for
the Utah Division of Securities, Bolson explained that she told investors her
understanding "that when money was placed in the trust account [] it could be used [] as
declared funds. . . . It was [] my understanding that there were funds - other funds
somewhere. I don't know where. I never asked." R1470:567.
l6

Bolson told Michael Hines that although she did meet with potential investors
and explain The Program to the best of her knowledge, and that she did tell them she was
"very confident that everything was secure and things were just rolling right along", she
had no actual involvement with the investment monies that were put into The Program.
R1470:569-70, 573. This evidence is unrefuted.
20

Bolson told investors that The Program was a safe investment because she had seen that
other people who invested had done well. R1467:176. She assured investors they would
make lots of money, there was no risk, and they "would be walking in knee high clover"
(R1466:80). Bolson told potential investors that she was convinced of The Program's
soundness so much that she and her mother had invested in it and The Program was
paying their mortgage payments. R1466:58; R1470:508-09; R1471:948.
Bolson told one investor, Milt Priest, that some of his payments might be late
because Stewart did not always get his monies from his investments on time, but there
was no risk because the principle investment was untouchable. R1470:508-09, 513.
Bolson told Priest and his wife that The Program was getting full so if they wanted to
invest, they had better do so soon; and they had to go through MSF for their loan.
R1470:526. However, out of 200-300 investors in The Program, less than 5% actually
obtained financing through MSF. Rl470:623. Although numerous different broker
companies were involved, only Bolson of MSF was charged with crimes. R1470:639-43.
Some investors ultimately signed the relevant investment documents in Bolson's
MSF office. R1466:62-3, 98-100. When MSF was the mortgage broker, much of the
correspondence and closing documents went through Bolson. R1467:179; R1468:338,
356. If investors expressed concern aboul the relatively high interest rate (i.e., 10.65%,
13.375%) on the new mortgage loan, Bolson would tell them not to worry about it
because The Program was making the payments anyway. R1468:341-42, 404-05.
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Bolson had the wife of one investor sign a quit claim deed because it was easier
to obtain the needed financing to invest in The Program without the wife's name being on
the loan. R1468:370-71, 378.l7 While income information was inflated for one investor
Michelle Jacobsen (Bolson was acquitted re. this charge), and another investor, Richard
Priest, knowingly misrepresented his primary residence in a letter prepared by MSF loan
officer, Mark Turney, Bolson did not sign any of the investment or loan documents for
any investor. R1466:72-3, 98-100,102-03; R1468:406; R1469:724-26, 728-29.18
As The Program paid out as promised, investors were collectively pleased and
persuaded of its soundness such that some made multiple additional investments.
R1466:128-29, 131; R1469:724-26, 728-29; R1470:597, 604-05, 608. When The
Program stopped making payments altogether in 2001, some of the investors angrily
confronted Bolson (R1467:182; R1469:738-9),19 while others called both Bolson and
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Bolson testified that she was acting under the direction of MSF loan officer,
Mark Turney, and thus she was not familiar with how the loan was structured and the
decision to remove the wife's name from the deed would have been Turney's.
R1471:954-55.
l8

Bolson did initial a purported contract executed between Stewart and Paul
Devenport "strictly in a witness capacity" when Devenport confronted Stewart about The
Program's failure to make the promised payments. R1467:182-83; R1471:863.
Devenport testified that both Stewart and Bolson assured him that his note would be
placed in second position on the underlying mortgage, but that did not happen.
R1467:185-86.
19

Bolson testified that she told investors they needed to discuss the problem with
Stewart and not with her. R1469:739.
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Stewart to get information. R1469:733-34, 736; R1468:313.20 Based on Stewart's
representations, Bolson told investors that all was well but there were some "glitches"
that needed to be worked out or transfers needed to be made or Stewart might be out of
town, and that investors would be reimbursed for any mortgage payments they made in
the meantime. R1466:126; R1467:181; R1468:313-14, 317, 351, 415, 417-18, 440;
R1470:479, 516.21 Bolson told investor Paul Devenport that Stewart was "the guy that
had The Program" and he was having a problem with it, whereupon Devenport demanded
to speak to Stewart. R1467:182.22
Bolson continued to represent to investors that The Program was a safe
investment and that The Program would reimburse investors for any mortgage payments
they had to make until the "glitches" were worked out. R1466:129-30, 133-34.
Generally, Bolson represented that she was just passing on information given to her by
Stewart, and most investors understood that Stewart was the source of Bolson's
information. R1468:443-44.
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Bolson testified that when she received these contacts, she told investors "what
[Stewart] told me" and also referred them to Stewart, and became in one instance "a
social calendair arranger" for the investor and Stewart to meet. R1469:733-34.
21

Initially, investors were reimbursed for late payments until The Program ran out
of money. R1470:480-81, 493.
22

Bolson testified that Stewart's explanations for late payments seemed feasible
and she would often pass on this information to inquiring investors. R1471:864, 897.
When investors contacted Bolson about late payments, she either explained to them what
Stewart had represented to her or had them contact Stewart directly. R1471:864, 897.
23

What Bolson got out of The Program
Bolson was convicted by a jury on June 18, 2004 of four counts of Securities
Fraud,23 (second degree felonies), one count of Sale of an Unregistered Security (third
degree felony), one count of Sale by an Unlicenced Broker, Dealer or Agent and one
count of Pattern of Unlawful Activity, both second degree felonies. R1472:1095-96.
Subsequent to the trial, the court vacated Bolson's conviction for Sale by an Unlicenced
Broker, Dealer or Agent. R1440-44.
During events in this case, Bolson worked as a manager and salaried employee
for MSF, a mortgage broker company owned by Bolson's brother. R1469:690.24 Bolson
received no commissions or loan origination fees. R1469:691, 697-700. Bolson's
responsibilities at MSF involved mostly bookkeeping and secretarial duties. R1469:69091. Because MSF was owned by Bolson's brother, Bolson was also on the board of
directors as corporate secretary; MSF loan officer, Ryan Nay, testified that Bolson "ran
the office" (R1467:205).
While MSF earned its standard fees from the small percentage of investors in
The Program who did their financing through MSF, Bolson received no commissions or
23

These convictions were for transactions involving Paul Devenport, Mark
Albright, Richard Priest, and Milt and Linda Priest.
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Bolson receives government widow benefits for the untimely death of her
husband who died from cancer, and also for her handicapped child, and cannot make
more than $8,000 per year or she will lose those benefits. R1469:693, 696-97. Thus,
Bolson made from $2,000 - $7,000 per year as a salaried employee for MSF due to her
income restrictions. R1469:691, 697-700.
24

other compenscition for those loans. R1471:895. Indeed, the State presented no evidence
that Bolson personally benefitted, either directly or indirectly, from others investing in
The Program. R1469:685-87; R1470:573, 575; R1471:834.
The trial court's findings and conclusions
In reviewing Bolson's motion to arrest judgment, the trial court agreed that the
State's theory that Bolson was criminally culpable because she had a duty to investigate
and discover Stewart's bankruptcy and the cease and desist order was incorrect. R1360.
The trial court agreed with Bolson that there was no evidence that she had actual
knowledge of Stewart's bankruptcy or the cease and desist order, or that she deliberately
blinded herself to these facts, and that criminal liability for failure to discover these facts
would improperly impose a negligence standard "rather than actual knowledge or
deliberate blindness." R1360.
However, the court determined that there was sufficient evidence to convict
Bolson on the charges because "program payments to at least some investors were
becoming chronically late and checks were bouncing, facts that [Bolson] knew of because
she was both sending out the payments and fielding investors' complaints about them."
R1361. "The jury could reasonably have believed that [Bolson] did not advise later
investors . . . of the payment[] problems she was aware of while assuring them that the
program would make the payments on new mortgages that some could not afford and that
there was no risk associated with their investments in the program. The jury could also
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have concluded that the information omitted was material to the investor's decision
whether to take out a loan through MSF and invest in the program." Rl362-63.
The trial court concluded that as to Count 10, Pattern of Unlawful Activity, there
was insufficient evidence to convict Bolson under either subsections (1) or (2) of the
statute.25 Rl375-76. However, because the court had already concluded that, construing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, there was enough evidence to
convict Bolson of the securities fraud charges, there was enough evidence to uphold her
conviction under Subsection (3). R1376-77. The trial court further noted that "[w]hile
the program had many more investors than those who dealt with [Bolson] or MSF, there
does not seem to be any requirement in the Act that a person's association with an

25

Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1603 provides:

(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived, whether
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the person has
participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that
income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from the
investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to
conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of Subsection
(l),(2),or(3).
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enterprise be comprehensive" (R1378, fn. 9) and there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to find that Bolson's activities were "plainly integral to carrying out" The Program.
R1380 (citing and quoting US v. Shiftman, 124 F.3d 31, 35-36 (1 st Cir. 1997)).
Additional facts will be cited throughout the body of this brief as warranted.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The interesting thing about this case is that while the State's theory of Bolson's
criminal culpability was firmly and consistently grounded upon what Bolson did not
know - Stewart's bankruptcy and the cease and desist order - because she did not avail
herself of public records, the trial court rejected this theory but concluded there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Bolson did not inform new investors that some
payments had been late or that some checks had bounced. Not only did the State disagree
with the trial court, but it did not present evidence sufficient to conclude either that there
was a history of payments not being made when Bolson told new investors about The
Program, or that she did not tell them that sometimes payments were late. The viability of
all the charges in this complex case hinge upon these relatively simple facts.
Also, the jury was improperly instructed on the meaning of "willful" and
Bolson's conduct did not rise to this level of criminal culpability. Therefore, the trial
court's findings that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude both that
Bolson sold an unregistered security, engaged in a pattern of unlawful activity, and
omitted telling investors material facts are clearly erroneous.
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ARGUMENT26
I.

BOLSON'S CONDUCT WAS NOT WILLFUL
A,

The Jury Instruction and Motion to Arrest Judgment in the context
of the securities fraud charges, Counts 4-7.

The merits of Bolson's motion to arrest judgment depend in part upon whether
the trial court properly instructed the jury about what constitutes willful conduct under the
securities fraud statutory provisions, which in turn depends upon the correct statutory
interpretation of that mental state. Accordingly, Bolson addresses both the jury
instruction and the motion to arrest judgment in the same argument.
The question of what constitutes willful conduct centered in this case upon the
parties' and the court's interpretation of State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). See
Addenda, generally. The instruction given in Bolson's case stated that "willfulness
implies knowledge of the falsity of the misstatements or knowledge of the omitted facts."
R1472:1015. In what was referred to below as the "ostrich" instruction, the trial court
also instructed the jury they could infer knowledge from evidence that Bolson
"deliberately blinded" herself to the existence of facts. R1472:1015.
1.

The ostrich instruction was unwarranted on these facts
and served only to confuse the jury, to Bolson's undue
prejudice.

A "deliberate blindness instruction is only appropriate when facts suggest that a
26

Bolson's trial counsel did an excellent job of researching and briefing many of
the issues herein, and thus appellate counsel uses and builds upon some of previous
counsel's work.
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defendant's avoidance of knowledge is deliberate such that it rises to the same criminal
culpability of willfulness. See, United States v. Delreal-Ordones, 213 F.3d 1263, 126869 (10th Cir. 2000).27 Courts considering the issue have explained that this occurs when
there is evidence that a defendant's conduct in deliberately blinding himself to material
facts is contrived to avoid prosecution or to set up a potential defense.
The deliberate ignorance instruction presents the danger that a jury will convict a
defendant on the basis of the lesser mens rea of negligence—punishing the
defendant for what he should have known. Circumstances rarely warrant the use
of this instruction. United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir.
1990). Nevertheless, when the defendant claims he lacks the requisite guilty
knowledge, such an instruction is appropriate if the trial evidence raises two
inferences: "(1) the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the
existence of the illegal conduct, and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to
avoid learning of the illegal conduct." Id.
United States v. Gray, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12983, 24-25 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 1997
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"The district court need not insist upon direct evidence of conscious avoidance of
a fact before tendering a deliberate ignorance instruction. . . . the Government is entitled
to rely on circumstantial evidence and the benefit of the favorable inferences to be drawn
therefrom. Such evidence and its inferences must establish that a defendant had a
subjective knowledge of his criminal behavior. Negligence or even recklessness is not
sufficient to charge a defendant with guilty knowledge. . . . The Test is whether there was
a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment.... In other words, the district court may
tender a deliberate ignorance instruction when the Government presents evidence that the
defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense
in the event of prosecution. The purpose of the instruction is to alert the jury that the act
of avoidance [could be] motivated by sufficient guilty knowledge to satisfy the knowing
element of the crime" Id. (Citations and quotations omitted; emphasis added). See also,
United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v.
Moncrief 133 Fed. Appx. 924 (5th Cir. 2004); vacated and remanded on other grounds,
544 U.S. 1029: United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2002), cert
denied, 537 U.S. 1178 (2003).
29

U.S. LEXIS 4203. Because willfulness is a highly culpable mens rea, the act of
avoidance or deliberate blindness must manifest an equivalent mental state - i.e., guilty
knowledge sufficient to motivate the avoidance in the first place. Anything less risks
conviction for mere negligence - or naivete, as in this case.
Here, inclusion of the "ostrich" instruction was confusing and thus prejudicial to
Bolson. There was no evidence, circumstantial or direct, to suggest that Bolson
deliberately blinded herself to material facts because she was willfully seeking to avoid
prosecution or to establish a defense because she was subjectively aware that Stewart's
conduct was probably illegal. Therefore, it was a manifest injustice and error to instruct
the jury that they could even consider the question of deliberate blindness when the State
presented no evidence to meet this standard. This error should have been obvious to the
trial court in light of the utter dearth of evidence and trial counsel's careful briefing of the
issue. R1061-1348:4-6.
In fact, conceding that Bolson had absolutely no knowledge of Stewart's fraud
and that she did not deliberately lie about anything, the State argued that she was just as
culpable because she had a duty to inquire beyond three separate credit reports and
verified statements of Stewart's income, even though Bolson was not the loan officer
responsible for approving or declining his application. R965-66; R1469:756-57, 762-63,
767. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, it is so
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State v. Lars en, at 1360.
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inconclusive and so inherently improbable that Bolson was deliberately blind to material
facts that reasonable minds must have differed. State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, «p0.
Indeed, the State argued, "I think we can say you are being deliberately ignorant
if you don't avail yourself of the opportunity of finding out if there are . . . public
documents .. . that might make what you're saying misleading or false." R1469:762-63.
Again, after the trial the State argued, "The jury properly concluded that evidence of
Stewart's credit problems and civil judgment were material omissions that defendant
deliberately blinded herself to." R966. While the trial court repeatedly rejected the
State's attempts to impose a negligence standard, that theory of culpability was presented
and argued to the jury and considered by them in reaching a verdict. It also represents the
State's evidence against Bolson: there was no evidence that she "deliberately blinded"
herself to material facts.
Thus, the trial court's error was prejudicial to Bolson because although the State
presented no evidence that Bolson was subjectively aware of a high probability of illegal
conduct or that she purposefully contrived to avoid learning of such conduct, the jury was
instructed that it could find on the basis of lesser evidence that Bolson deliberately
blinded herself. As noted in the law cited above, juries are not even given this instruction
unless and until the State's evidence of avoidance first meets a high threshold of
culpability. The jury was not even instructed about what deliberate blindness was, i.e.,
subjective awareness of a high probability of illegal conduct or purposeful contrivance to
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avoid learning material facts, only that they could find that Bolson had deliberately
blinded herself to material facts. This was incorrect, misleading and highly prejudicial.
Because there was no evidence in this case that Bolson "deliberately blinded"
herself to any material facts to avoid prosecution or to create a defense, the "ostrich"
portion of the willfulness instruction was inappropriate and should not have been given.
The instruction served only to confuse the jury and artificially lessen both the required
culpability and the State's burden of proof. The instruction was, therefore, not only
inappropriately given, but an incomplete and thus incorrect statement of the law, and
resulted in a guilty verdict on the basis of at most mere negligence or foolishness.
Moreover, Bolson's motion to arrest judgment should have been granted because
the evidence is not inconclusive - it conclusively establishes that Bolson's conduct was
not willful such that reasonable minds must have differed as to that element.
2.

The jury instruction on willfulness was incorrect and
resulted in a manifest injustice.

It is important to note from the outset that while willful and intentional conduct
is the highest level of criminal culpability next to scienter,29 the most that can be said on
these facts is that Bolson was naive and maybe negligent in her representations to
investors. Neither naivete nor negligence are culpable mens rea under the statute.
In State v. Lavsen, supra, the Utah Supreme Court explained:

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103.
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An individual must act willfully to be criminally liable under the [securities
fraud] statute. This means that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused "desire[d] to engage in the conduct or cause the result."
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103. This highly culpable mental state is not consistent
with "strict liability," as that term is traditionally used.
Id. at 1360 (citations omitted). In essence, the State was arguing for strict liability. See,
e.g., R965-66; R1469:756-57, 762-62, 767. In contrast, Defense counsel argued that the
jury instruction should have indicated that willfulness requires knowledge of the falsity of
material facts or omissions and knowledge of their materiality. R926--27; Rl 061-1348.
This is a correct statement of the law.
While the Larsen court rejected the argument that willful conduct requires
scienter,30 an intent to lie about material facts is required - whether by false statements or
omissions. As the Larsen court explained, "a 'no scienter' reading of the statute will
affect only those professionals who willfully omit or misstate material facts." Id. at 1360.
This reading of the statute makes sense, as does the legislative intent. Persons who
willfully lie about material facts in relation to the sale of a security are culpable and
criminally liable, regardless of their supposed good faith intent. However, there was no
evidence that Bolson willfully omitted or misstated any material fact.
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i.e., an intent to defraud. "Scienter" is "a term usually employed in legal issues
involving fraud [and] means knowledge on the part of the person making representations,
at the time they were made, that they are false . . . the false statements must have been
made intentionally to deceive or with what is recognized as the legal equivalent to a
deliberately fraudulent intent to deceive." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY, 3 RD ED.
(1991), 432.
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Bolson was convicted because the willful jury instruction is out of harmony with
Larsen and thus in error. This error should have been obvious to the trial court in light of
the evidence and Larsen. The jury was instructed that "[i]n the context of statements or
omissions of material facts, willfulness implies knowledge of the falsity of the
misstatements or knowledge of the omitted facts [which] knowledge can be inferred if
defendant deliberately blinded herself to the existence of a fact or facts; however,
defendant cannot be convicted if she was merely negligent, careless, or foolish. She must
have acted with a conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts."
R1472:1015.
As defense counsel argued below, the jury should have been instructed that
willfulness does not merely imply knowledge; it requires knowledge both of the falsity of
the misstatement and the materiality of the misstatement or omission. R1061-1348.
Otherwise, a person who knowingly or negligently misstates or omits to disclose a fact
that becomes material only in hindsight is subject to prosecution. The fact that Michelle
Jacobsen purportedly received some late payment or payments at an undisclosed time in
2000 was not material enough to her to prevent her from purchasing another property
through The Program in December 2000. R1466:84-85, 105. If Jacobsen, who had
several hundred thousand dollars invested already in The Program, did not find this fact
material, why should Bolson? At that point, Jacobsen knew as much about The Program
as Bolson did and she often contacted Stewart directly. R1466:84-88, 105.
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The problem with the jury instruction in this case is further manifest in its
inconsistency. On one hand, it indicates that the element of willfulness is satisfied with
evidence thai the defendant knew represented facts were untrue, or the omission of facts
made statements misleading. The instruction expressly provides negligence or
foolishness are not sufficient. On the other hand, it instructs that knowledge can be
inferred from "deliberate blindness" without explaining what "deliberate blindness" is.
While reasonable jurors might have perceived all the investors as deliberately blind for
permitting greed to overrule prudence, that reasonable interpretation of the term does not
reflect its legal definition - that the act of avoidance manifests guilty knowledge and is
willfully and intentionally contrived to avoid prosecution.
Therefore, because of the undefined term and inconsistent language, the jury
could easily conclude that to prove willfulness, the State was not required to present
evidence of actual knowledge that statements of material fact were untrue, but could
satisfy the mens rea element with evidence that The Program was too good to be true or
with evidence of what Bolson did not know but could have discovered in public
documents had she been inclined to investigate, thereby improperly imposing a
negligence or foolishness standard through the back-door. In fact, based on the evidence
in this case, the jury did just that. Therefore, the error was harmful.
The evidence is that Bolson did not willfully lie about material facts in this case.
This is precisely why the State advocated a strict liability theory of criminal culpability
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(R965-66; R1469:756-57, 762-62, 767) while the defense argued that willfulness could
not be proven short of knowledge of material omissions or misstatements and knowledge
of their materiality. R926-27; R1061-1348.
The plentiful evidence that Bolson did not lie, that she sincerely believed in
Stewart and The Program as did every other investor, and that she had no guilty
knowledge,31 fully explains the parties' divergent views on criminal culpability. Bolson
was just as taken in as every other arguably foolish investor who was apparently more
than willing to give his or her money to an evasive individual who "knew the constitution
. . . backwards and forwards" but who told investors from the outset they "would never
know how The Program made money" (R1466:53-55, 58; R1468:348). It is not difficult
to see why a jury might conclude such persons demonstrated deliberate blindness,
especially when that term was undefined.
The willfulness jury instruction in this case was confusing and misleading to the
jury and harmful to Bolson, thereby resulting in a manifest injustice. The instruction
failed to make clear that willfulness requires knowledge of the falsity of statements and
omissions of fact and knowledge of their materiality. It further left open for the jury's
subjective interpretation what conduct constitutes deliberate blindness, thereby permitting
the jury to find criminal culpability on the basis of mere negligence or foolishness, which

3l

See, e.g., R1466:57-8, 105, 148-49; R1467:249, 252, 264, 269, 857; R1468:363;
R1469:701-08, 706, 756-57, 761-63, 767, 888-90; R1471:892-9-5, 897-98.
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is what the jury did because there is no evidence to support a finding that Bolson's
conduct was willful. Bolson's resulting conviction on these facts is a manifest injustice.
3.

Bolson's convictions should have been vacated for
insufficient evidence on the defense's motion to
arrest judgment.

In rejecting the State's theory of Bolson's criminal culpability based on
negligence, foolishness, or strict liability arising from a duty to search out public
documents (R1360), the trial court found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude that Bolson made material omissions to investors regarding problems with late
payments and bounced checks. R1361. A review of the material evidence as to each
investor regarding when they invested and when they stopped receiving payments
summarily refutes this finding and demonstrates that it is clearly erroneous.
Michelle Jacobsen: Invested 1999 and stopped receiving payments in spring 2001
Bolson was acquitted on the count relating to Michelle Jacobsen, who first
invested in The Program in 1999 (R1466.51, 95). Jacobsen testified that some payments
were late during 2000 and she became concerned about The Program in December of that
year (R1466:84-85). This testimony is discredited by the fact that she purchased an
additional property in December 2000. R1466:105. The Program failed to make
payments to Jacobsen in spring 2001. R1469:732.
John Taylor: Invested before he met Bolson and again in June 2001
Bolson was also acquitted on the charge relating to John Taylor, who invested in
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The Program before he met Bolson. R1466:138-39. In November 2000, Bolson told
Taylor her understanding that one portion The Program monies was temporarily seized by
the government, but all was well. R1466:126, 129. In June 2001, Taylor wanted to invest
again and was fully persuaded by Stewart that Stewart was a qualified ''insider" in the
investment business. R1466:123-28, 131, 148-49. In November 2001, Taylor learned
that The Program had no money and he was going to lose his investments. R1466:134.
Tom Barberi: Invested 1999 and stopped receiving payments 13-14 months later
Although the count relating to Tom Barberi was dismissed, the trial court found
that his testimony was relevant to Bolson's knowledge. R1359-63. Barberi first invested
in 1999 when he sold his personal residence. R1468:292-300, 321. In early 2000 and
because he had consistently received his scheduled payments from The Program, Barberi
agreed to extend the term of his investment contract and Stewart paid him $5,000 for
doing so. R1468:316. The $5,000 check bounced and was shortly replaced with a
cashiers check. R1468:316. Barberi testified that he received all of his scheduled
payments from The Program 13-14 months into the deal. R1468:314.
Paul Devenport: Invested November 2000 and did not receive April 2001 payment
Paul Devenport investigated The Program in January 2000 (R1467T71-72) but
did not invest until October or November of 2000. R1467:175-76. He did not receive his
first quarterly interest payment in April 2001. R1467:181.
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Ryan Nay: Invested 1999 and stopped receiving payments 2001
Bolson was not charged in relation to Ryan Nay, who invested in The Program
after meeting with Stewart in 1999. R1467:221. Nay received his payments as promised
for about two years, or until sometime in 2001. R1467:219, 244-45.
Mark Albright: Invested November 2000 and missed payments due after Feb. 2001
Mark Albright contacted Bolson in November 2000 to refinance his home so he
could invest in The Program based on information he received from his cousin, John
Taylor. R1468:336-356, 360. Albright closed on the refinance in January 2001 and gave
the proceeds for investment to Clay Harrison in February 2001. R146:361-62. Albright
received a only partial payment from The Program for the mortgage payment sometime
after February 2001. R1468:349.
Richard Priest: Invested December 2000 and missed payments in spring 2001
Richard Priest met Bolson in the spring or summer of 2000. R1468:391.
However, he did not invest in The Program until December 2000. R1468:397.
Subsequent to lhat initial investment, Priest and his partner purchased 3 additional
investment through The Program in January 2001. R1468:403-04, 409-10, 414, 431.
Although The Program provided checks for 2 mortgage payments dated April 26, 2001,
which Priest testified Bolson held until May 18, 2001, those checks were returned for
insufficient funds. R1468:436-37. Priest tried unsuccessfully to get The Program to pay
the mortgage payments as promised until September 2001, when he learned that Stewart
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was in jail and The Program was defunct. R143 8:444.
Milt Priest: Invested December-January 2001 and missed June 2001 payment
Milt Priest and his wife were introduced to The Program in December 2000 by
Priest's brother, Richard Priest. R1470:464-66. They met with Bolson in either
December 2000 or the first of the year in 2001. R1470:304, 466-67. Bolson told Priest
that his payments from The Program would be late, but The Program would pay any late
fees. R1470:478-79. Although the first three payments due beginning in March 2001
were late, The Program reimbursed the Priests for those first three payments with a
cashiers check, presumably in June 2001, after which no other payments were made.
R1470:479-81.

As noted above, the trial court concluded that Bolson encouraged investors to
invest in The Program without disclosing to them that there were problems with late
payments and bounced checks. However, as this evidence demonstrates and construing it
in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, The Program did not stop making payments
until the spring of 2001 after all of the participants had already invested, and at which
time Paul Stewart continued to reassure everyone, including Bolson, that the money
would still be paid, that there were a few "glitches" and the delay was merely temporary.
R1467:183; R1470:495, 617, 621.
It was not until even later that it became obvious that Stewart was lying. In
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other words, even construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict,
Boison not only disclosed what she knew about The Program making some late payments
(Rl470:478-79), but she could not have known there would be a problem with payments
not being made at all until The Program stopped making them - sometime in 2001 and
after all of the witnesses in this case had already invested.
The only witness who testified that The Program made some late payments in
2000 was Michelle Jacobsen, for whom Boison was acquitted and who admittedly made
another substantial investment by purchasing an additional home through The Program in
December 2000. R1466:105. In fact, people were still investing in The Program at least
as late as March 2001. State v. Wallace, 124 P.3d 259, 260 (Utah App. 2005) (explaining
that Wallace purchased at least three homes and the sellers were required to reinvest
$200,000 each between August 2000 and March 2001).32 As noted above, John Taylor
reinvested in June 2001. R1466:123-28, 131, 148-49.
In Wallace where the defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
on similar charges involving Paul Stewart's The Program, Wallace purchased three
homes where the sellers were each required to reinvest $200,000 of the proceeds. This
Court affirmed Wallace's convictions because Wallace conceded he knew the risks of
The Program, and while he testified that he disclosed those risks to sellers, the witnesses
refuted his testimony. Id at 263.

32

Cert granted, 132 P.3d 683 (Utah 2006).
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In contrast, the State presented no evidence that Bolson knew of any risks. The
State's own evidence demonstrated that Bolson and every other investor believed their
investments were untouchable based on Stewart's promises confirmed by written
guarantees from Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund. The only witness who testified about a
bounced check in 2000 was Tom Barberi, and he testified the check was quickly replaced
with a cashiers check and The Program continued making its regularly scheduled
payments for more than a year into his investment. Rl468:316. John Taylor, for whom
Bolson was also not convicted and who invested in The Program early on and before he
met Bolson, was apparently satisfied enough with whatever payments he had already
received from The Program that he wanted to invest again in June 2001. Rl466:128-31.
Paul Devenport invested in the fall of 2000 and no problems were manifest with
regard to his investment until The Program failed to pay his first interest payment in April
2001, at which time Stewart was assuring everyone, including Bolson, that there were just
temporary glitches holding up the money and all would eventually be fine. R1467:181,
183; R1470:195, 617, 621. Bolson even told Milt Priest who was one of the last to invest
in December 2000 that The Program made some late payments. R1470:466-67. Priest
still invested notwithstanding this disclosure.
Viewing all of the relevant evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, it is
impossible to conclude that The Program was not making payments until the spring of
2001 at the earliest, at which time Stewart personally reassured investors there was no
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problem. R1467:181, 183; R1470:195. 617, 621. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude
that Bolson willfully omitted telling any investor about payment problems before that
time in light of the fact that all these witnesses had already invested before problems
arose. Accordingly, the trial court's finding otherwise is clearly erroneous.
Started another way, even viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's decision,
evidence that Bolson willfully made material misstatements of fact or omitted material
facts in connection with the sale of any security "is so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable . . . that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that
element." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993).
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Bolson's motion to arrest judgment
and Bolson's convictions for securities fraud should be vacated.
B.

The State failed to present sufficient evidence that Bolson willfully
sold an unregistered security or engaged in a pattern of unlawful
activity, and the trial court's contrary finding is clearly erroneous.

The basis for Bolson's claim that she should not have been convicted for
engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity is that she did not willfully commit securities
fraud violations. Therefore, the outcome of Bolson's appeal as to the charge of engaging
in a pattern of unlawful activity is contingent upon this Court's holding relative to the
securities fraud charges and will not be reargued here, other than to say that Bolson's
conviction ou this count must also be vacated if the securities fraud charges are vacated.
Bolson was also convicted on one count of selling an unregistered security in
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violation of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-7. Under this provision, the offer or sale of any
unregistered security is unlawful, unless it is exempt. "'Sale' or 'sell5 includes every
contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security
for value. 'Offer' or 'offer to sell' includes every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security for value." Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-13 (22) (a) (b). This language is identical to the federal Securities Act. 15
U.S.C. §77b (3). The trial court determined that there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to conclude that Bolson sold The Program to investors. R1357.
The offer or sale of a security requires both the intent and the ability to complete
the transaction. See, United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772 (1979) (explaining that
an offer and sale occurred when respondent "placed sell orders with the brokers; the
brokers, acting as agents [of respondent], executed the orders; and the results were
contracts of sale"); United States SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1997)
("by advertising, offering shares, and accepting payment... [defendant] did everything
necessary to complete the offer and sales of the unregistered securities .. ."); see also,
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429 (1981) ("Obtaining a loan secured by a pledge
of shares of stock unmistakably involves a 'disposition of [an] interest in a security, for
value5")- The State's evidence in this case also had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Bolson willfully offered or sold an unregistered security. State v. Wallace, 124 P.3d
at 262.
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Construing the relevant evidence relative to an actual sale or offering in a light
most favorable to the jury verdict and therefore disregarding Bolson's contrary testimony,
Bolson acted as the contact person for Paul Stewart and was "the facev of The Program
for many investors. R1466:51, 95; R1467:171-72; R1468:336, 356, 389; R1470:468,
492, 505, 510. She explained The Program in glowing terms, told investors it was a safe
investment, and encouraged them to invest. R1466:55-7, 80, 122, 142; R1467:176, 191;
R1468:336, 347-48, 390; R1470:508-09.
When Bolson explained The Program to Michelle Jacobsen, Elolson would
periodically turn to Stewart who was also present and ask, "Is that about right?"
R1466:51-2, 96. Paul Devenport testified that Bolson contacted him and told him
someone was interested in purchasing Devenport's home through The Program.
R1467:175-76. Milt Priest and his wife testified that when they contacted Bolson, she
told them they had to invest quickly because The Program was getting "full", and that
they were given the understanding that they had to finance through MSF. R1470:509,
526. Although Bolson was not a loan officer, she had some involvement in the financing
aspect for some investors. R1467:179; Rl468:338, 356. Bolson told both Milt and
Richard Priest that they qualified for The Program. R1468:395; R1470:471.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that Bolson told investors that Paul Stewart
"was the person [in charge of] The Program" and she ultimately referred investors to
Stewart if they wanted to invest. R1467.T91; R1468:363, 393; R1470:470, 506, 508-09;
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R1471:857, 950-51. Bolson had no knowledge, ability or authority to take investment
funds, to structure an investment transaction, to actually offer a security, or to otherwise
initiate or complete a sale, nor did she have any direct or indirect involvement with the
investment monies or the trust account where those monies were supposed to have been
kept. R1470:597-98; R1471:864, 885. Bolson was not the loan officer on any loan, she
did not sign any loan or other documents, and she did not participate nor was she present
at any loan closing. R1470:491, 521-22.
The question then becomes: Can a person be found guilty of willfully selling or
offering an unregistered security if they cannot actually offer or sell it? Bolson was
clearly enthusiastic about The Program and there is evidence she promoted33 it and
encouraged potential investors to participate.
She was not the only one.
Every single investor in this case testified that they first became interested in The
Program after engaging in presumably enthusiastic and glowing conversations with
family members or friends who were already invested in a no-risk "too good to be true"
scheme that would make them all insanely wealthy - although only Paul Stewart knew
how that could happen. See, e.g., R1466:48-50, 59, 116-17, 121; R1467:171-72;
R1468:354-55, 360, 388; R1470:464-66, 503. By the time these people contacted Bolson,

33

This colloquial use of this term should not be confused with the term "promoter"
as defined in Utah Code Ann. §61-1-13 (21).
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they already had the proverbial dollar signs in their eyes. Id. Therefore, if Bolson's
enthusiastic telling about The Program constitutes a felony offer or sale, every similarly
enthusiastic investor in this case is equally culpable.
If Bolson's conduct of explaining The Program and referring potential investors
to Stewart constitutes an unlawful offer or sale, people already invested who explained
their good fortune to family and friends then referred those potential investors to Bolson
also engaged in the unlawful offer or sale of unregistered securities.
Construed in a light most favorable to the jury's decision, the evidence in this
case supports a finding that Bolson promoted The Program under the direction of Paul
Stewart. The evidence does not, however, support a finding that she offered or sold any
security. In the context of securities, promoting is not synonymous with offering or
selling. The case law cited above indicates that a defendant must have both the intent
and the ability to complete the sale. See, e.g., United States v. Naftalin, supra. Bolson
had neither. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Bolson did anything
more than tell people about The Program and act as an intermediary for Stewart. While
there is evidence that Bolson participated in the financing process for some investors,
there is insufficient evidence to conclude that her participation was more than clerical.
Therefore, the trial court's finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude that Bolson offered or sold any security is clearly erroneous.
Bolson lacked the knowledge, ability and authority to structure or consummate
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any transaction in this case. R1471:597-98, 864, 885. Investors understood that her
knowledge was based upon what Stewart told her. R1466:94, 122,142; R1468:394, 44344; R1470:468, 492, 505, 510. Bolson had no authority, capability, or responsibility to
take or otherwise manage investment funds. R1471:597-98, 864, 885. Bolson was not a
signatory on the trust account where monies were supposed to be held. R1467.191;
R1468:363; R1469:715-16; R1470:470, 506. Bolson never took an investment check or
signed an investment contract. R1467:191; R1468:363; R1469:715-16; R1470:470, 506.
She was not a loan officer and was not present during any closing, nor did she sign any
loan documents. R1467:235-36; R1469:690-91, 700-02, 708-09. Bolson's involvement
was less than that of loan officers Mark Turney and Ryan Nay, who not only promoted
The Program, but unlike Bolson they directly arranged financing for investors and shared
their personal testimonials of its viability. R1467: 219-20, 221, 227-28, 243, 250-51;
R1470:491, 521-22.
The State's and the trial court's comments during Bolson's sentencing in this
case are illuminating. The prosecutor agreed that it would not be appropriate to send
Bolson to prison for the several felonies she was convicted of. R1473:27. The State
conceded that while the chances of recidivism were nil, Bolson's liability stemmed from
her not "opening her eyes to there being a problem" (R1473:28). The trial court noted
that while Bolson perhaps "portrayed herself as an insider" in this case, she did so out of
"genuine helpfulness, a good natured desire to help other people." R1473:33. The trial
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court further noted it was apparent that Bolson truly believed in The Program and there
was no evidence that Bolson profitted directly from it; and that while her involvement
went beyond that of other investors, she was as duped and victimized as anyone else who
participated in it. R1473:35-8.
Based on the foregoing facts and law, Bolson did not engage in the offer or sale
of securities. If Bolson's conviction for offer or sale of an unregistered security is upheld
on these facts, that decision will effectively create a strict liability standard under Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-7. Any friend who enthusiastically and in good faith tells another
friend about a "too good to be true" scheme with the hope that they will buy into the
scheme and thereby share in the good fortune, and then refers that friend to the principal
who actually has the ability to structure and complete the deal, will be deemed to have
willfully offered or sold a security with "a conscious objective or desire to [offer or sell
the security] or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(1). If that is true, the State
should have prosecuted almost every witness in this case and every other enthusiastic
investor who told someone else about The Program.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts, law, and argument, Bolson respectfully requests
this Court to find that she did not act willfully relative to the charges in this case, the State
presented insufficient evidence that she acted willfully and the trial court's contrary
findings are clearly erroneous, and to vacate her convictions.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
UTAH CODE ANN. §§61-1-1 AND 61-1-21

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-21:
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates any provision of this
chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or order
under this chapter, or who willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made
to be false or misleading in any material respect.
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1:
(a)
is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was
committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought
to be obtained was worth less than $10,000;
(b)
is guilty of a second degree felony if:
(i)
at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or
thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth
$10,000 or more; or
(ii)
(A) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money,
or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was
worth less than $10,000; and
(B) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly
accepted any money representing:
(I) equity in a person's home
(II) a withdrawal from any individual retirement
account; or
(III) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan
as defined in the Internal Revenue Code; or
(c)
is guilty of a second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of not less than three years or more than 15 years if:

(i)

(ii)

at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or
thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth
$10,000 or more; and
in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly
accepted any money representing:
(A) equity in a person's home;
(B) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or
(C) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined
in the Internal Revenue Code.

(3)

No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he proves
that he had no knowledge of the rule or order.

(4)

In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter, the
sentencing judge may impose any penalty or remedy provided for in Subsection
61-l-20(2)(b).

ADDENDUM B
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF
(sans exhibits)

SHANNON ROMERO (7974)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
Fax:(801) 532-0330

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT
AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT THEREOF

vs.

RENAE REID BOLSON,
Defendant.

:
:

Case No. 021100413
JUDGE STEPHEN ROTH

Defendant RENAE REID BOLSON, by and through counsel SHANNON ROMERO,
hereby moves this Court to arrest judgment in the above-numbered matter pursuant to Rule 23 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence. This matter proceeded to a jury trial, which began on June 14th and
ended June 18, 2004. The jury returned a verdict finding Ms. Bolson guilty of Securities Fraud
as set forth in counts IV (Paul Devenport), V (Mark Albright), VI (Richard Priest and Sean
Pearson), and VII (Milt and Linda Priest). The jury also found Ms. Bolson guilty of the sale of
an unregistered security, sale of a security by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, and guilty of
engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity. Ms. Bolson was acquitted of Securities Fraud as set
forth in counts I (Michelle Jacobsen) and III (John Taylor), while count II (Tom Barberi) was
dismissed by the court after defense counsel moved for a directed verdict at the close of the
state's case and prior to the case being submitted to the jury.

L

GENERAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
RENAE Bolson is the general manager of a local mortgage broker company, Main Street

Financial. Calvin Paul Stewart represented himself to be an investment banker involved with a
number of investments. Between August of 1999 through June 2001, the state alleged that Ms.
Bolson acted with Mr. Stewart to offer or sell a security called the "program" through
misrepresentation, fraud or deceit, to the following individuals: (1) Michelle Jacobsen; (2) Tom
Barberi; (3) John Taylor; (4) Paul Devenport; (5) Mark Albright; (6) Richard Priest and Sean
Pearson; and (7) Milt and Linda Priest. The state further alleged that Ms. Bolson sold an
unregistered security without a license, and the totality of this conduct constitutes a pattern of
unlawful activity (Racketeering), a second degree felony.
The jury returned a verdict finding Ms. Bolson not guilty with respect to count I involving
Michelle Jacobsen; not guilty with regard to count III, involving John Taylor; guilty of securities
fraud as set forth in counts IV through VII; guilty of count VIII, the sale of an unregistered
security; guilty of count IX, the sale of a security by an unlicensed broker/dealer or agent; and
guilty of count X, engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity/racketeering.
A,

Tom Barberi2
With regard to Tom Barberi, although this count was dismissed at the close of the state's

1

All facts set forth here are taken directly from trial testimony. Testimony and evidence
relating to counts I and III, involving Michelle Jacobsen and John Taylor, is not recited herein as
Ms. Bolson was acquitted of both counts. Notably, Ms. Jacobsen was alleged to have been the
victim of securities fraud during the last quarter of 1999 while Mr. Taylor was alleged to have
been a victim in June of 2000.
2

Ryan Nay, who purchased Mr. Barberi's home, testified that The Program paid his
mortgage payments up until February 2001 and that it was not until February of 2001 that he
began having problems with payments. (Trial Tr. 244.)
2

ooc

case on defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the state was permitted to rely upon Mr.
Barberi's testimony for the purpose of other counts charged in the information over defense
counsel's objection. Mr, Barberi sold a home and invested in the program in November of 1999
but he had no contact with ReNae Bolson with regard to this transaction. (Trial Tr. 325-326.)
Mr. Barberi testified that he received monthly payments regularly for about a year,
beginning in January of 2000. (Trial Tr. 312.) Mr. Barberi was also to receive quarterly
payments. (Trial Tr. 312.) Mr. Barberi testified he had contact with Ms. Bolson toward the end
of 2000 when one of the later quarterly payments bounced.3 (Trial Tr. 312.) He contacted Ms.
Bolson and she reassured him that Mr. Stewart would be making a funds transfer and a new
check would be coming soon. (Trial Tr. 312-314.) Mr. Barberi testified he did in fact receive a
cashier's check for the quarterly payment which had previously bounced. (Trial Tr. 317.)
Mr. Barberi testified that he would call Ms. Bolson if he had any problems with his
checks. (Trial Tr. 313.) Subsequently, after the first check bounced, Mr. Barberi testified that
several other checks bounced. (Trial Tr. 314.) However, Mr. Barberi testified inconsistently that
after the first check bounced in the first part of 2000, he received payments in the form of
cashier's checks only, which he picked up at Main Street Financial. (Trial Tr. 316.) Mr. Barberi
further testified that 12 to 14 months after he sold his house, the checks stopped coming
altogether. (Trial Tr. 315.)
B.

Paul Devenport (Count IV)
3

All testimony offered by Mr. Barberi which occurred after his investment was objected
to by defense counsel as having no relevance to the sale or offer of a security; however, such
testimony was admitted over defense objections. Defense counsel further objected to evidence
relating to Mr. Barberi remaining part of the state's case following the court's order dismissing
the charge upon the defense motion for a directed verdict. The court permitted the evidence.
3
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Paul Devenport testified that he was told about the program by a family friend, Terry
Young, who then referred him to ReNae Bolson, (Trial Tr. 171-172.) Mr. Devenport testified
that he spoke with Ms. Bolson and she explained the program to him in February of 2000. (Trial
Tr. 172-174.) At that time, he did not invest because "it sounded too good to be true." (Trial Tr.
172.) Later, Ms. Bolson and Mr. Devenport again discussed the program. (Trial Tr. 175-176.)
According to Mr. Devenport's testimony, Ms. Bolson contacted him in October or November of
2000, informing him that there was a buyer who was interested in a home he had for sale in St.
George. (Trial Tr. 175-176.)
According to Mr. Devenport's testimony, Ms. Bolson informed him a lot of people had
done well with the program, that her mother's home was in the program, and that no one had any
problems getting their money. (Trial Tr. 176.) Mr. Devenport testified that Ms. Bolson told him
that he would carry a note on his home for two years, during which time he would receive nine
percent annual interest in quarterly payments, and at the end of the two years, he would receive
his money back. (Trial Tr. 176.) Between October of 2000 until the time Mr. Devenport closed
on the home, he had several conversations with Ms. Bolson regarding title work and escrow
information. (Trial Tr. 177.) Although Mr. Devenport testified that Ms. Bolson did not discuss
Paul Stewart with him at any time prior to his investment, he did admit on cross- examination
that he had previously stated, under oath, that Ms. Bolson told him about Mr. Stewart in October
or November of 2000 and that Stewart was the person who had the program; this information
was conveyed prior to Mr. Devenport's investment being made. (Trial Tr. 177; 190-191; 202.)
Mr. Devenport invested in the program in December 2000. (Trial Tr. 180; State's Exhibit
18.) Mr. Devenport expected an interest payment in April 2001. (Trial Tr. 181.) Attorney's
4
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Title was the title company involved with the sale of Mr. Devenport's home. (Trial Tr. 193-195.)
When Mr. Devenport did not receive his April payment, he called Ms. Bolson, who informed
him the money was forthcoming. (Trial Tr. 181.)
C.

Mark Albright (Count V)
Mark Albright testified that he became aware of the program through his cousin, John

Taylor. (Trial Tr. 334; 352-353.) He testified that Mr. Taylor explained the program to him and
based on that explanation, he refinanced his home for the sole purpose of investing in the
program. (Trial Tr. 334-335; 352-355.) This refinance occurred in January 2001. (Trial Tr.
357.) Mr. Albiight further testified the refinance of his home was done through Main Street
Financial and he had spoken with Ms. Bolson a few times on the phone regarding the refinance.
(Trial Tr. 356.) Regarding any information Ms. Bolson provided to Mr. Albright prior to his
investment, Mr. Albright testified as follows:
She talked a lot about Clay Harrison, Paul Stewart. Clay Harrison was the
one that was going to hold my money and that Paul Stewart was using it for - not
to invest but to leverage against, through the governmenmt [sic] and that the
money wasn't going to be touched and at any time I could get out of The Program
if I wanled to but we more talked about how to get my house financed at the that
time, you know, initially the first phone calls.
(Trial Tr. 336.)
The first time Mr. Albright met Ms. Bolson was the night he signed the closing
documents on his home refinance loan. (Trial .Tr. 356.) Ms, Bolson had taken the loan
documents to Mr. Albright's home because it was more convenient for Mr. Albright. (Trial Tr.
359.) The testimony at trial reflected that Mark Turney, from Main Street Financial, was the loan
officer who was responsible for putting together the paperwork for the loan refinance. (Trial Tr.
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357.)
At this point, Mr. Albright's loan had already been applied for and the documentation
was already filled out. Mr. Albright, according to his testimony, had already decided to invest
based on what John Taylor, his cousin, had told him about the program. (Trial Tr. 360.) Mr.
Albright further testified that Ms. Bolson told him his money
would go and be held by Clay Harrison and it's not to be used for any investing.
It's not to be touched. It's to be maintained in a trust or in escrow and that I
would receive a certified on it of holding and that Paul Stewart would leverage it
and make an outrageous amount of interest on the money.
(Trial Tr. 347.) Mr. Albright testified Ms. Bolson told him Mr. Stewart made these investments
out of the country, that he was a humanitarian and "it was just something to do through the
government that they leveraged this money through against the pool of money that Clay Harrison
was holding for us." (Trial Tr. 347.)

Finally, Mr. Albright testified that Ms. Bolson told him

The Program would make the payments on the loan and then at the end of two years, he would
receive the title to his home in addition to the initial investment. (Trial Tr. 347.)
Sheree Albright, Mark Albright's wife, also testified that when Ms. Bolson arrived at the
Albright home, the program was discussed. (Trial Tr. 373.) Ms. Albright testified that questions
were asked about the program and Ms. Bolson responded to them. (Trial Tr. 375.) Ms.
Albright further testified, however, that the night Ms. Bolson came to her home with documents
to be signed, her husband, Mark Albright, had already made the decision to invest. (Trial Tr.
383; 385.)
D.

Richard Priest and Sean Pearson (Count VI)
Richard Priest testified he had become aware of the program from a co-worker named
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Jade Sewell. (Trial Tr. 388.) Mr. Sewell informed Mr. Priest about a program involving the
investment of home equity and in return, The Program would pay your mortgage. (Trial Tr. 389.)
Mr. Sewell was already invested in the program and referred Richard Priest to ReNae Bolson.
(Trial Tr. 389; 392.) Mr. Sewell told Mr. Priest Paul Stewart was involved with The Program,
was the person who worked out all of the details and did the investing. (Trial Tr. 420-421.) Mr.
Sewell also told Mr. Priest that because Mr. Stewart was so difficult to get in touch with, ReNae
Bolson would be the better contact person. (Trial Tr. 421.)
Mr. Priest contacted Ms. Bolson and asked her questions about the program. (Trial Tr.
390.) Mr. Priest testified that Ms. Bolson explained how the program worked. (Trial Tr. 390391.) Mr. Priest further testified Ms. Bolson informed him that Paul Stewart was the investor for
the program and that it was Paul's program. (Trial Tr. 393.) According to Mr. Priest, "[ReNae]
wasn't real forthcoming with a lot of information." (Trial Tr. 394.)
Richard Priest testified Ms. Bolson told him that
[the properties] were closed at Attorney's Title but that also was where this money
was kept in escrow, you know, the one-third of the money that we invested and
that was in escrow at Attorney's Title and it was my understanding that it would
never leave there, it was always there because if we ever wanted to get out of The
Program all we'd have to do is give them a notice, I don't know, a month or so
notice and we could get out of The Program and get our money back. The only
problem would be that we wouldn't -• our mortgages wouldn't be paid and you
know, all of that wouldn't be paid. So that was the incentive to keep the money
in.
(Trial Tr. 395-396.) Mr. Priest also testified that Ms. Bolson told him the mortgage payments
would be made by The Program. (Trial Tr. 404.)

In addition, Ms. Bolson informed Mr. Priest

that he did not have to worry about the interest rate on the loans because The Program would be
making the payments. (Trial Tr. 405.) According to Mr. Priest, checks were sent to pay the
7
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mortgages on two of the properties he had in the program, but neither check cleared. (Trial Tr.
405.) One of those payments was from April 26, 2001. (See State's Exhibit 45.)
E,

Milt and Linda Priest (Count VII)
Milt and Linda Priest testified that they became aware of the program through Richard

Priest. (Trial Tr.464-465.) Richard pulled them aside before Christmas and explained the
program to them and told them he had personally invested. (Trial Tr. 464-465.) Richard
explained how the program worked and gave them Ms. Bolson's phone number. (Trial Tr. 465466.) Milt Priest testified his brother Richard arranged a meeting and that Richard, Milt and
ReNae met and discussed the program. (Trial Tr. 466.)

Ms. Bolson explained the program to

Milt Priest generally and informed him Paul Stewart was the person who controlled the money
and investments. (Trial Tr. 467-468; 470) Specifically, Ms. Bolson informed Milt Priest that
you borrowed money against your house and - our situation is our house is paid
for and so we borrowed like $300,000 and a third of it went into the program and
with this $100,000 they put it kind of in an escrow account type thing. And then
they would make the payments on the whole $300,000, on the whole loan against
the house and after about two years this money that they had, the $100,000, they
would evidently make enough off of that to - after two years or thereabouts pay
off the whole loan and then you would have your house clear. If you didn't own
your house or with us we would have the extra two-thirds, you know, of the
money, you know.
(Trial Tr. 467-468.) Thereafter, Milt informed his wife about the program and she and Milt met
with Ms. Bolson again. (Trial Tr. 470.)
Ms. Bolson again informed Milt and Linda that Paul Stewart was handling the
investment. (Trial Tr. 506.) Ms. Bolson provided Milt and Linda with information about Paul
Stewart, including his background. (Trial Tr. 507-508.) Notably, Milt Priest also obtained
information about the program from Mark Turney and Jade Sewell, and he was also aware
8
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Michelle Jacobsen was an investor. (Trial Tr. 485-486; 491.)
The Priests subsequently invested b> refinancing their home. The refinance of their home
was complete on February 2, 2001. (Trial Tr. 490.) On February 6, 2001, the Priest's issued a
money order to Clay Harrison for the purpose of investment in the program. (State's Exhibit 49.)
The Priests were informed the mortgage/loan payments would be late from time to time but that
the program would pay late fees. (Trial Tr. 48-479; 513.)
II

RACKETEERING
The state argued at trial that Ms. Bolson used "monies that came from the securities fraud

to operate an enterprise, Main Street Financial." (Trial Tr. 1053.) The state further argued,
without any support, "Main Street Financial... was keeping it's doors open through the loan
origination fees of two percent." (Trial Tr. 1053.) Specifically, the state argued that Ms. Bolson
personally used monies gained from The Program to operate Main Street Financial. (Trial Tr.
1053.)
A.

Monies from Securities Fraud

Paul Devenport's home was purchased by Michelle Jacobsen. (Trial Tr. 177.) With the
proceeds from the sale of his home, Mr. Devenport paid off a second mortgage, received
$144,000 cash, and the remainder of the sale proceeds were represented by a note he was to carry
for two years on the property as part of his participation in the program. (Trial Tr. 179-180.)
The amount thstt was secured by the trust deed/note was $144,000. (Trial Tr. 180.) There was
no testimony involving any payments made by Mr. Devenport going to Main Street Financial,
Mark Albright testified he refinanced the home belonging to himself and his wife in order
to borrow money to invest in the program. (Trial Tr. 338.) Mr. Albright testified he invested
9
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$41,000 in The Program. (Trial Tr. 349.) Mr. Albright refinanced his home through Main Street
Financial and Mark Turney was the loan officer. (Trial Tr. 357; State's Exhibit 34.) A loan
origination fee was charged for this refinance, which is standard on ANY home loan. (Trial Tr.
208-209.)
Richard Priest testified he refinanced his condominium in order to obtain funds to invest
in the program. (Trial. Tr. 397-398.) In addition, Mr. Priest bought a home in West Valley and
it was also in The Program. (Trial Tr. 404.) There were loan origination fees, processing fees,
and underwriting fees associated with the loan. (Trial Tr. 405.)
Milt Priest testified that he borrowed money against his house to invest in The Program.
(Trial Tr. 468-469.) He obtained the loan against his home through Main Street Financial, which
received a loan origination fee. (Trial Tr. 477.)
B.

Main Street Financial

Evidence at trial presented by a joint witness for the state and defense demonstrated Brent
Reed, ReNae Bolson's brother, owned Main Street Financial at least from 1997 through 2000.
(Trial Tr. 206.) Ryan Nay, a mortgage loan officer employed by Main Street Financial from
1997 through 2000 testified that when he worked at Main Street Financial, Ms. Bolson was the
manager of Main Street Financial. (Trial Tr. 205.) Mr. Nay further testified that a percentage of
loan origination fees associated with a mortgage loan were given to loan officers as commissions.
(Trial Tr. 213.) Finally, Mr. Nay testified that yield spread premiums were rebates given to a
mortgage broker from the lending institution. (Trial Tr. 210-211.) Such premiums do not come
out of the borrower's proceeds and are not paid by a seller. (Trial Tr. 211.)
C.

Monies Received by ReNae Bolson
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The state offered absolutely no testimony or evidence demonstrating Ms. Bolson received
any compensation, proceeds, commissions or olher benefit from The Program. Instead, the state
argued that because Ms. Bolson maintained her employment at Main Street Financial during the
existence of the program, she benefitted because the doors to Main Street Financial remained
open and she continued to receive a salary during the period of time The Program was in
existence. However, the state ignored the fact that Ms. Bolson worked for Main Street Financial
since 1992 and remained working at Main Street Financial, after the program collapsed.
Furthermore, the state presented no evidence that but for the four loan origination fees obtained
through mortgage loans involved with The Program, Ms. Bolson would have been unemployed.
III. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally
ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting
judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is
entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defendant is
charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be just and proper
under the circumstances.
Pursuant to this standard, either on appellate review or pursuant to Rule 23, the court reviews the
evidence to determine whether "there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the
charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991). This standard requires the court to view
"the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most
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favorable to the jury verdict. It is only when the evidence as viewed in this light is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt that it is proper to overturn the conviction." IcL at 784-85. See also State v.
Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, 3 P.3d 192, 194-95 ("the 'trial court may arrest a jury verdict when
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive qr so inherently
improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to that element.'" (Citations omitted)).
B.

SECURITIES FRAUD CONVICTIONS - GENERALLY4
Ms. Bolson was convicted of four counts of Securities Fraud, Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-1

to 61-1-21. As presented to the jury, the state was required to prove that
the defendant, in connection with the offer or sale of a security, directly or
indirectly, to a person, made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state
material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
In addition, the state had to demonstrate that at the time of the statements, the property, money or
thing unlawfully obtained or sought was valued at more than $10,000. (Trial Tr. 1009-1012.)
Moreover, the state was required prove any untrue statement of material fact or omitted material
facts were made by Ms. Bolson with knowledge of the falsity of the misstatements or with

4

In addressing the securities fraud convictions, defense counsel has not addressed Paul
Stewart's bankruptcy or the Cease and Desist Order, State's Exhibit 66, because Ms. Bolson was
acquitted with respect to the offense involving Michelle Jacobsen, which is alleged to have
occurred during the last quarter of 1999. The charge involving Tom Barberi, which was
dismissed on motion for direct verdict, was alleged to have occurred in November 1999 (Trial Tr.
309). The charge involving John Taylor was alleged to have occurred in June of 2000. The
bankruptcy dated back to 1988 and the Cease and Desist Order was issued March 7, 2000. (Trial
Tr. 669.) Accordingly, neither of these documents could have formed a basis for conviction with
respect to any of the other remaining charges.
12
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knowledge of the omitted facts. Essentially, the state was required to prove that Ms. Bolson
acted with more than negligence, carelessness or foolishness, and that Ms. Bolson acted with the
conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts. (Trial Tr. 1015.)
The stale presented evidence Calvin Paul Stewart had previously filed for bankruptcy in
1988, which was discharged in 1996. (Trial Tr. 652; State's Exhibit 59.) The state also
presented evidence that a cease and desist order had been issued by the Utah Division of
Securities on March 7, 2000, ordering Mr. Stewart and Carson International cease from engaging
in the offer or sale of securities in the state of Utah. (Trial Tr. 669-670; State's Exhibit 66-) The
Cease and Desist Order was specifically served on Carlson International and Paul Stewart via
certified mail. (Trial Tr. 670.-671.) The order was never sent to ReNae Bolson or Main Street
Financial. (Trial Tr. 671.) Moreover, such information did not and would not appear on a credit
report, according to the state's expert. (Trial Tr. 671.)
Through the state's expert witness, Steven Taggart, defense counsel elicited testimony
that the bankruptcy appeared nowhere on Mr. Stewart's June 3, 1999, credit report. (Trial Tr.
667; Defense Exhibit A.) It was later elicited Ms. Bolson had access to Mr. Stewart's credit
report. (Trial Tr. 701-702; Defense Exhibit A.)
The state argued to the jury Ms. Bolson should have sought out information about Calvin
Paul Stewart and that the failure to do so rendered her culpable. (Trial Tr. 1049; 10791080; 1082.) That is not the law, and it is not the instruction that was given to the jury. (Trial
Tr. 780.)5 In response to this argument made by the state, the court ruled that none of the case
5

When the prosecutor was arguing against defense counsel's motion for a directed
verdict, the prosecutor argued that the case should survive directed verdict because the defendant
had a duty to inquire and her failure to inquire was sufficient to constitute deliberately blinding
13
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law offered or argued by the state supported an instruction or argument by the state that Ms.
Bolson had a duty to seek information.
1. PAUL DEVENPORT
Paul Devenport testified that he was told about the program by a family friend, Terry
Young, who then referred him to ReNae Bolson. (Trial Tr. 171-172.) Mr. Devenport testified he
spoke with Ms. Bolson and she explained the program to him in February of 2000. (Trial Tr.
172-174.) At that time, he did not invest because "it sounded too good to be true." (Trial Tr.
172.) Later, Ms. Bolson and Mr. Devenport again discussed the program. (Trial Tr. 175-176.)
According to Mr. Devenport's testimony, Ms. Bolson contacted him in October or November of
2000, informing him that there was a buyer who was interested in a home he had for sale in St.
George. (Trial Tr. 175-176.)
According to Mr. Devenport's testimony, Ms. Bolson informed him a lot of people had
done well with the program, that her mother's home was in the program, and no one had any
problems getting their money. (Trial Tr. 176.) Mr. Devenport testified Ms. Bolson told him he
would carry a note on his home for two years, during which time he would receive nine percent
annual interest in quarterly payments, and at the end of the two years, he would receive his
money back. (Trial Tr. 176.) Between October of 2000 until the time Mr. Devenport closed on
the home, he had several conversations with Ms. Bolson regarding title work and escrow
information. (Trial Tr. 177.)
Mr. Devenport invested in the program in December 2000. (Trial Tr. 180; State's Exhibit

herself to facts. (Trial Tr. 767- 770; 779-780.) The court concluded that the state could not rely
on a duty to disclose theory with regard to meeting the elements of its case against Ms. Bolson.
(Trial Tr. 780-781.)
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18.) Mr. Devenport expected an interest payment in April 2001. (Trial Tr. 181.) Attorney's
Title was the title company involved with the sale of Mr. Devenport's home. (Trial Tr. 193-195.)
When Mr. Devenport did not receive his April payment, he called Ms. Bolson, who informed
him the money was forthcoming. (Trial Tr. 181.)
The state failed to present any evidence lhat any of the statements Ms. Bolson made to
Mr. Devenport at the time he invested in the program, were made with more than negligence,
carelessness or foolishness. Moreover, the state wholly failed to demonstrate Ms. Bolson acted
with the conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts. Ms. Bolson did make
statements regarding the program, however, such statements were made with the belief they were
true. In addition, at the time Mr. Devenport invested, Ms. Bolson did not have any reason to
believe that the statements she made were in any way false. Ms. Bolson's belief in the veracity
of Mr. Stewart and The Program may have been misplaced, careless and foolish, but it was not
criminal.
Given the paucity of evidence presented by the state, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence was so sufficiently inconclusive that a jury must
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to Ms. Bolson's guilt. Accordingly, we ask this court to
arrest the judgment on this count.
2.

Mark Albright

Mark Albright testified he became aware of the program through his cousin, John Taylor.
(Trial Tr. 334; 352-353.) He testified that Mr. Taylor explained the program to him and based on
that, he refinanced his home for the sole purpose of investing in the program. (Trial Tr. 334335; 352-355.) The refinance occurred in January 2001. (Trial Tr. 357.) Mr. Albright testified
15

00C3

that the refinance of his home was done through Main Street Financial and he had spoken with
Ms, Bolson a few times on the phone regarding the refinance. (Trial Tr. 356.) Regarding any
information Ms. Bolson provided to Mr. Albright prior to his investment, Mr. Albright testified
as follows:
She talked a lot about Clay Harrison, Paul Stewart. Clay Harrison was the
one that was going to hold my money and that Paul Stewart was using it for - not
to invest but to leverage against, through the government [sic] and that the money
wasn't going to be touched and at any time I could get out of The Program if I
wanted to but we more talked about how to get my house financed at the that time,
you know, initially the first phone calls.
(Trial Tr. 336.)
The first time Mr. Albright met Ms. Bolson was the night he signed the closing
documents on his home refinance loan for the purpose of getting funds to invest in the program.
(Trial Tr. 356.) At this point, the loan had already been applied for and the documentation was
already filled out; Mr. Albright, according to his testimony, had already decided to invest based
on what John Taylor, his cousin, had told him about the program. (Trial Tr. 360.) Mr. Albright
further testified Ms. Bolson told him his money
would go and be held by Clay Harrison and it's not to be used for any investing.
It's not to be touched. It's to be maintained in a trust or in escrow and that I
would receive a certified on it of holding and that Paul Stewart would leverage it
and make an outrageous amount of interest on the money.
(Trial Tr. 347.) Mr. Albright testified Ms. Bolson told him Mr. Stewart made these investments
out of the country, that he was a humanitarian and "it was just something to do through the
government that they leveraged this money through against the pool of money that Clay Harrison
was holding for us." (Trial Tr. 347.)

Finally, Mr. Albright testified Ms. Bolson told him the

program would make the payments on the loan and then at the end of two years, he would receive
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the title to his home in addition to the initial investment. (Trial Tr. 347.)
Again, the state failed to demonstrate or present any evidence Ms. Bolson misstated or
omitted any material facts; all evidence presented at trial showed the opposite: Ms. Bolson
believed the statements she made to be true. In addition, at the time Mr. Albright invested, Ms.
Bolson did not have any reason to believe that the statements she made were in any way false.
Without that showing, Ms. Bolson cannot logically be held liable under Utah law.
Both Mr. Albright and his wife Sheree Albright testified at trial. Mr. Albright was the
person making the investment. Mr. Albright testified that he made the decision to invest based
on information given to him about the program by John Taylor. Mr. Albright jfurther testified
that the sole purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan on his property was to invest the proceeds in
The Program. At the point Mr. Albright first met Ms. Bolson and spoke with her, the paperwork
was already in plcice to obtain the loan to invest. Again, Mr. Albright was sold into the program
by his cousin, John Taylor, not Ms. Bolson. The state presented no evidence that in connection
with the offer or sale of a security, Ms. Bolson made false statements or omitted material
information given to Mr. Albright. He had already made the investment decision prior to any
deals with Ms. Bolson.
Given the scant of evidence presented by the state, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence was so sufficiently inconclusive that a jury must have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to Ms. Bolson's guilt. Accordingly, we ask this court to arrest
the judgment on this count.
3. Richard Priest and Sean Pearson (Count VI)
Richard Priest testified he had become aware of the program from a co-worker named
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Jade Sewell. (Trial Tr. 388.) Mr. Sewell informed Mr. Priest about a program involving the
investment of home equity and in return, the program would pay your mortgage. (Trial Tr. 389.)
Mr. Sewell was already invested in the program and referred Richard Priest to ReNae Bolson.
(Trial Tr. 389; 392.) Mr. Sewell told Mr. Priest Paul Stewart was involved with the program,
was the person who worked out all of the details and did the investing. (Trial Tr. 420-421.) Mr.
Sewell also told Mr. Priest that because Mr. Stewart was so difficult to get in touch with, ReNae
Bolson would be the better contact person. (Trial Tr. 421.)
Mr. Priest contacted Ms. Bolson and asked her questions about the program. (Trial Tr.
390.) Mr. Priest testified Ms. Bolson explained how the program worked. (Trial Tr. 390-391.)
Mr. Priest further testified Ms. Bolson disclosed that Paul Stewart was the investor for The
Program and that it was Paul's program. (Trial Tr. 393.) According to Mr. Priest, "[ReNae]
wasn't real forthcoming with a lot of information." (Trial Tr. 394.)
Richard Priest testified that Ms. Bolson told him that
[the properties] were closed at Attorney's Title but that also was where this money
was kept in escrow, you know, the one-third of the money that we invested and
that was in escrow at Attorney's Title and it was my understanding that it would
never leave there, it was always there because if we ever wanted to get out of The
Program all we'd have to do is give them a notice, I don't know, a month or so
notice and we could get out of The Program and get our money back. The only
problem would be that we wouldn't - our mortgages wouldn't be paid and you
know, all of that wouldn't be paid. So that was the incentive to keep the money
in.
(Trial Tr. 395-396.) Mr. Priest also testified Ms. Bolson told him the mortgage payments would
be made by The Program. (Trial Tr. 404.)

In addition, Ms. Bolson informed Mr. Priest he did

not have to worry about the interest rate on the loans because The Program would be making the
payments. (Trial Tr. 405.) According to Mr. Priest, checks were sent to pay the mortgages on
18
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two of the properties he had in the program, but neither check cleared. (Trial Tr. 405.) One of
those payments was dated April 26, 2001. (See State's Exhibit 45.)
The state failed to present any evidence that any of the statements Ms. Bolson made to
Mr. Priest and Mr. Pearson at the time they invested in the program in December 2000 through
January 2001, were made with more than negligence, carelessness or foolishness. Moreover, the
state failed to demonstrate Ms. Bolson acted with the conscious objective or desire to ignore a
material fact or facts. Ms. Bolson did make statements regarding the program, however, such
statements were made with the belief that they were true. In addition, at the time Ms. Bolson
invested, Ms. Bolson did not have any reason to believe that the statements she made were in any
way false.
Given the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the state, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence was so sufficiently inconclusive that a jury
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to Ms. Bolson's guilt. Accordingly, we ask this
court to arrest the judgment on this count.
4. Milt Priest
Milt and Linda Priest testified that they became aware of the program through Richard
Priest. (Trial Tr.464-465.) Richard pulled thera aside before Christmas and explained the
program to them and told them he had personally invested. (Trial Tr. 464-465 ) Richard
explained how the program worked and gave them Ms. Bolson's phone number. (Trial Tr. 465466.) Milt Priest testified his brother Richard arranged a meeting and Richard, Milt and ReNae
met to discuss the program. (Trial Tr. 466.)

Ms. Bolson explained the program to Milt Priest

generally and informed him that Paul Stewart was the person who controlled the money and
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investments. (Trial Tr. 467-468; 470) Specifically, Ms. Bolson informed Milt Priest that
you borrowed money against your house and - our situation is our house is paid
for and so we borrowed like $300,000 and a third of it went into the program and
with this $100,000 they put it kind of in an escrow account type thing. And then
they would make the payments on the whole $300,000, on the whole loan against
the house and after about two years this money that they had, the $100,000, they
would evidently make enough off of that to - after two years or thereabouts pay
off the whole loan and then you would have your house clear. If you didn't own
your house or with us we would have the extra two-thirds, you know, of the
money, you know.
(Trial Tr. 467-468.) Thereafter, Milt informed his wife about the program and she and Milt met
with Ms. Bolson again. (Trial Tr. 470.)
Ms. Bolson again informed Milt and Linda that Paul Stewart was handling the
investment. (Trial Tr. 506.) Ms. Bolson provided Milt and Linda with information about Paul
Stewart, including his background. (Trial Tr. 507-508.) Notably, Milt Priest also obtained
information about the program from Mark Turney and Jade Sewell, and he was also aware
Michelle Jacobsen was an investor. (Trial Tr. 485-486; 491.)
The Priests subsequently invested by refinancing their home. The refinance of their home
was complete on February 2, 2001. (Trial Tr. 490.) On February 6, 2001, the Priest's issued a
money order to Clay Harrison for the purpose of investment in the program. (State's Exhibit 49.)
The Priests were informed the mortgage/loan payments would be late from time to time but that
the program would pay any associated late fees. (Trial Tr. 48-479; 513.)
The state failed to present any evidence that any of the statements Ms. Bolson made to
Mr. and Mrs. Priest prior to the time they invested in the program in the first week of February
2001, were made with more than negligence, carelessness or foolishness. Moreover, the state
failed to demonstrate Ms. Bolson acted with the conscious objective or desire to ignore a material
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fact or facts. Ms. Bolson did make statements regarding the program, however, such statements
were made with the belief that they were true. In addition, at the time the Priests invested, Ms.
Bolson did not have any reason to believe that the statements she made were in any way false.
Moreover, at that time, Ms. Bolson did inform the Priests that sometimes payments would be late
but that The Program would pay the late fees. Nothing was presented by the state to demonstrate
Ms. Bolson was aware of any problems with checks prior to this time. All of the evidence
suggests that aside from one check to Mr. Barberi that bounced and was paid within a few days
via a cashier's check, there were no problems with payment until the beginning of 2001.
Given the paucity of evidence presented by the state, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence was so sufficiently inconclusive that a jury must
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to Ms. Bolson5s guilt. Accordingly, we ask this court to
arrest the judgment on this count.
IV

COUNT X - PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY (RACKETEERING)

In order to establish a pattern of unlawful activity sufficient to demonstrate a violation of
the statute, the state must produce evidence to demonstrate that Ms. Bolson violated the Pattern
of Unlawful Activity Act, set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603. The jury was instructed
that in order to find Ms. Bolson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating this section, the
state had to prove the elements set forth injury instruction # 36. Specifically, the jury was
instructed as follows:
Instruction No. 36. Before you can find the defendant ReNae Bolson
guilty of the crime of Pattern of Unlawful Activity, Racketeering, as alleged in
Count 10 of the first amended criminal information you must find from the
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evidence all of the following elements of the crime: (1) from on or about August
1999, in the state of Utah (2) ReNae Bolson (3) through a pattern of unlawful
activity in which ReNae Bolson participated as a principal, (4) directly or
indirectly (a) used or invested any part or proceeds of the income which she
received from the specified unlawful activity to acquire, establish or operate an
enterprise; or (b) acquired or maintained any interest in or control of an enterprise;
or (c) was employed by or associated with any enterprise and conducted or
participated in the conducting of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
unlawful activities; and (5) did so intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.
(Trial Tr. 1014.) Later, the court defined principal to mean "a person who directly commits the
offense as opposed to a person who solicits, requests, commands, encourages or intentionally
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitute the offense." (Trial Tr. 1094.)
The state argued at trial that "she [Ms. Bolson] used these monies that came from the
securities fraud to operate an enterprise, Main Street Financial." (Trial Tr. 1053.) The state
further argued, without any support, "Main Street Financial was getting money from this and was
keeping it's doors open through the loan origination fees of two percent." (Trial Tr. 1053
"Emphasis added".) Finally, the state concluded it's argument on this count by contending as
follows:
Okay, so we show directly or indirectly that used the monies to operate an
enterprise or - and I think (c) is what I want to focus on, "Was employed by or
associated with any enterprise and conducted or participated in the conducting of
that enterprise's affairs through unlawful activity." So we're talking about the
enterprise. Part of the enterprise was Main Street Financial, part of the enterprise
was The Program and she certainly was associated with that enterprise, with The
Program and "conducted or participated in the conducting of the enterprise's
affairs." She was right out there in front helping people to decide, telling people
what, you know, about the program and selling the program basically to the
people.
(Trial Tr. 1053.)
Each element of the statute will be addressed separately. Subsections (1) & (2) of the
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Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act are not addressed here as they were not supported by the
evidence. Subsection (1) required proof that Ms. Bolson received proceeds from a pattern of
unlawful activity in which she acted as a principal and that she used or invested those proceeds to
acquire any interest in or establish or operate an enterprise. The state never proved that Ms.
Bolson received any proceeds from The Program. The evidence demonstraited Ms. Bolson was
employed by Main Street Financial from 1992 through the time of trial. (Trial Tr. 690.) Ms.
Bolson received her income as a salary, but received no commission. (Trial Tr. 699.) Ms.
Bolson does not have nor did she ever have an ownership interest in Main Street Financial.
(Trial Tr. 699.) Ms. Bolson can only earn about $8,000 annually due to benefits she receives and
would lose if her income were higher.
A,

ReNae Bolson Did Not Engage in a Pattern of Unlawful Activity

As previously set forth, the defense believes the jury verdicts are not supported by the
evidence presented at trial. Absent a guilty verdict or other proof with respect to three separate
violations of the Utah Securities Fraud Act, this conviction may not stand.
B.

ReNae Bolson Did Not Participate as a Principal

The jury was informed that a principal is defined as to mean "a person who directly
commits the offense as opposed to a person who solicits, requests, commands, encourages or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitute the offense." (Trial Tr.
1094.) Again, as previously noted, because the defense believes the jury verdicts regarding the
Securities Fraud violations are not supported by the evidence, a conviction may not rest on the
evidence that Ms. Bolson acted as a principal.
Moreover, to demonstrate that Ms. Bolson acted as a principal, the state had the burden of
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proving Ms. Bolson directly committed the offenses of securities fraud. All of the evidence
presented at trial demonstrates the state's theory was that Ms. Bolson was "the face" of the
program, but the state presented no evidence that Ms. Bolson ever took any money, ever invested
any of the money, or that she had any control of the funds or the securities. See generally
McAllister Trial Testimony (Trial Tr. 592-644) (identifying the Miller Brothers and Paul Stewart
as individuals involved in investments).
C.

ReNae Bolson Directly or Indirectly was Employed by or Associated with
Any Enterprise

The state failed to demonstrate the existence of The Program as an enterprise that Ms.
Bolson was employed by or associated with. An "enterprise" was defined for the jury as "any
individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust or other entity including
illicit and licit entities." (Trial Tr. 1022.) The jury was further informed that the enterprise
alleged in this case was Main Street Financial and/or The Program. (Trial Tr. 1022.) The state
presented no evidence regarding the structure of The Program, and certainly no evidence that it
was a partnership, corporation, business trust, sole proprietorship, individual or entity.
In evaluating a racketeering charge brought under state law, the court looks to other state
and federal case for guidance as the state law is virtually identical to the federal RICO statute.
State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah App. 1997). Pursuant to the federal RICO statute,
18 U.S.C. 1962(c),
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
In accordance with this definition of enterprise, it must be demonstrated that the enterprise
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alleged is "an ongoing 'structure' of persons associated through time, joined in purpose, and
organized in a manner amenable to hierarchical or consensual decision making." Jubelirer v.
Mastcard I n f l l n c , 68 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D. Wise. 1999). See generally United States v.
Turkette 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (existence of an enterprise is proven "by evidence of an
ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as
a continuing unit." ).
The only enterprise that the state could demonstrate in accordance with this definition
would be Main Street Financial. The state produced no evidence that The Program was "an
ongoing 'structure' of persons associated through time, joined in purpose, and organized in a
manner amenable to hierarchical or consensual decision making." Any evidence relating to the
structure of The Program as an entity was elicited through Dale McAllister. Even then, Dale
McAllister discussed investments generally, not The Program specifically, and denied ReNae
Bolson had any involvement with the investments. (Trial Tr. 595; 641-642.) Accordingly, the
state could only have alleged Main Street Financial as the involved enterprise in this case.
D.

ReNae Bolson Did Not Conduct or Participate in the Conduct of Main Street
Financial's Affairs Through a Pattern of Unlawful Activities

In order to demonstrate this element, the state was required to present proof that Ms.
Bolson conducted the affairs of Main Street Financial through a pattern of unlawful activity. A
pattern of unlawful activity
means engaging in conduct which constitutes the commission of at least three
episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated, but have the same
or similar purposes, results, participants, victims of methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the
episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to
each other or to the enterprise.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2).
In order to demonstrate a pattern of unlawful activity, or a pattern of racketeering activity
under RICO, it must be demonstrated the unlawful activity or racketeering activities are related
and that they constitute or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). The same is true pursuant to Utah's Pattern of
Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA), which dictates that unlawful activities "shall demonstrate
continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1602(2).
Under RICO, activities are related if they embrace "criminal acts that have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." Id. at 240, quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3575 (e). Pursuant to UPUAA, such activities are related if they "are not isolated, but
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2).
A pattern of unlawful conduct is not defined in the UPUAA. However, the United States
Supreme Court identified what is required to demonstrate a pattern or continuity of racketeering
activity under RICO in H.J. Inc.. 492 U.S. at 241-244. The Court identified continuity as "both a
closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past
conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition." Id. at 241.
A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed
period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period
of time. Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no
future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement: Congress was concerned
in RICO with long-term criminal conduct. Often a RICO action will be brought
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before continuity can be established in this way. In such cases, liability depends
on whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated.... [T]he threat of continuity
may be established by showing that the predicate acts or offenses are part of an
ongoing entity's regular way of doing business. Thus, the threat of continuity is
sufficiently established where the predicates can be attributed to a defendant
operating as part of a long-term association that exists for criminal purposes....
The continuity requirement is likewise satisfied where it is shown thai the
predicates are a regular way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate
business (in the sense that it is not a business that exists for criminal purposes), or
of conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO "enterprise".
Id at 242-243 (footnote omitted).
Essentially, open-ended continuity involves an allegation of a pattern of racketeering
activity where past criminal conduct is coupled with a threat of future criminal conduct, while
closed-ended continuity involves past criminal conduct extending over a substantial period of
time. See GICC Capital Corp. v. Technology Finance Grp.« Inc., 67 F.3d 463, 465-466 (2nd Cir.
1995).
Here, the state alleged that ReNae Bolson engaged in unlawful activities from August
1999 through February 2001, given the allegations of securities fraud violations. This constitutes
an 18 month period. Presumably, the state believes Ms. Bolson did so through the enterprise of
Main Street Financial. Because Main Street Financial is a business in existence since 1992 and
which does not exist for criminal purposes, the state must demonstrate that Ms. Bolson's
commission of unlawful activities "are a regular way" of conducting Main Street Financial's
ongoing legitimate business or of conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO
"enterprise".

ReNae Bolson began working for Main Street Financial in 1992 and continued to be
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employed at Main Street up through the time of trial in June 2004. (Trial Tr. 690.) The state
never has alleged that Main Street Financial is a business organized for the sole purpose of
criminal activity. Moreover, Main Street Financial is a legitimate business enterprise which was
in operation for numerous years prior to The Program and is currently in operation, despite the
termination of The Program. Finally, the state failed to demonstrate or present any evidence of a
threat of future criminal activity, a necessary element where a business is not organized solely to
facilitate unlawful activity. See GICC Capital 67 F.3d at 766. Once The Program failed, and
even prior to that, Ms. Bolson had ceased her involvement in The Program through Main Street
Financial (Trial Tr. 690.) In light of Ms. Bolson's termination of involvement with the program
and the continuation of Main Street Financial's legitimate business activities, the state has failed
to demonstrate that Main Street Financial is organized solely to facilitate unlawful conduct.
Due to the state's failure to present sufficient evidence on the Racketeering count, we
urge this Court to arrest judgment given that the facts alleged do not constitute a public offense.
Moreover, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
presented by the state is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to Ms. Bolson's guilt with regard to this count.
V

SALE BY AN UNLICENSED AGENT/BROKER
The defense moved to dismiss this charge in a motion to quash the bindover, following a

preliminary hearing. In order to preclude waiver of this issue, the defense reasserts this motion.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 prohibits any person from transacting "business in this state as a
broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed under this chapter." Rather than reciting a
factual challenge, the defense reasserts its argument presented in the motion for bindover
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regarding the application of an incorrect legal standard.
In interpreting the extent of civil liability for an individual alleged to have violated
section 61-1-22(1 )(a), which involves the offer or sale of a security in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-3(1), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a defrauded party who seeks to
recover civilly for a violation of the Utah Securities Act must demonstrate that he or she relied on
the alleged misrepresentation. Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah 1996). Concluding
that reliance is not a necessary element of civil recovery, but privity is, the Court determined that
"[p]rivity . . . establishes the necessary link between the alleged misrepresentation and the
plaintiffs injury and therefore serves the same purpose as the reliance requirement of common
law fraud and the federal implied cause of action." Id. at 565-66. Thus, the Court found that
only a plaintiff who is in privity with a defendant may recover civilly for a violation of the Utah
Securities Act. Id. at 565. In essence, the Utah Supreme Court limited primary civil liability for
violations of the Utah Securities Act to those individuals who sell securities.
With respect to secondary liability, such liability may only be established if it can be
shown that an individual directly or indirectly controls a seller who is primarily liable, with
control being the main issue.

Wenneman v. Brown, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1291 (D. Utah 1999)

A seller under the Utah Securities Act is "one who actually passes title to the stock or who
actively solicits the purchase motivated by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of
the securities owner." Wenneman v. Brown. 49 F. Supp. 2d 2383, 1290 (D. Utah 1999), citing
FSLIC v. Provo Excelsior Ltd.. 664 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Utah 1987) (finding "seller" under the
Utah Act to be identical to seller under § 12(2)of Federal Securities Act of 1933). Under this
definition, to be secondarily liable for a violation of the Utah Securities Act, an individual must
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control a seller, either indirectly or directly.
Thus, in the civil context, an individual can only be found to violate this section of the
Utah Securities Act involving the sale of a security by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent by
being in privity with the purchaser of a security. The Utah Supreme Court imposed this
requirement in the civil context rather than imposing a reliance requirement. Due to the differing
burdens of proof that attach to civil versus criminal proceedings, there is no reason to believe that
the state is held to a lesser standard than privity, when it seeks to enforce this section through a
criminal proceeding. Certainly it would be antithetical to our notions of due process to permit an
individual to be convicted of an offense in the criminal context, where liberty and freedom are at
stake, which the individual could not be financially held liable for in a civil proceeding. See Cf.
Alta Indus, v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1288 n.l 1 (Utah 1993) ("It is axiomatic that statutory
language imposing both civil and criminal liability cannot be interpreted to require stricter
requirements in a civil context than it does in a criminal context."). The state presented no
evidence to demonstrate Ms. Bolson was in privity with any of the individuals who allege that
they purchased a security.
At trial, the state only had to present evidence on this count that would demonstrate Ms.
Bolson willfully engaged in the activity alleged. There was no requirement that the state
demonstrate privity. Because the stakes in a criminal case are substantially higher than in the
civil context, the state should at least be required to prove the elements necessary in the civil
context for the sale of a security by an unlicensed broker/agent. The failure to do and to gain a
criminal conviction with less than is required to obtain a civil judgment offends constitutional
guarantees of Due Process. Here, the state did not prove privity. Accordingly, Ms. Bolson
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should not have been convicted of this offense.
CONCLUSION
Based on the afore-mentioned facts and argument, we ask this Court to arrest judgment
on the above-numbered counts.
SUBMITTED this

of September, 2004.

NNON ROMERO
orney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE
TO MS. BOLSON'S MOTION TO
ARREST JUDGMENT

vs.

RENAE REID BOLSON,
Defendant.

:
:

Case No. 021100413
JUDGE STEPHEN ROTH

From the outset of this case, defense counsel has opposed the state's interpretation of the
appropriate mens rea applicable in a securities fraud case. Much of the tension between defense
counsel's interpretation of the appropriate mens rea and the state's interpretation of the same
arises from the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993).
Until now, however, defense counsel has failed to properly explain her interpretation of Larsen in
a clear and concise way While this memorandum serves as a reply to the state's responsive
brief, it will primarily explain the reasons counsel believes the jury was improperly instructed
regarding the appropriate mens rea in this case and therefore why an arrest of judgment and/or
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new trial is appropriate.

I

THE JURY INSTRUCTION DEFINING WILFULLY INCORRECTLY
STATES THE LAW
A jury found Ms. Bolson guilty of violating Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (hereinafter "the

statute"), as charged in counts IV-VII of the information. The jury was instructed that in order to
find Ms. Bolson guilty of securities fraud, it had to find Ms. Bolson acted wilfully in violating
the statute.
[T]o act willfully, it must be a person's conscious object or desire to engage in
certain conduct or cause a certain result. A person acts willfully if she acts
purposefully and not because of mistake or accident. In the context of willful
misstatements or omissions of material facts, willfulness implies knowledge of the
falsity of the misstatements or knowledge of the omitted facts. That knowledge
can be inferred if defendant deliberately blinded herself to the existence of a fact
or facts; however, defendant cannot be convicted if she was merely negligent,
careless, or foolish. She must have acted with a conscious objective or desire to
ignore a material fact or facts.
This instruction was agreed upon by the state and defense counsel prior to trial, largely as a result
of the court's analysis regarding the appropriate mens rea in denying Ms. Bolson's motion to
quash. However, given the analysis of State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) set forth infra,
this instruction appears to adopt a mixed criminal negligence/recklessness standard, which is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1. Rather, 1he wilful mens rea
required to show a securities fraud violation1 requires intentional conduct according to the
1

The willfulness standard is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21(2).
2
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definition of culpable mental states set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) ("A person
engages in conduct: [ijntentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result."). Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed only that
intentional conduct is sufficient to violate the statute.
Particularly, counsel believes the following language to be most troublesome:
In the context of willful misstatements or omissions of material facts, willfulness
implies knowledge of the falsity of the misstatements or knowledge of the omitted
facts. That knowledge can be inferred if defendant deliberately blinded herself to
the existence of a fact or facts; however, defendant cannot be convicted if she
was merely negligent, careless, or foolish. She must have acted with a conscious
objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts.
(Emphasis added.) First, rather than stating wilfulness implies knowledge of falsity, the
instruction should have advised the jury that wilfulness requires knowledge of the falsity of
statements made or the materiality of omitted facts. Second, the instruction should have
informed the jury that knowledge of an omitted fact requires knowledge of the materiality of the
omitted fact. For example, Ms. Bolson's failure to disclose Calvin Paul Stewart's age would not
violate the statute because Mr. Stewart's age is not a material fact. Third, the "ostrich" portion of
the instruction permitting the jury to infer Ms. Bolson's mental state through deliberate blindness
or wilful ignorance was inappropriate.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a deliberate ignorance instruction is
only appropriate when the government demonstrates a defendant "purposefully contrived to
3

avoid learning all of the facts" in order to have a defense in the event of prosecution. United
States v. Delreal-Ordones, 213 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000),2 quoting United States v.
Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999). Moreover, the deliberate ignorance instruction
is seldom appropriate given that the prosecution must first provide evidence a defendant
deliberately avoided knowledge, before the instruction may be given. Id. at 1268.
The district court need not insist upon direct evidence of conscious avoidance of a
fact before tendering a deliberate ignorance instruction. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d at
1233. To establish a defendant's "deliberate ignorance," the Government is
entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence and the benefit of the favorable
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. Such evidence and its inferences must
establish that a defendant had subjective knowledge of his criminal behavior.
[UnitedStates v.] de Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d[1405, 1409 (10th Cir. 1991)].
Negligence or even recklessness is not sufficient to charge a defendant with
guilty knowledge. United States v. Bar bee, 968 F2d 1026, 1033-34 (10th Cir.
1992). We established nearly forty years ago, however, that "one may not willfully
and intentionally remain ignorant of a fact, important and material to his conduct,
and thereby escape punishment. The test is whether there was a conscious purpose
to avoid enlightenment." Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d845, 849 (10th Cir.
1962).
A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when a defendant denies
knowledge of an operant fact but the evidence, direct or circumstantial, shows that
defendant engaged in deliberate acts to avoid actual knowledge of that operant
fact, de Franciso-Lopez, 939 F.2dat 141L Accord United States v. Lee, 54 F.3d
1534, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995). In other words, the district court may tender a
deliberate ignorance instruction when the Government presents evidence that the
defendant "purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts" in order to have
a defense in the event of prosecution. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d at 1233. The purpose
of the instruction is to alert the jury that "the act of avoidance [could be]
motivated by sufficient guilty knowledge to satisfy the knowing element of the

2

This case involved a defendant who was charged with the knowing or intentional
possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. Id. at 1264.
4

00X061

crime." Bornfwld, 145 F.Sdat 1129 (internal quotations and ellipses omitted).
Id at 1268-69 (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also evaluated the deliberate ignorance
instruction. In United States v. Moncrief 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22641 (5th Cir. November 1,
2004),3 the Court explained the circumstances under which such an instruction is appropriate:
A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate only where "the
defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the proof at trial supports the
reasonable inference of deliberate ignorance." United States v. Soto-Silva, 129
F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1997). There is no question here that [the defendant] has
claimed a lack of guilty knowledge throughout. A reasonable inference of
deliberate ignorance can be made upon a showing of "(1) the subjective awareness
of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct and (2) purposeful
contrivance to avoid learning of the illegal conduct." United States v. SaucedoMunoz, 307F.3d344, 348 (5th Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 537 US. 1178, 154 L.
Ed 2d 926, 123 S. Ct 1009 (2003).
Id. at *32-33. The deliberate ignorance instruction is dangerousness in that it implies a lower
mens rea. 'The deliberate ignorance instruction presents the danger that a jury will convict a
defendant on the basis of the lesser mens rea of negligence-punishing the defendant for what he
should have known." United States v. Gray. 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12983, *24 (10th Cir. 1997),
cert denied, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4203.
In this case, the state did not present evidence demonstrating Ms. Bolson was subjectively
aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct and that she purposefully, i.e.,
3

This case involved the allegation that the defendant engaged in illegal monetary
transactions in criminally derived property, an offense requiring knowledge, not specific intent.
Id. at *38.
5

intentionally, schemed to avoid learning of it. As the Court noted in Delreal-Ordones, 213 F.3d
at 1268, negligence or recklessness is insufficient to charge a defendant with guilty knowledge.
At best, the state demonstrated Ms. Bolson was negligent, naive and foolish. This level of proof
provided by the state did not meet the threshold required to instruct the jury regarding deliberate
ignorance. Theiefore, because this instruction essentially allowed the jury to convict Ms. Bolson
if it found her to have acted in a criminally negligent or reckless manner, the instruction
improperly stated the law and lowered the state's burden of proof.

II

MENSREA
Ms. Bolson was charged with and convicted of violating section 61-1-1 (2) of the Utah

Uniform Securities Act as set forth in counts III through IV of the information. Specifically, Ms.
Bolson was convicted of making an untrue statement of material fact or omitting to state a
material fact in order to make a statement not misleading. In State v Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,
1357 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a defendant must act with
scienter, i.e., the specific intent to defraud, deceive or manipulate, under subsection (2) in order
to violate the statute. The Larsen court held subsection (2) contains no such scienter
requirement.
Section 61-1-1(2) provides as follows:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly, to . . . make any untrue statement of a material fact
6

or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.
While this portion of the statute makes no reference to the requisite mental state, Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-21 (2)4 sets forth a willfulness mens rea requirement.
In rejecting a scienter requirement under subsection (2), the Larsen court nevertheless
emphasized that
[a]n individual must act willfully to be criminally liable under the statute.
This means that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused "desire[d] to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-103. This highly culpable mental state is not consistent with "strict
liability," as that term is traditionally used.
IdL at 1360 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
A cursory review of the Larsen opinion might lead to the conclusion that only a nominal
mens rea requirement is imposed under the statute. However, a closer reading demonstrates
quite the contrary. A brief review of the concepts of mens rea, scienter and specific intent is
necessary to a full understanding of the Larsen decision.
In 1973, the Utah Legislature promulgated a criminal code premised on the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code. In so doing, the Utah legislature abolished both common law
crimes and common law mens rea principles of "specific intent"5 and "general intent" in favor of
4

5

This section is the penalty provision for the Utah Uniform Securities Act.

"At common law, the specific-intent crimes were robbery, assault, larceny, burglary,
forgery, false pretenses, embezzlement, attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy." BLACK'S LAW
th
DICTIONARY 814 (7 ed. 1999).

enumerated and defined culpable mental states. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-105 (abolishing
common law crimes), 76-2-101 to -104 (1999 & Supp. 2003) (defining culpable mental states
necessary to impose criminal liability); see also State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 260 n.3 (Utah
1988) (noting the Model Penal Code's abandonment of "specific intent" and "general intent"
principles).
Specific intent is "the intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later
charged with." BlACK's LAW DICTIONARY 814 (7th ed. 1999). In contrast, general intent is "[t]he
state of mind required for the commission of certain common-law crimes not requiring a specific
intent or not imposing strict liability." Id 813. With the adoption of the new criminal code in
1973, "specific intent" and "general intent" principles were abandoned in favor of defined
culpable mental states. These culpable mental states are now set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 762-103, and include: (a) intentionally, or willfully; (b) knowingly, or with knowledge; (c)
recklessly, or maliciously; and (d) with criminal negligence. With the adoption of these culpable
mental states, the need for classifying offenses on the basis of "specific intent" and "general
intent" became unnecessary. While the legislature has abandoned "general intent" and "specific
intenf'in the criminal code lexicon, the Utah Supreme Court has continued to use these principles
to inform interpretation of the code. See Standi ford, 769 P.2d at 260 n.3.
Mens rea is "[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove
that a defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness." IdL 999. Mens

8

rea therefore encompasses all culpable mental states, including scienter. Scienter is "[a] mental
state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. • In this sense, the term is used
most often in the context of securities fraud." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1347 (7th ed. 1999).
Applying this definition, it is clear scienter is the equivalent of common law "specific intent."
This understanding of mens rea may best be illustrated by thinking of the various
culpable mental states in a hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is scienter, or specific intent,
followed by intentionally/willfully. Below that is knowingly, followed by recklessly. At the
bottom of the hierarchy is criminal negligence.
Support for this view of scienter as specific intent, or the most culpable of mental states,
is found within the Larsen opinion itself. In Larsen, the defendant argued that to act willfully
under the statute requires acting with scienter, i.e., the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,
i.e., specific intent. 865 P.2d at 1358. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that if the Utah
legislature had intended to require scienter under the statute, it could have done so by including
specific language to that effect. Id, The Court cited to a number of statutory sections where the
legislature has specifically required scienter for particular offenses. Id The Court specifically
referenced the following statutes for this proposition: Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-20-27,6 41-la-

6

Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-27 provides that "[a]ny person who at any time alters or
changes in any manner, with intent to defraud, any license, permit, tag or certificate of
registration issued under provisions of this code or action of the Wildlife Board is guilty of a
misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.)
9

1319,7 76-6-506.2,8 76-10-7069 & -106.10 (A copy of these statutes is attached hereto as
Addendum A). The plain language of each of these statutes specifies the "intent to defraud" as
an element thai must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before criminal liability attaches. It
is clear that scienter, as analyzed by the court in Larsen, means the specific intent to defraud,
deceive or manipulate. The absence of a scienter requirement simply means the statute may be
violated by willful or intentional conduct but such conduct need not include a particular objective
to defraud. However, in light of the statute's willful mens rea, neither negligence nor
recklessness are sufficient to establish criminal responsibility.
The difference between what is meant by mens rea and what is meant by scienter is a

7

Utah Code Ann. §41-1 A-1319 provides, inter alia, "[i]t is a third degree felony for a
person, with intent to defraud, to: (1) disconnect, turn back, replace, or reset or cause to be
disconnected, turned back, replaced, or reset, the odometer of any motor vehicle with the intent
to reduce the true number of miles or kilometers indicated on it." (Emphasis added.)
8

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.2 provides, inter alia, "[i]t is unlawful for any person to
knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain credit or purchase or attempt to
purchase goods, property, or services, by the use of a false, fictitous, altered . . . financial
transaction card . . . . " (Emphasis added.)
9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-706 provides, inter alia, "[e]very director, officer, or agent of
any corporation or association who knowingly receives or possesses himself of any property of
such corporation or association,... and who, with intent to defraud, omits to make, or to cause
or direct to be made, a full and true entry thereof in the books or accounts of the corporation or
association.. .." (Emphasis added.)
10

Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1006 provides that "[e]very person who, without the consent
of the owner of an article bearing the owner's validly registered trademark or service mark,
knowingly sells or traffics in the articles or who withholds the articles from the owner thereof
with intent to defraud the owner is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.)
10
raOi O ^ 1

distinction of gradations. Scienter is a particular type of mens rea. The court's decision in
Larsen simply states that violation of the false statement section of the securities fraud statute
does not require proof or evidence of a specific intent (scienter) to defraud or deceive. Rather,
willfulness, or intent, is required before a violation of the statute may be found. Viewing the
Larsen decision in this light, it is clear Larsen requires a highly culpable mental state of intent or
willfulness, i.e. mens rea, in order for a violation of the statute to occur.

Ill

OTHER JURISDICTIONS11
A.

State Statutes Governing Securities Fraud12
1.

States with statutes similar to Utah's false statement provision
a. Statutory Provisions

Most states have adopted securities fraud provisions relating to false statements or
omissions that mirror or are substantially similar to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2).13 (Statutes

11

All analysis relating to the securities fraud statute (Utah and other jurisdictions) is
limited to the false statements/omissions portion of the statutes.
12

Reference to other jurisdictions is included here primarily as a result of Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-27, which provides that the Utah Uniform Securities Act be construed to effectuate
its general purpose "to make uniform the law of those states which enact it."
13

Alabama Code of Ala. § 8-6-17(a)(2) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly, to . . . [m]ake any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.");
Alaska Alaska Stat. § 45.55.010(a)(2) ("A person may not, in connection with the offer, sale, or
11

purchase of a security, directly or indirectly . . . make an untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1191
("It is a fraudulent practice and unlawful for a person, in connection with . . . an offer to sell or
buy securities, directly or indirectly to . . . [m]ake any untrue statement of material fact, or omit
to state any material fact necessary in order to make th statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."); Arkansas Axk. Code Ann. § 2342-507 ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."); California Cal. Corp. Code §
56401 ("It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell a security in this state . . . by means of any
written or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."); Colorado Colorado Rev. Stat. §
11-51-501 (2004) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly . .. [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."); Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 36b-4
("No person shall, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly . . . make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading."); Deleware 6 Del. C. § 7303 ("It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading."); District of Columbia D.C. Code § 31-5605.02 ("A person shall n o t . . . [i]n
connection with the . . . offer, sale, or purchase of an investment or security . .. directly or
indirectly . . . obtain money or property by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an
omission to state a material fact in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."); Florida Fla Stat. § 517.301 ("It
is unlawful and a violation of the provisions of this chapter for a person . . . in connection with
the offer, sale, or purchase of any investment or security . . . directly or indirectly . . . to obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a
material fact in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading."); Georgia O.C. G. A. § 10-5-102(a)(2)(B) ("It shall be
12

unlawful for any person . . . [i]n connection with the offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase, or
purchase any security, directly or indirectly . .. [t]o make an untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."); Hawaii H.R.S. § 485-25(a)(2)
("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase . . . of any security .
. . directly or indirectly... [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading."); Idaho Idaho Code § 30-1403(2) (Repealed
effective September 1, 2004) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly,... To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."); Illinois 815 I.L.C.S. 5/12
(G) ("It shall be a violation of the provisions of this Act for any persons . . . [t]o obtain money or
property through the sale of securities by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."); Indiana Burns Ind. Code
Ann. § 23-2-1-12 (2) ("It is unlawful for any person in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of any security, either directly or indirectly, [t]o make any untrue statements of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); Iowa Iowa Code §
502.401 (2) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer to sell, offer to purchase,
sale or purchase of any security in this state, directly or indirectly .. . [t]o make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.");
Kansas K.S.A. § 17-1253 ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . . . to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); Maine 32 M.R.S. § 10201 (2)
("In connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, a person shall not, directly or
indirectly,. . . make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading."); Massachusetts ALM GL ch 110A, § 101(2) ("It is unlawful for
any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly ..
. to make any untrue statements of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading."); Michigan M.C.L.S. § 451.501.101(2) ("It is unlawful for any person, in
13

connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly. . . [t]o make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading."); Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 75-71-501 ("It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly,. .. [t]o make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading."); Missouri § 409.5-501(2) R.S.Mo. ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection
with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security, directly or indirectly,... [t]o make an untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, not misleading.");
Montana M.C.A. §30-10-301(l)(b) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer,
sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly,.. . to . .. make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); Nebraska R.R.S.
Neb. § 8-1102 (l)(b) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); Nevada N.R.S. § 90-570 (2)
("In connection with the offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase or purchase of a security, a person
shall not, directly or indirectly . . . [m]ake an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading in the light of
circumstances under which they are made"); New Jersey N.J. Stat. § 49:3-52 (b) ("It shall be
unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly . .. [t|o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading."); New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-13B-30(B) ("In connection
with the offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase or purchase of a security, a person shall not, directly
or indirectly .. make an untrue statement of a material fact or fail to state a necessary material
fact where such an omission would be misleading."); North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-8
(2)("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security,
directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading."); North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 10-04-15 (3)
("It shall be a fraudulent practice and it shall be unlawful... [f]or any person, in connection with
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly, to make any untrue statement of
14
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a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); Pennsylvania 70
P.S. § 1-401 (b) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security in this State, directly or indirectly . .. [t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); Rhode Island R.I. Gen.
Laws § 7-11-501 ("In connection with the offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase, or purchase of a
security, a person may not, directly or indirectly . . . [m]ake an untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. §
35-1-1210 (2) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of
any security, directly or indirectly, to . . . make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws
§ 47-31B-501 ("It is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 482-121(a)(2) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly, to . .. make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."); Texas Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art.
581-83 (Penal Provisions) ("Any person who shall... [i]n connection with the sale, offering for
sale or delivery of, the purchase, offer to purchase, invitation of offers to purchase, invitations of
offers to sell, or dealing in any other manner in any security or securities . . . directly or indirectly
. .. knowingly make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading."); Vermont 9 V.S.A. § 4224a (a)(2) ("In connection with the
offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase or purchase of a security, a person may not, directly or
indirectly . . . make an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading."); Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-502(2) ("It shall be unlawful
for any person in the offer or sale of any securities, directly or indirectly,... [t]o obtain money or
property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading."); Washington Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 21.20.010
15

attached as Addendum B.)
b. No Scienter Requirement
Of the states that have statutes substantially similar to Utah's securities fraud provision,
there are only handful that have addressed the issue of mens rea in the context of the false
statements portion of the statute. In Haves v. State. 507 So.2d 982, 992-993 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App.
1986), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that in securities fraud cases involving false
statements, the state must prove a person acted willfully, or intentionally, or knew what he or she
was doing. The court declined to require the state to prove an evil motive or intent to violate the
law, or to prove knowledge that a law is being violated for liability to attach. Instead, the court
determined a person must have an "intent to say something, that is expected to be relied on, that
is not believed to be true, or, if strictly true, is hoped will be understood in an untruthful sense."
(2) ("It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security,
directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or <o omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading."); West Virginia W. Va. Code § 21-1-101 (2) ("It is
unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading."); Wisconsin Wis. Stat. § 551.41(2) ("It is unlawful for any
person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security in this state, directly or
indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading."); Wyoming Wyo. Stat. § 17-4-101 (a)(ii) ("It is unlawful for any
person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . . .
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading.").
16

14 at 993, quoting SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540 (1st Cir. 1976) (attached
hereto as Addendum C.) Thus, the Haves court rejected a scienter or specific intent requirement
but recognized an intentional mens rea.
In People v. Johnson, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), the California Court
of Appeals held that a willful violation of the false statements section of the securities fraud
statute does not require a person to know of the falsity of a statement. Id at 1374. Specifically,
the Court rejected the defendant's argument that in order to be found in violation of the securities
fraud statute, the state had to demonstrate he possessed guilty knowledge. IdL The Court did find
that "a defendant acting under a reasonable mistake of fact does not entertain criminal intent..
.", thereby recognizing ignorance or mistake of fact as valid defenses in securities fraud cases.
Id. at 1375. (Attached hereto as Addendum DJ
The court's decision in Johnson was subsequently overruled by People v. Simon, 886
P.2d 1271 (Cal. 1995). In Simon, the California Supreme Court held that "knowledge of the
falsity or misleading nature of a statement or of the materiality of an omission, or criminal
negligence in failing to investigate and discover them, are elements of the criminal offense [of
securities fraud involving the making of false statements or omitting information]." Id at 129091. The Court noted that if knowledge or criminal negligence "is not an element of the offense,
criminal penalties would be imposed for conduct less culpable than that for which recovery in a
private civil action is not permitted, [resulting in] an unreasonable application of the statutory
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scheme." Id at 1291. (Attached hereto as Addendum E.)
In People v. Whitlow, 433 N.E.2d 629 (111. 1982), the Illinois Supreme Court held that
because the securities fraud statute contains no wilfulness requirement, no scienter is required to
sustain a conviction for a violation of the false statements section of the statute. The court noted,
however, if willfulness language had appeared in the statute, a fraudulent or specific intent would
be required to violate the statute. Id. at 634. (Attached hereto as Addendum R)
In People v. Mitchell. 437 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), the Michigan Court of
Appeals considered the defendant's argument that the securities fraud statute was
unconstitutional because it failed to require proof of scienter or guilty knowledge. The defendant
also argued that to act willfully requires a defendant to specifically intend to mislead or defraud.
The Court rejected the defendant's attempts to engraft an intent to defraud or mislead element
into the statute, holding;
To wilfully violate subsection 101(2) [omissions or false statements] this
defendant must have intended the omission which was found to be material and
misleading. To wilfully offend subsection 101(3) [act or practice operating as a
fraud or deceit] he must have intended to engage in the course of conduct found to
operate as a fraud. In addition, this defendant must have known or recklessly
failed to discover facts that rendered his conduct violative of those subsections. It
is insufficient that he could have discovered the facts by due care. On the other
hand, he need not have acted with the conscious purpose to mislead or defraud. It
is also unnecessary that he know his conduct violated the law. Like any element
of a crime, knowledge and intent can be inferred.
Id at 307 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court held that the false statement portion of the
securities fraud statute requires no specific intent to defraud, i.e. scienter, as an element of the
18

offense. IdL (Attached hereto as Addendum G.)
In State v. Fries, 337 N.W.2d 398 (Neb. 1983), the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's assertion that in order to be found guilty of a willful violation of the securities fraud
statute, the state was required to prove that he acted with a "bad purpose either to disobey or
disregard the law." Id at 404. At trial, the jury was instructed as follows:
"Willfully . . . means knowingly, as distinguished from accidentally or
involuntarily, and bears on the intent required. All that is required is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit the acts with
which he is charged, that is, that he was aware of what he was doing. Proof is not
required that the defendant acted with evil motive or with a specific intent that he
knew that his conduct violated the law."
Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court approved of the trial court's instruction and concluded specific
intent, evil motive, or knowledge that the law is being violated is not required to sustain a
conviction for a wilful violation of the securities fraud statute. Li at 405. (Attached as
Addendum H.) See also Hardcastle v. State, 755 S.W.2d 228 (Ark. App. 1988) (adopting a
"knowing" mens rea but rejecting an intent to defraud requirement); State v. Shama Resources
Ltd. Partnership, 899 P.2d 977, 982 (Idaho 1995) (scienter, or intent to defraud, not required to
prove liability under false statements provision of statute); Manns v. Skolnik, 666 N.E.2d 1236,
1248-49 (Ind. App. 1996) (no scienter, or intent to defraud, required to recover civilly for
violation of the false statement provision of the securities fraud statute); State v. Ross, 715 P.2d
471,474 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (specific intent to defraud or deprive a victim of property not
necessary to prove a violation of the securities fraud statute); State v. Cox, 566 P.2d 935 (Wash
19

Ct. App. 1977) (wilful violation of false statements portion of securities fraud statute requires no
intent to defraud or deprive); State v. Tembv. 322 N.W.2d 522, 528 (Wise. Ct. App. 1982)
(wilful violation of false statements provision of the securities fraud statute requires no intent to
defraud).
While the above courts have rejected efforts to engraft a scienter element into their
respective state securities fraud statutes, these courts have nevertheless required the state to prove
a highly culpable mental state or mens rea to establish guilt, thereby rejecting strict liability.
Notably, these courts have almost uniformly rejected a negligence standard as the appropriate
mens rea to establish such liability.
c.

Scienter Required

Even in jurisdictions with statutory language almost identical to the false statements
provision of Utah's Securities Fraud statute, some courts have required the state to prove
scienter, an intent to defraud or deceive (or specific intent), in order to find a person guilty of a
statutory violation. See People v. Terranova, 563 P.2d 363 (Colo. App. 1976) (state must prove
scienter to demonstrate a violation of the securities fraud statute; defendant may rely on good
faith defense against such a charge); Hubbard v. Hibbard Brown & Co, 633 A.2d 345 (Del.
1993) (scienter is a required element of the false statements portion of the securities fraud statute
to recover civilly); Curtis v. State, 109 S.E. 2d 868, 872-73 (Ga. App. 1959) (scienter, or intent to
defraud, required to sustain conviction under false statements provision of statute); State v.
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Puckett 634 P.2d 144, 153-54 (Kan. App. 1981) (scienter, or intent to defraud, necessary to
convict under false statements provision of securities fraud statute).

d.

Securities fraud statutes not corresponding to Utah's statute

There are a handful of states with securities fraud statutes which differ substantially from
the Uniform Securities Act and Utah's securities fraud statute.14

(Statutes attached hereto as

Addendum I.) These states either significantly tailor their statutes to limit the scope of who is
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Louisiana La. R.S. 51:712(A)(2) ("It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o offer to
sell or to sell a security by means of any oral or written untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, the buyer not knowing of the
untruth or omission, if such person in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of
the untruth or omission."); Oklahoma 71 Okl. St. § 1-502 (A)(2) ("It is unlawful for a person
that advises others, for compensation, either directly or indirectly, or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling
securities, or that, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities .. .[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the
circumstances under which it is made, not misleading."); Ohio O.R.C. Ann 1707.44(B)(l)-(6)
("No person shall knowingly make or cause to be made any false representation concerning a
material and relevant fact, in any oral statement or . . . written statement, for any of the following
purposes: [securities transactions, including the sale registration, or purchase of a
security]");Oregon O.R.S. § 59.115 (l)(b) ("A person is liable as provided in subsection (2) of
this section to a purchaser of a security if the person . . . [sjells or successfully solicits the sale of
a security . . . by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission), and
who does not sustain the burden of proof that the person did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omission.").
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subject to civil and criminal liability, or they embrace additional elements required to prove
liability. In either case, these statutes limit the scope of criminally culpable conduct and appear to
demand a higher level of proof than does Utah's statute. Compare above statutes with Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-1. These statutes are included for comparison only.
e.

Conclusion

While il is true that scienter need not be proven to demonstrate a violation of the statute,
the statute's plain language does require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant acted willfully, i.e. intentionally, before a violation can be found. While the Utah
Uniform Securities Act has its origin in the federal Uniform Securities Act, Ihe statute must be
construed in the context of state law. In Utah, the legislature has defined willfulness to be the
same as intentional with respect to mens rea, or a culpable mental state. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-103. If the legislature had intended the statute to require a culpable mental state of criminal
negligence, recklessness, or even knowledge, it could have said so. Instead, the legislature
found willfulness to be the appropriate mens rea. None of the evidence presented by the state at
trial, even viewed in the light most favorable to the state, demonstrates Ms. Bolson acted
willfully, i.e., intentionally; therefore, Ms. Bolson did not engage in conduct which constitutes a
public offense and this Court should arrest judgment.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and those previously set forth in Ms. Bolson's motion and
memorandum to arrest judgment, this Court should arrest judgment.

SUBMITTED this

± day of December, 2004. /

SHANNON-ROMERO
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to Arrest Judgment and
Memorandum in Support thereof to Office of the Utah Attorney General, Financial Crimes
Prosecution Unit, 5272 South College Drive, Suite 200, Murray, Utah 84123, this
December, 2004.
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OPINION:
[* 13 57] On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
C. Dean Larsen petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
seeking review of a Utah Court of Appeals decision
upholding the district court's rulings on two issues
relating to his conviction on eighteen counts of criminal
securities fraud. Larsen contends that the trial court erred
in refusing to instruct the jury that the intent to defraud,
deceive, or manipulate is an element of a criminal
violation of sections 1(2) and 21 of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act. See Utah Code Ann. § § 61-1-1(2), -21.

Larsen also complains that the trial court erroneously
allowed a State expert to testify as to the "materiality" of
information that Larsen allegedly had failed to [**2]
disclose to investors. We affirm his convictions.
The facts of this case are detailed in the court of
appeals' opinion in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 488-90
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). To summarize, Larsen was
charged with, and convicted of, eighteen counts of
securities fraud under sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 of
the Code. These convictions arose out of his actions
while president of a real estate development company in
which others had invested. Larsen's criminal acts
included his failure to inform investors of material
information related to the company, misrepresentations
of material facts regarding the company's financial
status, and related acts of dishonesty. Larsen appealed to
the court of appeals, which affirmed his convictions. 828
P.2d at 496. We granted certiorari to consider his claims
of legal error.
Larsen first asserts that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury as to the applicable law. He alleges
that the trial court improperly refused to give portions of
his proposed instructions concerning the elements of and
defenses to criminal securities fraud. The omitted
portions, in substance, would have instructed [**3] the
jury that to be guilty of a criminal violation of section
61-1-1(2), Larsen must have acted with the specific
intent to defraud and that a representation made "in good
faith constitutes a complete defense to a charge of
securities fraud."
The propriety of the instructions given hinges on the
correct interpretation of sections 61-1-1(2) and -21. nl In
particular, does a criminal violation of these sections
require proof of an intent to defraud, deceive, or
manipulate? The correct interpretation of a statute is a
question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v.
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); Ward v.
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
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nl In this case, this court is concerned only
with the proper construction of a portion of
section 61-1-1, specifically subsection 1(2). We
therefore do not address the question of whether
subsections 1(1) and 1(3) require scienter. Cf.
Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S.
680, 695-702, 64 L. Ed. 2d 611, 100 S. Ct. 1945
(1980).

must have acted "willfully" in misstating or omitting
material facts. Id. Larsen asks this court to interpret
"willfully" as requiring "scienter," the intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud, as defined by the United States
Supreme Cowl in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668, 96 S Ct. 1375 (1976), a rule 10b5 case.
n2 In 1963, the Utah legislature substantially
adopted the Uniform Securities Act, which had
been developed by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Utah
Code Ann. § § 61-1-1 to -30; Uniform Securities
Act, reprinted in Blue Sky Laws 1993 289-374
(1993). See generally Wallace R. Bennett,
Securities Regulation in Utah: A Recap of
History and the New Uniform Act, 8 Utah L. Rev.
216, 227-28 (1963). The Uniform Act contains an
anti-fraud provision, section 101, modeled after,
and with language taken from, section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933 and rule 10b-5, which
was promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Uniform
Securities Act § 101, cmt. .01; Blue Sky Laws, at
295. The Utah legislature incorporated section
101 into the Utah Code as section 61-1-1 without
significant modification. Compare Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-1 with Uniform Securities Act §
101.

r**4]
When faced with a question of statutory
construction, this court first examines the plain language
of the statute. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d
1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d
497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Section 61-1-1(2)
states in relevant part:

It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly to:

(2) make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances [*1358] under which they
are made, not misleading.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). n2 This section's standards
govern both civil and criminal liability. To ascertain the
elements of a criminal violation, however, this section
must be read in conjunction with section 61-1-21, which
specifies the requisite mental state and penalties for a
criminal violation. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. Section
61-1-21 provides in pertinent part:

Any person who willfully violates any
provision of this chapter [including
section 61-1-1(2)] . . . or who willfully
[**5] violates any rule or order under this
chapter . . . shall upon conviction be fined
not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned not
more than three years, or both.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (emphasis added). The plain
language of section 61-1-21 requires that to be liable for
a criminal violation of section 61-1-1(2), the defendant

[**6]
In determining whether we can, or should, give
"willfully" such a construction, we first look to the
statutory definition of "willful." The legislature has
indicated that a person acts willfully when it is his or her
"desire to engage in the conduct that cause[s] the result."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. Nothing in this definition
requires scienter. n3 Moreover, a brief survey of the
Code confirms that the Utah legislature knows how to
require scienter, if it so desires, by including specific
language to that effect. See, e.g., id. § § 23-20-27, 41la-1319, 76-6-506.2, 76-10-706 & -1006.

n3 To act willfully in this context means to
act
deliberately
and
purposefully,
as
distinguished from merely accidentally or
inadvertently. Cf. United States v. Hairs ton, 819
F.2d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 1987). Willful, when
applied to the intenl with which an act is done or
omitted, implies a willingness to commit the act,
which, in this case, is the misstatement or
omission of a material fact. Willful does not
require an intent to violate the law or to injure

Page 3
865 P.2d 1355, *; 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 3;
1993 Utah LEXIS 157,**
another or acquire any advantage. See generally
State v. Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582,
585 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
[**7]
Failing to find support in the express terms of the
Code, Larsen suggests that the scienter requirement is an
"independent element" of the offense. Stated another
way, although it is not apparent from the language of the
provision, Larsen contends that we should read the
scienter requirement into the statute. We have rejected
similar attempts to engraft a judicially created intent
requirement upon the plain language of a criminal
statute. E.g., State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315
(Utah 1983) (holding offense of writing bad check does
not require intent to defraud). Perhaps more on point,
other states have rejected attempts to import scienter into
analogous securities-fraud statutes. See, e.g., People v.
Johnson, 213 Cal App. 3d 1369, 262 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369
(Cal Ct. App. 1989); State v. Temby, 108 Wis. 2d 521,
322 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982). This court
will not affix new "independent requirements" to an
otherwise clear and constitutional statute.
Although the language of the statute effectively
disposes of the issue, Larsen asserts that this court should
look beyond the plain language of the Utah Uniform
Securities [**8] Act [* 1359] to the legislative intent.
Section 61-1-27 of the Code provides that Utah's
Uniform Securities Act "may be construed so as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it and to coordinate the
interpretation and administration of this chapter with the
related federal regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27.
Larsen asserts that this section was intended to bind state
judicial interpretations of Utah's antifraud provisions to
the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of
similar federal securities provisions. Specifically, Larsen
argues that the language similarities between section 611-1(2) and rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), when viewed in light of the intent
requirement embodied in section 61-1-27, require this
court to interpret Utah's antifraud provision in
conformity with the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668, 96
S Ct. 1375 (1976). Hochfelder held, inter alia, that
"scienter," or an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud, must be proved before civil liability can be
imposed under rule 10b-5. See id. at 674; Aaron v.
Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680, 692, 64 L. Ed.
2d 611, 100 S Ct. 1945(1980). [**9] Larsen's argument
is facially legitimate and requires response.
We first examine Hochfelder's reasoning. The issue
before the Hochfelder court was "whether a private cause
of action for damages [would] lie under § 10(b) and

Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of'scienter'intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. The SEC
promulgated rule 10b-5 n4 pursuant to powers vested in
it by section 10(b) n5 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("1934 Act"). Id. at 195. The Court ultimately
determined that scienter is required because the language
of section 10 (b)-the statutory authority upon which rule
10b-5 is grounded-implicitly limited the SEC's power to
promulgate an implementing rule to one that required
scienter. Id. at 213-14; see also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690; 2
Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation §
13.4, at 81 (2d ed. 1990).

n4 17 CF.R.§

240.10b-5.

n5 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
In contrast to rule 10b-5, Utah's securities fraud
provision, [**10] section 61-1-1(2), does not operate
against a background of limiting statutory authority. The
interpretation we give to section 61-1-1(2) of the Utah
Code is therefore not circumscribed by the dispositive
language of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. In that
respect, section 61-1-1(2) of the Code atavistically
resembles, not rule 10b-5, but section 17(a)(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, which the Aaron Court declined
to interpret as requiring scienter. 446 U.S. at 697. n6
Because of this critical difference, Hochfelder is not
particularly helpful in interpreting Utah's analogue to
rule 10b-5. n7

n6 Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or
sale of any securities by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails,
directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice
to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(<£). The Supreme Court in
Aaron stated "that the language of § 17(a)
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requires scienter under § 17(a)(1), but not under
§ 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)." 446 U.S. at 697. As
we are dealing here only with section 61-1-1(2)
of the Utah provision, which is analogous to
section 17(a)(2), we do not reach the question of
a scienter requirement vel non under section 61l-l(l)or-l(3).
[**11]

n7 Even if Hochfelder were directly on
point, the committee that promulgated the
Uniform Securities Act has indicated that the Act,
in most cases including this one, was not intended
to bind state courts to related federal
interpretations. See Uniform Securities Act §
501 cmt. 3 (1985), reprinted in Blue Sky Laws
1993 428 (1993). In 1985, the committee
specifically indicated that it "did not intend that
state courts be bound to follow [Hochfelder]." Id.
To the extent that Larsen relies on a perceived
mandate in the Uniform Securities Act favoring
state adherence to federal interpretations, his
analysis is lacking in support.
[*1360] Further, even if we were to assume that
rule 10b-5 and section 61-1-1(2) are direct parallels, as
Larsen suggests, he fails to recognize that the Utah
legislature has not required the courts to interpret the
Utah Uniform Securities Act in lockstep with federal
decisions. Section 61-1-27, on which Larsen relies for
his lockstep mandate, seems to make uniformity with
other states more important than uniformity with
interpretations of analogous federal statutes. [**12] See
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27. Section 61-1-27 provides
that Utah's Uniform Securities Act "may be so construed
as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the
interpretation and administration of this chapter with the
related federal legislation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27
(emphasis added). Although the meaning of "coordinate"
as it relates to federal legislation is not entirely clear, the
mandate "to make uniform" the law of the enacting states
is unmistakable. Uniformity with a significant majority
of states is achieved only by a "no scienter" construction
of the provision. See Johnson, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 369;
People v. Whitlow, 89 III. 2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634,
60 III. Dec. 587 (111.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982);
People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich. App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304,
307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 895
(1990); State v. Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398,
405 (Neb. 1983); State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d
471, 474 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Cox, 17 Wash.
App. 896, 566 P.2d 935, 938 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977),

[**13] cert, denied, 439 U.S. 823, 58 L. Ed. 2d 115, 99
S. Ct. 90 (1978); Temby, 322 N W.2d at 526.
As a policy argument for his position, Larsen argues
that without a scienter requirement section 61-1-1(2)
raises the specter of strict liability, or in other words, a
fear that accounting firms and other professionals will be
held liable for "good faith oversight" or failure "to
discover and disclose a material fact." Larsen predicts
that this threat of strict liability will preclude
"responsible individuals and entities" from providing
securities services in the future. This argument
completely ignores the willfulness requirement of section
61-1-21 and misuses the term "strict liability."
An individual must act willfully to be criminally
liable under the statute. This means that the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
"desire[d] to engage in the conduct or cause the result."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. This highly culpable
mental state is not consistent with "strict liability," as that
term is traditionally used. See Black's Law Dictionary
1422 (6th ed. 1990); 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 23,
123 (15th ed. 1993). Further, a [**14] "no scienter"
reading of the statute will affect only those professionals
who willfully omit or misstate material facts. This result
seems to be exactly what the legislature intended. If the
legislature had wanted scienter for perceived public
policy reasons, it could have included that requirement.
It did not, and we will not. n8

n8 Because a finding of scienter is not a
prerequisite to criminal liability under section 611-1(2), the trial court properly refused to instruct
the jury that good faith is a complete defense to
criminal liability. Cf. In re University Med. Ctr.,
973 F.2d 1065, 1087-88 (3d Cir. 1992); Barnett
v. United States, 594 F.2d 219, 222 (9th Cir.
1979).
Larsen's second challenge is based on his claim that
the trial court erred by allowing a securities expert for
the State, Sherwood Cook, n9 to testify as to the
"materiality" of information Larsen allegedly had
omitted from securities-related documents. Larsen's
argument before this court [**15] is somewhat diffuse.
Nevertheless, he appears to be asserting that the trial
court should not have admitted Cook's expert testimony
on materiality under Utah Rule of Evidence 702 because
the testimony purportedly expressed the "legal [*1361]
conclusion" that Larsen's omissions violated section 611-1(2), the statute prohibiting material omissions or
misstatements.
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n9 Cook was introduced to the jury as a
former Utah securities regulation official and the
top securities administrator in Nevada.
We first state the proper standard of review. The
trial court has wide discretion in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v.
Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 n.l (Utah 1991); Dixon v.
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982); State v.
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982); see 2 Gregory
P. Joseph & Stephen A. Saltzburg, Evidence in America:
The Federal Rules [**16] in the States ch. 51, § 51.3,
at 2 & n.4 (1987) [hereinafter Joseph and Saltzburg];
accord Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 784 (8th Cir.
1981), aff d, 461 US 30 (1983). Under this standard, we
will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of
reasonability. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40
(Utah 1992); Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168,
1173 (Utah 1980).
In general, the admissibility and limits of expert
testimony are governed by rules 701 through 704 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Utah R. Evid. 702. Under rule 702, the question that
must be posed prior to the admission of any expert
evidence is whether, "on balance, the evidence will be
helpful to the finder of fact." State v. Rimmasch, 775
P.2d 388, 398 n.8 (Utah 1989); [**17] see Dixon, 658
P.2dat598.
In determining "helpfulness," the trial court must
first decide whether the subject is within the knowledge
or experience of the average individual. Dixon, 658 P. 2d
at 597. It is not necessary that the subject of the
testimony be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could
not possibly understand it without the aid of expert
testimony, nor is it a requirement that the subject be
beyond the comprehension of each and every juror. See
id.
Here, we agree with the court of appeals1 statement
that expert testimony may be appropriate in "securities
fraud cases because the technical nature of securities is
not within the knowledge of the average layman or a

subject within the common experience and would help
the jury understand the issues before them." Larsen, 828
P.2d at 492-93. In his testimony, Cook was expressing
his opinion that some of the material that Larsen had
omitted from the securities documents could have been
important or significant to an investor. nlO We do not
find that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that such testimony would be [**18]
helpful to the jury, nl 1

nlO Cook did not, as Larsen suggests, testify
that Larsen was guilty, nor did Cook testify that,
as a matter of law, the facts satisfied the legal
standard of materiality.
nl 1 Unlike Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147,
153 (Utah 1987), the present case does not
involve expert testimony regarding legal or
factual issues not before the court or jury. The
Ashton court upheld the trial court's exclusion of
an attorney's proposed testimony on the legal
effect of a joint tenant's transfer of property. Id.
at 153. In other words, the proposed testimony in
Ashton was intended solely to explain the
applicable law, which did not aid the jury in
resolving the factual disputes.
Larsen claims that even if the subject of this
testimony might have been beyond the experience of the
average individual, Cook's testimony regarding
materiality was not "helpful" because it transgressed into
the area reserved for the jury by instructing the [**19]
jury as to what legally constitutes material information.
Larsen focuses on Cook's occasional use of the term
"material" during his expert testimony. Specifically,
Larsen argues that Cook could have given his testimony
without using the term "material" and that by using the
term, he moved from arguably admissible opinion
evidence to an "inadmissible legal conclusion" because
[*1362] the statute in question is framed in terms of
material information. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2).
In the present case, the use of the term "material"
presents unique problems because it has two possible
referents. First, in ordinary parlance materiality means
"important" or "significant."
Oxford
American
Dictionary 547 (1980). Used in this context, "material"
signifies something that an individual would want to
know in making an important decision. One could testify
about this concept without using the term "material" by
stating that the information allegedly omitted is
important or significant. Presumably, such testimony,
assuming it was otherwise helpful and admissible, would
not be objectionable as expressing a legal conclusion.

Page 6
865 P.2d 1355, *; 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 3;
1993 Utah LEXIS 157,**
The second, and legal, usage of the term "material"
comes from the Utah [**20] statute under which Larsen
was prosecuted and from securities law in general. The
law uses the term "material" in defining what
information must legally be disclosed. Larsen's basic
claim is that when Cook used the disputed term, the trial
court was allowing him to tell the jury that the omitted
information legally constituted material information
within the meaning of the statute, and Cook was thereby
instructing the jury that Larsen was guilty. Larsen
suggests, in fact, that Cook's testimony would have been
proper if he had used a word other than "material."
Cook certainly should have avoided employing the
specific term "material." However, his limited use of that
word, under the circumstances, does not mandate the
conclusion that he was improperly instructing the jury on
the law.
We think that Larsen's analysis, hanging as it does
on one word that has two almost identical meanings, is
unduly formalistic. The jury was charged with making
the ultimate determination of whether the statements
made or facts omitted by Larsen were factually material,
i.e., whether they were likely to influence a reasonable
investor. Cf. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 450, 48 L. Ed. 2d 757, 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976) [**21]
("Issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed
question of law and fact."). Given that "materiality" has a
popular meaning bearing directly on the factual issue
before the jury and that Cook's testimony, when read in
context, seems to use "material" as a synonym for
"important," we do not believe that the trial court abused
its discretion by admitting Cook's testimony.
Moreover, materiality, as it relates to the importance
of the omitted information, was an "ultimate issue."
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 704, expert testimony is
not objectionable solely because it encompasses the
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. Rule 704
provides in pertinent part that "testimony in the form of
an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704. Larsen's
semantic characterization of Cook's testimony as a legal
conclusion does not, without more, move the testimony
outside the scope of this ultimate-issue rule.
Larsen correctly asserts that rule 704 does not make
expert testimony admissible simply because it expresses
an opinion regarding an ultimate issue. By the same
token, [**22] however, rule 704 does not make expert
testimony inadmissible simply because it expresses an
opinion on the ultimate issue, as Larsen seems to
suggest. See Span, 819 P.2d at 332 n.l. As one
commentator noted, "Since the adoption of rule 704,
courts have generally not hesitated to follow it and to

permit expert testimony directly concerning the critical
issue before the trier of fact." Joseph & Saltzburg, ch. 53,
§ 53.3, at 2; see People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394, 400
(Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that pathologist's opinion
testimony indicating attack occurred in two stages is not
improper because it embraced an ultimate issue); see also
United States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727, 737 (2d Cir.)
(holding that trial court did not abuse it discretion by
admitting expert testimony on the reach of the concepts
of "underwriter" and "materiality" in securities fraud
case), cert, denied, 96 S. Ct. 270, 271 (1975).
[*1363] The bottom line is that the question of
materiality as it relates to the importance or significance
of the omitted information is, at least on one level, a
factual [**23] issue to be determined by the jury. Rule
704 permits Cook to express an opinion regarding the
ultimate resolution of that disputed issue as long as that
testimony is otherwise admissible under the rules of
evidence. See Joseph & Saltzburg, ch. 53, § 53.3, at 3.
Under the circumstances, we are not persuaded that the
trial court abused its discretion in permitting Cook's
testimony. nl2

nl2 We do not suggest that the trial court
must allow expert testimony
regarding
materiality, especially testimony utilizing the
term "material." We simply hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
limited testimony in this case.
We also note that an integral element of a
rule 702 determination to admit expert evidence
is a balancing of the probativeness of the
evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice.
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d 388, 398 n.8 (Utah
1989). This balancing mimics that under rule 403
and is necessary to a determination of
"helpfulness." In the present case, Larsen did not
specifically object to the use of "material" on the
ground that the probative value of the usage was
substantially outweighed by the potential for
unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See
Utah R. Evid. 403. Larsen's objections, although
citing to rule 702, addressed only the contention
that materiality in general was not a proper
subject for expert testimony. Trial counsel must
state clearly and specifically all grounds for
objection. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). Inasmuch
as Larsen failed to assert a claim of prejudice at
the trial court, that issue is not properly preserved
for appeal. If Larsen had made such an objection,
it might have merited serious consideration by the
trial court.
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Finally, even if the admission of Cook's testimony
couched in terms of materiality had been in error, Larsen
has not convinced us that the error would have been
harmful. The trial court correctly admonished the jury as
to the relative roles of expert testimony and opinion
evidence and instructed the jury to accord no unusual
deference to an expert's opinions. The trial court also
gave careful instructions regarding the legal definition
and requirements of the term "material" as used in the
statute. Taken together, these instructions substantially
reduced whatever slight risk of confusion Cook's use of
the term "material" might have engendered in the jury.
Given the trial court's adequate instructions to the jury,

we find that if any error had occurred in admitting the
expert testimony, it would have been harmless.
The convictions are affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge
John A. Rokich, District Judge
Hall, Chief Justice, and Stewart, Justice, having
disqualified themselves, do not participate herein;
Frederick and Rokich, District Judges, sat.

ADDENDUM E
MEMORANDUM DECISION ORDER
(MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT)

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION and
ORDER (Motion to Arrest Judgment)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 021100413
Judge Stephen L. Roth

RENAE REID BOLSON,
Defendants.

After trial in this matter, defendant Renae Reid Bolson filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment
and Memorandum in Support Thereof ("Defendant's Memorandum"); the State filed a Response to
Motion to Arrest Judgment (the "State's Response") to which defendant filed her Reply to State's
Response to Ms. Bolson's Motion to Arrest Judgment ("Defendant's Reply"). In connection with
her Motion, defendant filed a transcript of the proceedings of the trial. The Motion to Arrest
Judgment came on for hearing on May 20,2005, with Charlene Barlow, Assistant Attorney General,
representing the State and Shannon Romero, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association representing the
defendant; and the court took the Motion under advisement. Having considered the memoranda
submitted by the parties and their arguments, as well as other pleadings and documents on file in this
matter and the exhibits received at trial and the transcript, the court DENIES the Motion to Arrest
Judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Information in this matter charged defendant with ten felony counts, including seven
counts of Securities Fraud, a second degree felony, under U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (Counts 1

through 7, each alleging wrongdoing involving different victims); one count of Sale of an
Unregistered Security, a third degree felony, under U.C.A. §§61-1-7 and 61-1-21 (Count 8); one
count of Sales by an Unlicenced Broker-Dealer or Agent, a third degree felony, under U.C.A. § § 61 1-3(1) & (2) and 61-1-21 (Count 9); and one count alleging a Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a second
degree felony, under U.C.A. § 76-10-1603 (Count 10). The case was tried to a jury on June 14-18,
2004.
Before submitting the matter to the jury, the court dismissed Count 2, charging securities
fraud committed against Tom Barberi. The jury acquitted defendant of securities fraud on Count 1
(Michelle Jacobsen) and Count 3 (John Taylor). The jury convicted defendant of securities fraud
on Count 4 (Paul Devenport), Count 5 (Mark Albright), Count 6 (Richard Priest and Sean Pearson)
and Count 7 (Milton and Linda Priest). The Jury also returned guilty verdicts on Count 8 (offer or
sale of an unregistered security), Count 9 (sale of a security by an unlicensed agent), and count 10
(engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity). Defendant challenges the jury"s verdict on all counts
except Count 8 (offer or sale of an unregistered security).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, before sentence is imposed,
a court "upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is
other good cause for the arrest of judgment." The Utah Supreme Court has defined the applicable
standard for arrest of judgment:
The standard for determining whether a trial court correctly granted or denied a
motion for arrest of judgment is the same standard appellate courts apply in
determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence.
Under that standard, a trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently
-2-

improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element.
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted); see State v. James, 819 P.2d
781, 784-85 (Utah 1991) (It is proper for a court to overturn a conviction only when "the evidence
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict" are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must have entertained a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt . . . ."). The court noted that in the event the evidence "is
conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given particular evidence," and conflicts must therefore be resolved "in favor of the
jury verdict." Id (citations omitted).1
DISCUSSION
The court will address the challenged convictions in the order in which defendant presented
them in her Memorandum.
A.

FACTUAL CONTEXT
Viewing the evidence most favorably to the verdict, the jury could reasonably have concluded

the following about the investment program that is at the heart of this case and defendant's
connection to it:
The witnesses in these counts each described their participation in an investment "program"
(hereafter the "program"), the outlines of which had significant similarities. The program was
created and run by one Calvin Paul Stewart and generally involved each investor taking the equity

1

Only in the unusual circumstance where testimony "is inherently improbable," i.e., where
there is "'a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its falsity [is] apparent, without any
resort to inferences or deductions,'" may a court "reassess witness credibility." Id (citations
omitted).
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out of his or her home, or another residential property, with that money deposited in an escrow
account with Attorneys Title, where it was to remain untouched and available for retrieval on the
investor's notice of withdrawal from the program. The investors in this case borrowed money
secured by their homes or other properties, generally at near or over 100% of their value, in order
to invest the portion of the loan representing their equity into the program. All but one of the loans
involved in this case were obtained through Mainstreet Financial ("MSF"), a mortgage brokerage
owned by defendant's brother and sister-in-law. where defendant worked on salary as manager.
The invested money was to be used as collateral or as leverage to make other investments
by Stewart (or persons associated with him), in order to produce high rates of return. The investors
were promised returns of various kinds, including payment of monthly mortgage installments, with
the new mortgage to be completely paid off in one to two years, plus return of invested equity; or
periodic interest payments, with return of investment after two years; and other investment
configurations generally involving the investment of equity realized from loans on real property.
None of these investments required the investors to do anything significant other than pay over
money to the program, and the investors relied on the "program" to make the further investments that
would produce the promised return.
Although the investors often had heard of the program from others who had already invested,
defendant was the central figure through whom they ultimately became involved.

Defendant

explained the nature of the program to the investors and described it in glowing terms, enhancing
the potential benefits of investment and denying or minimizing the risks, as well as making
statements about Stewart's capabilities and financial strength. Defendant sometimes talked to or met
with investors multiple times before they made the decision to invest.
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Defendant not only "sold" the program through her representations, she was the nexus
between these investors and Stewart, arranging meetings with Stewart, often at MSF, both before
and after investments were made. A couple of investors described defendant as doing most of the
talking in meetings with her and Stewart, where Stewart appeared socially unskilled or reserved.
Defendant's discussions with investors suggested that she was a person with insider knowledge of
the program, both by being a source of information and a contact point with Stewart and by the way
she spoke, implying that she had insider information not generally available.
Defendant also was involved in providing the financial means and opportunity for many of
these investors to buy into the program. She arranged for the loans that allowed them to get the
equity out of the property (often their homes) that they needed to make their investments; and
reassured some that they did not need to worry about high payments or other troubling loan terms,
because the investment program was going make the payments. For example, the defendant put
investor Devenport (Count 4) in contact with a buyer for his St. George house, so that the buyer and
he could both get involved in the program through the transaction. The buyer was Michelle Jacobsen
(Count l). 2 Defendant convinced Milt and Linda Priest (Count 7), who wanted simply to invest cash
in the program, to instead mortgage their debt-free home, reassuring them in the face of their

2

Defendant argues that evidence relating to the dismissed Count 2, involving Tom Barberi,
and to the two counts on which defendant was acquitted (Count 1-Michelle Jacobsen, and Count 3
-Hal Taylor) should not have been considered by the jury or taken into account in connection with
this motion. The court believes that the evidence is relevant to the issue of whether defendant acted
as an agent of Stewart and/or the program, which is an element of the securities fraud and the sales
by an unregistered agent counts. Her role as an agent involves evidence beyond the facts of any
particular count, and her dealings with investors who were not the subject of charges on which she
was convicted can still be considered as to whether she was, in fact, an agent in connection with the
counts on which she was convicted. In addition, her dealings with the earlier investors-Jacobsen,
Barberi and Taylor, are relevant in assessing what knowledge she had of the program's payment
problems in connection with her dealings with later investors that were the subject of counts on
which she was convicted.
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misgivings about the size of the mortgage payments, that they need not be concerned because the
program would cover the payments.
Defendant's involvement with the program and the investors continued after investments
were made, in ways that underscore the scope of her role.3 Defendant acted as the clearing-house
for the program's payments in connection with the investments involved in this case, whether to
mortgage lenders or directly to investors. When payments were late or ceased, or checks bounced
or were not paid, as occurred with all these investors, defendant was the point of access between
them and the program for their complaints and for responses from Stewart or others associated with
the program. And she went substantially beyond the role of mere intermediary by placating angry
and insistent investors and by repeatedly reassuring them that there were no problems.
Defendant often told interested investors that she and her mother were also invested in the
program; and she sometimes referred interested persons to other investors for information. Taking
the evidence as a whole, however, the jury could reasonably concluded that defendant's role in the
program was not simply related to her own experience as an investor in the program or her
observations of other investors. Jurors could have believed that she was the means of access to the
program's principals, particularly Stewart; she provided information about how the program worked
and promoted or "sold" the program through her repeated representations about its success and lack
of risk; she was an intermediary for program-related payments to investors; and, for most of the
investors here, she provided access to the loans that enabled people to invest. She handled payments
and complaints for the program, and acted for Stewart and the program in reassuring nervous and

3

Defendant has also objected to evidence dealing with events after indiviual investments
occurred. The court believes that this information is relevant for the same reasons stated in the
footnote just above.

angry investors about the program's continued viability, even after things had apparently gone very
wrong.
Seen in the light most favorable to the verdict, in doing these things, defendant was not
simply relating her or others' experiences with the program, as other participants might have done;
her role was that of an insider, facilitator and seller of the program and was qualitatively different
and more consequential.
B.

THE SECURITIES FRAUD CONVICTIONS (Counts 4 through 7),
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that she knew that

her representations to investors were false or that she knew of omitted facts or, in the alternative, that
she deliberately blinded herself to material facts by acting with the conscious objective or desire to
ignore such facts. See Defendant's Memorandum at 13.
The Utah Uniform Securities Act provides in pertinent part that:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly to:
*

* *

(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading . . . .
U.C.A. § 61-1-1. The Act further provides that a person who "willfully violates" this section is guilty
of a second degree felony if the value at issue is more than $10,000 U.C.A. § 61-l-21(2)(b).
The jury was instructed that in order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of securities
fraud, they would have to find as to each alleged named victim each and every one of the elements
of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The elements of securities fraud were presented to the jury,
separately as to each alleged named victim:
Before you can find the Defendant ReNae Bolson guilty of the crime of
Securities Fraud as alleged in [Counts 4, 5, 6 and 7] of the first amended criminal
-7-
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information you must find from the evidence all of the following elements of the
crime: . . . On or about late 1999 in the state of Utah ReNae Bolson (1) directly or
indirectly, (2) willfully, (3) in connection with the offer or sale of a security, (4) to
[Paul Devenport, Mark Albright, Richard Priest and Sean Pearson, Milt and Linda
Priest], (5) made an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading or engaged in an act, a practice, or
course of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
investors, (6) at the time the property, or money, or the thing unlawfully obtained or
sought to be obtained was worth more than $10,000.
Tr. at 1009; Instructions No. 30-33 (the instruction for each count was essentially the same except
for the count number and identification of the alleged victim, which appeared where brackets are
inserted above); see also Tr. at 1009-1012. The jury was instructed that "a material fact is something
which a buyer of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of importance in determining
whether to buy or sell." Tr. at 1017, Instruction No. 42.
Defendant does not appear to deny that she omitted material facts or made statements to
investors that were not true; instead, as to each count, she contends that the evidence did not permit
the jury to conclude that her statements or omissions were "willful" rather than simply negligent,
careless or foolish. See Defendant's Memorandum at 12-13.
With regard to the securities fraud counts, the court instructed the jury that:
. . . to act willfully, it must be a person's conscious object or desire to engage in
certain conduct or cause a certain result. A person acts willfully if she acts
purposefully and not because of a mistake or accident. In the context of willfulness
[sic] statements of [sic] omissions of material facts, willfulness implies knowledge of
the falsity of the misstatements or knowledge of the omitted facts. That knowledge
can be inferred if defendant deliberately blinded herself to the existence of a fact or
facts; however, defendant cannot be convicted if she was merely negligent, careless,
or foolish. She must have acted with a conscious objective or desire to ignore a
material fact or facts.4
4

In connection with the Motion to Arrest Judgment both the State and the defendant, for
different reasons, challenge Instruction no. 37 defining the mens rea requirement of willfulness for
a criminal conviction under the Utah Securities Act. In connection with defendant' Motion to Quash
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Bindover, filed much earlier in this case, the court addressed at some length the meaning of the
willfulness requirement where, as here, the defendant claimed lack of knowledge of the falsity of
representations she made or of the existence of facts she omitted. See Memorandum Decision and
Order (Motion to Quash Bindover), filed on September 16, 2003 ("Bindover Decision"), at 43-50.
The court concluded that, in order to avoid imposing a standard of strict liability in such a
circumstance, forbidden under State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1360 (Utah 1993), in order to violate
the statute,
a defendant must "willfully omit or misstate material facts." A person cannot
willfully (i.e., "deliberately and purposefully") omit a fact that she does not know,
nor misstate a fact that she does not know to be false. To do either without
knowledge would necessarily be inadvertent, and therefore not willful, under the
rationale of Larsen, To base criminal liability on such inadvertence would impose
a standard of strict liability, which Larsen eschewed. Therefore, some element of
factual knowledge must be required in order to find a willful omission or
misstatement of facts under section 61-1-1(2).
Bindover Decision at 45. The court went on to conclude that an appropriate standard for finding
willful misstatement or omission of facts would not be actual knowledge but criminal negligence in
failing to learn the falsity of a misstated fact or the existence of an omitted one.
Before trial, the court concluded that the criminal negligence standard, although adopted by
the California Supreme Court, was unduly low for a criminal conviction and asked the parties to
attempt to agree on a mens rea instruction that set out a higher standard. After discussion with the
defendant's counsel the State provided the challenged "ostrich" instruction, which the parties
stipulated to and jointly presented to the court. See Tr. at 839; see also State's "Response at 5. If
the instruction was erroneously given, both the State and the defendant invited the error, the State
by providing the instruction and stipulating to it and the defendant by stipulating to it and then
strongly resisting the State's attempt to withdraw its stipulation in mid-trial. See Tr. at 838-39. For
both the state and the defendant to both challenge the propriety of the instruction now is not
warranted because they each invited the error, if any. See e.g., State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932
(Utah CT App. 1989)(concluding a party "cannot lead the court into error by failing to object and
then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions").
Further, the court believes that this instruction was an acceptable statement of the law, where
there was no specific Utah decision on the issue and divergent views in other jurisdictions. The
court also believes that, if anything, the instruction was more strict in its requirements and more
favorable to the defendant than other mens rea approaches that the State might have argued for, e.g.,
recklessness or criminal negligence in failing to discover falsity or omitted facts, or did argue for,
i.e., (in the court's view, at least) a form of strict liability. In other words, if the instruction was
erroneous, the court believes that defendant was favored and not prejudiced. The instruction requires
knowledge of the falsity of misstatements or omitted facts, while not permitting deliberate blindness.
It expressly distinguishes deliberate blindness from mere negligence, carelessness or foolishness,

Tr. at 1015, Instruction No. 37 (the written instruction stated "In the context of statements or
omissions of material facts . . . . " in the portion where errors appear in the transcript). Defendant
asserts with regard to each of the securities fraud convictions that the state failed to bear its burden
to prove that any of her statements or omissions to investors "were made with more than negligence,
carelessness or foolishness;" in other words, "the state wholly failed to demonstrate Ms. Bolson acted
with the conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts." See, e.g., Defendant's
Memorandum at 15.
First, defendant contends generally that there was no evidence to support a jury verdict based
on defendant's failure to advise investors that Calvin Paul Stewart had filed for bankruptcy in 1988,
with discharge of debts in 1996, or that the Utah Division of Securities had issued a cease and desist
order against Stewart and the program on March 7,2000. There was no evidence that defendant had
actual knowledge of either of these facts or that she deliberately blinded herself to such facts. The
court agrees with defendant that the State's argument that defendant had a duty to seek out such facts
because a reasonable person would do so under the circumstances is contrary to the willfulness
standard given to the jury, because it would require a breach of duty, i.e., a kind of negligence, rather
than actual knowledge or deliberate blindness.

reiterating that the defendant "must have acted with a conscious objective or desire to ignore a
material fact or facts." Read in a common sense fashion, in its entirety, the instruction does not, as
defendant argues,"' [present] the danger that a jury will convict a defendant on the basis of the lesser
mens rea of negligence-punishing the defendant for what he should have known,'" Defendant's
Reply at 5 (citation omitted). Rather, the jury is instructed that it may not base finding of culpability
on mere negligence. As discussed further in this decision, the court believes that there was sufficient
evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that the defendant made material
misrepresentations and omissions based on her knowledge. The court is not convinced that the
instruction, even if erroneous, undermines confidence in the jury's verdict.
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The court also concludes that defendant's conviction could not be based alone on the state's
position that information the defendant saw in otherwise favorable credit reports on Stewart (e.g., that
he had an unsatisfied ORS judgment, that he had a number of accounts "not paid as agreed, and some
other negative flags for credit), supported an inference of willful blindness, because they should have
put her on notice of problems in Stewart's finances or background and raised a duty to further
investigate before vouching for Stewart's financial status and acumen. Again, to accept that position
would require a conclusion that defendant should have investigated further based on inferences that
could be drawn from such facts, in other words, that she had a duty to further inquire and breached
that duty-essentially a negligence standard. Although the jury was certainly entitled to consider such
evidence commutatively, there would have to be other evidence to support a jury determination of
willfulness.
The court believes that there was such evidence, principally that program payments to at least
some investors were becoming chronically late and checks were bouncing, facts that defendant knew
of because she was both sending out the payments and fielding investors' complaints about them.
Michelle Jacobsen made four investments in the program funded by mortgage loans on her
residence and other properties, the first in December 1999 and the others during 2000. Jacobsen
expressed concerns to defendant that she could not afford the mortgages because she was retired and
had no salary coming in. Defendant told her not to worry, reassuring her that she would be so wealthy
in two or three years from her program investments that she would never have to worry about money
again. Tr. at 70-80. Jacobsen received program checks starting in January 2000 to make payments
on the various mortgage loans and for interest payments to her, which she picked up monthly from
defendant at MSF. The first check was on time, but each successive check was later and later until
they finally started bouncing. By December 2000, Jacobsen was quite worried. Defendant was the
-11-
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person she went to when she had problems with payments, and reassured her that there were some
little problems. Tr. at 83-86.
As part of a rather complicated deal involving the sale of his home, Tom Barberi invested
about $ 164,000 in the program and was to receive monthly payments and quarterly interest payments
on a note. Barberi received the quarterly interest payments during 2000, starting in January, but some
checks (unclear whether monthly or quarterly or both) were late and the last quarterly payment of
2000 bounced (by inference, as early as October 2000). When there were problems with checks, he
called defendant at MSF, who reassured him that Stewart's businesses were going fine and that there
was nothing wrong. Tr. at 311-14. In addition, during the first part of 2000, defendant acted as an
intermediary for Stewart in approaching Barberi to negotiate an extension on the note for a payment
of $5,000. The $5,000 check bounced. When he contacted defendant aboul this, she reassured him
that Stewart was very successful and good for the money and that there was a funds transfer problem;
she provided him with a cashiers check in a couple of days. Although he asked defendant to provide
him with a written extension agreement, she "was evasive" but told him one would be provided; it
never was. Tr. at 315-17. About a year into the deal, in January or February 2001, the checks stopped
coming altogether. Tr. at 314-15.
As it turned out, during 2000, the program was using new investor's money to pay old
investors. Tr. at 596. Regular payments to investors, late or otherwise, virtually ended during the
first months of 2001, and the late payments and bounced checks proved to have been a harbinger of
the program's imminent collapse.
The jury could reasonably have believed that defendant did not advise later investors, involved
in the securities fraud counts on which they voted to convict, of the payments problems she was aware
of while assuring them that the program would make the payments on new mortgages that some could
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not afford and that there was no risk associated with their investments in the program. The jury could
also have concluded that the information omitted was material to the investor's decision whether to
take out a loan through MSF and invest in the program.5 Each count is briefly addressed below.
Paul Devenport (Count 4). Paul Devenport first had contact with defendant about investing
his parents' St. George home in the program in early 2000 but decided that it sounded too good to be
true. Tr. at 171 -72. Defendant contacted Devenport in October or November 2000, after he had been
unsuccessfully marketing the St. George house, telling him that she had a buyer (as it turned out, the
buyer was Michelle Jacobsen) who was willing to purchase the property through the program. Tr.
at 175-76. Defendant told him that the program was a "safe, sound investment" and that "no one ever
had any problems getting their money . . . . " Tr. at 176. The closing on the house and his investment
occurred on December 21,2004, by fax, with defendant calling him to tell him the documents would
be faxed to him. Tr. at 178-79, 195. Defendant never received the quarterly interest payments that
were to begin in April.
The jury could reasonably have inferred from the evidence that defendant did not qualify her
statements about the safety of the program and the lack of problems in getting paid by the information
she had about Jacobsen's and Barberi's payment problems when she first made the statements, and
did not update her earlier statements to him with that information at the time she contacted him about
closing. The jury could reasonably have concluded that the omitted information about late and
bounced payments was material (i.e., information that an investor of ordinary intelligence and

5

While defendant testified that, with regard to late payments, "there was always a reasonable
explanation [by Stewart], and the payments continued to be made, and so the reasonable explanation
worked" (Tr. at 897), the jury was not required to believe her under all the circumstances and could
still have concluded that she made material misstatements or omissions about payments, whether
they believed her or not.
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prudence would think to be of importance in determining whether to invest in the program) and
necessary to make her unqualified representations about the program's soundness and lack of payment
problems "not misleading" under the circumstances, and that those misstatements or omissions were
willful.
The court concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on this
count.
Mark Albright (Count 5). Defendant appears to make two arguments here. First, she argues
that the State failed to prove that defendant misstated or omitted material facts; and, second, she
contends that because Albright had decided to make the investment before he met defendant, her
contact with him was not in connection with the offer or sale of security. Defendant's Memorandum
at 17. These arguments will be addressed in reverse order.
Defendant first met with Albright at his home, where she went to close a loan on Albright's
house that would provide the money for his investment in the program. Tr. at 338-39, 343, 357-58.
Albright testified that when the defendant went to his home, he had already decided to invest in the
program, based on prior discussions with his cousin, John Taylor, who had explained the program to
him. Tr. at 383, 385. He had earlier been referred to defendant at MSF to arrange the financing on
his house to get the money for his investment. Tr. at 335-36, 352, 356. While Albright had already
learned about the program from Taylor, when he talked to her by telephone in November 2000 about
arranging for a loan, defendant herself gave Albright substantial information about how the program
worked and therefore knew that his refinancing was for a program investment, and decided to invest.
Tr. at 336, 347, 360-61, 363-64. Defendant also explained the program to Albright and his wife at
the closing on January 25, 2005. Tr. at 369, 371.

-14-

G C J -2 C ±

While Albright testified that he already had decided to invest at the time defendant met with
he and his wife at their home to sign the loan papers, the jury could have concluded that it was
defendant's reassurances to him about the program that convinced him and his wife to go forward
with the refinancing in the face of their concerns about its terms. Albright's investment in the
program depended on his ability to get suitable financing and on his wife's willingness to have her
name removed from title to their home in order to facilitate the loan approval. Tr. at 356, 345-46,
364, 369-72. When Albright expressed his concerns about the high adjustable interest rate and the
high payment ("It scared me to death;" "I couldn't afford it, absolutely not"), defendant reassured him
that the interest rate didn't matter "because we're making the payments for you, so don't even worry
about the interest rate" and made similar assurances about the payment size. Tr. at 340-41.
Defendant explained to Albright's wife, Sheree, that the loan could close quickly only if she removed
her name from the title to the house, but that it would only be temporary, for a month or so. Tr. at
345-46,369-75. Whether the closing on the loan and the investment went forward depended on Mrs.
Albright agreeing to sign away her interest by quit-claim deed. See Tr. at 381. Defendant responded
to Mrs. Albright's concerns about the title and the safety of the investment by telling her that her
name would go back on the title right after the refinance and about the program's successful history,
the non-stock market and government nature of its investments, and that the investment was safe.
Tr. at 371-75. Defendant never told them that there had been any problems with payments. Tr. at
348. The program made only a single partial payment of Albright's mortgage.
The jury could reasonably have concluded from the evidence that defendant's representations
about the program were instrumental in assuaging their concerns about the loan they were getting into
and the change of title and that the loan was central to Albright's ability to invest in the program.
Thus there was substantial evidence supporting a conclusion that, even if Albright had already
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decided to invest, defendant's statements or omissions to the Albrights were meant to enable and
facilitate their investment and were therefore in connection with the offer or sale of a security.6
With regard to the argument that there was insufficient evidence of any material misstatement
or omission of fact, Albright testified that defendant told them nothing about "problems with people
getting paid" before they invested. Tr. at 348. As discussed above, the jury could reasonably have
believed that defendant knew about late payments and bounced checks before this late January 2001
closing. The jury could reasonably have concluded that the omitted information about late and
bounced payments was material (i.e., information that an investor of ordinary intelligence and
prudence would think to be of importance in determining whether to invest in the program) and
necessary to make her statements about the program's success and lack of payment problems "not
misleading" under the circumstances, and that those misstatements or omissions were willful This
is particularly so, given that the jury could reasonably have believed that defendant made these
statements in an attempt convince the Albrights to close the mortgage loan in the face of their
expressed concerns about the nature of the loan transaction defendant had put together to make
possible their investment, a loan that would obligate them to payments on a home mortgage they
could not afford and remove Mrs. Albright's name from the title to their house.

6

To the extent that defendant may be contending that she cannot be held liable where the
State has not proved reliance by the investor on a defendant's misstatements or omissions, she has
supplied no legal basis for such a position, and nothing in the relevant statute seems to require that
a defendant be the sole contact with the investment or even the primary basis for a decision to invest.
To the contrary, the provision has been interpreted as applying when "the fraud has a sufficiently
close relationship to the purchase or sale of a security to make it actionable." State v. Harry, 873
P.2d 1149,1156 (Ut.Ct.App. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing with
approval while not actually adopting holdings of other jurisdictions that the "connection" is
sufficient "where fraud 'touches' the transaction" (citations omitted)). There is sufficient evidence
in each of these counts that defendant's actions, even though not the sole source of representations
about the program, had a sufficiently close relationship to each investment in the program to be
"actionable" under section 61-1-1.

The court concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on this
count.
Richard Priest and Sean Pearson (Count 6). Priest first learned about the program from a coworker and friend, who referred him to defendant for further information and to see if the program
was still open to new investors. Tr. at 3 8-89,392,419-22. While Priest talked to his friend about the
program, defendant became Priest's primary source of information, explaining how it worked,
including making statements that the program would make all of the payments on mortgages taken
out to make investments, as well as insurance and taxes on the property. Tr. at 389-91, 404. She
made him feel comfortable about the program. Tr. at 424,427. Pearson was Priest's roommate and
they co-owned the condominium they lived in. Tr. at 389. Priest made four investments in the
program with money obtained from refinancing their condominium on about December 5,2000, and
through the purchase and financing of a house and two condominiums they closed on at the end of
January 2001, all through MSF. Tr. at 397,408 and Ex. 41,410 and Ex. 42 & 43,412-13 and Ex 44.
Because they did not have sufficient equity in the last two condominium purchases to fund their
program investments, priest cashed out $ 100,000 of his retirement savings to make up the difference.
Tr. at 408,412. One of the mortgage loans had an interest rate as high as 13.35%. Tr. at 404-405 and
Ex. 41. Priest's income could not justify the four mortgages amounting to four or five hundred
thousand dollars and "there's no way we could have paid that anyway." Tr. at 435. Priest testified
that they expressed their concern about the high interest rate on all of the loans and defendant said,
"we don't have to worry about it because we're not going to pay the payments and it doesn't really
matter what the mortgage rate is or what the payment is because we won't be paying the payment,"
which "would come out of the program." Tr. at 405. Defendant told Pearson that among the many
investors were "very well known people like Tom Barberi
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" Tr. at 450. The program made only

two payments on their mortgages (both of which were made out, but not signed by, defendant),
neither of which cleared the bank. Tr. at 414-416.
As discussed above, the jury could reasonably have believed that the defendant knew about
late payments and bounced checks before the December 5, 2000 and the late January 2001 closings.
The jury could reasonably have concluded that the omitted information about late and bounced
payments was material (i.e., information that an investor of ordinary intelligence and prudence would
think to be of importance in determining whether to invest in the program) and necessary to make her
statements about the program's success and lack of payment problems "not misleading" under the
circumstances, and that those misstatements or omissions were willful. Again, this is particularly so,
given that Priest and Pearson were leveraged beyond their financial capabilities and unable to pay the
mortgages they had committed to in order to invest in the program (not to mention Priest's cashing
out retirement funds) and that defendant had affirmatively represented that they did not need to worry
about either high interest rates or payments because the program would pay the mortgages in order
to alleviate their concerns. It is perhaps telling that she told them that Barberi was an investor,
apparently in an attempt to pump the program, apparently without disclosing that he had received late
payments and a bounced check.
The court concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on this
count.
Milt & Linda Priest (Count 7). Richard Priest told his brother Milt about the program at the
end of December 2000, and Milton spoke with an invested co-worker as well. Tr. at 464,486. Milt
and Richard met at MSF with defendant about the program in early Januaiy 2001, and Milt and his
wife later met with defendant at MSF, before investing, and spoke with her on the phone. Tr. at 46668, 471,488, 504, 523. Defendant explained the program to them and they decided to invest. They
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initially wanted to invest $100,000 cash, but defendant convinced them that it was better to borrow
money against their debt-free home. Tr. at 468-69, 505-506, 513. The size of the mortgage payment
on the loan arranged through MSF was $1,784 per month, more than Milton's monthly income and
not designed for their needs based on a combined income of about $2,400. Tr. at 474-75,516. While
there is no testimony that they discussed the size of the payment directly with defendant, the jury
could have inferred that she was aware of both the payment amount and their finances. See, e.g., Tr.
at 47 L They did discuss their concerns about the high interest rate, term and costs of the loan with
defendant, however. Tr. at 474, 514, 522-23. Defendant told them "that the loan wasn't a real big
concern because they were going to be making the payments and not to worry about any of that." Tr.
at 514; see Tr. at 474,477-78, 522-23. Because of this, Milt was not concerned particularly with the
ultimate terms of the loan. See Tr. at 474,477-78. Defendant told them that the program was getting
full and that if they wanted to invest, they "needed to do it right away." Tr. at 509. She told them that
there was "very, very little" risk to their money. Tr. at 507.
At first, the Priests had decided to make the mortgage payments themselves and let the
program reimburse them, because they were concerned about the effect of late payments on their good
credit. Tr. at 479, 513. Defendant told them that "at some point in time there may be a late payment"
(Tr. at 513) or that "payments would sometimes be a little bit late" (Tr. at 479), but "no more than
like two weeks" and the program would pay the late fees (Tr. at 497). The Priests decided to invest
in the program and to have their mortgage payments made by the program. Defendant admitted in
her testimony that payments had been late by up to "30 days instead of getting a payment from the
first to the 15th, a payment was received by the end of the month."7 Tr. at 897. The jury could have

7

Defendant's testimony inferred that late payments occurred in 2001 (Tr. at 897), but the
jury could have disbelieved that based on other testimony.
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believed from this testimony that defendant had represented to the Priests that payments were
occasionally up to two weeks late, when she had knowledge that payments were chronically late and
had bounced for some investors and that payments had been as much as a month late.
The Priests closed on their loan February 1, 2001, mortgaging their house for $243,750 and
investing $100,000 in the program. Tr. at 477-78, 492, 499, 515 and Ex. 47 & 48th Avenue. The
program did not make the first three payments on the mortgage, but reimbursed the Priests, who had
finally made the payments themselves, after they continued to complain. Tr. at 479-80, 494, 516.
There were no more payments from the program.
The jury could reasonably have believed that the defendant knew about late payments and
bounced checks before the February 1, 2001, closing and that she did not disclose bounced checks
and minimized both the frequency and timing of late payments. While open to dispute, whether these
omissions or misrepresentations are materia] is a jury question; and the juiy could reasonably have
concluded that the omitted information about bounced payments and the minimization of late
payments was material (i.e., information that an investor of ordinary intelligence and prudence would
think to be of importance in determining whether to invest in the program) and necessary to make her
statements that the program would make the payments on their mortgage loan and there was minimal
risk "not misleading" under the circumstances, and that those misstatements or omissions were
willful. Again, this is particularly so, given that the jury could have determined that defendant had
encouraged the Priests to mortgage their debt-free house to enter into a loan obligation with high
payments, interest rate and closing costs that she had reason to know was beyond their means if the
program did not pay as she promised.
The court concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on this
count.
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In summary, the court concludes that, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the verdict,
the evidence was not so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to the challenged elements of the
securities fraud counts that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to those
elements.8
C.

SALE OF A SECURITY BY AN UNLICENSED AGENT (Count 9).
The Securities Act makes it "unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as [an]

. . . agent unless the person is licensed" under Title 61. U.C.A. § 61-1-3(1). An "agent" is defined
as "any individual... who represents [ a n ] . . . issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or
sales of securities." U.C.A. § 61-1-13(2). Criminal liability attaches if "[a] person . . , willfully
violates any provision" of the Act. U.C.A. § 61-1-21(1). Thus, in order to be convicted of a criminal
violation of this statute, the State must prove that the defendant acted as an agent under the Securities
Act, i.e., that she represented an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of
securities, and did so willfully.
Defendant appears to challenge her conviction on this count by reasserting the applicable
portion of her Motion to Quash Bindover. Defendant's Memorandum at 28. The extent of
defendant's challenge and whether it is factual, legal or both is difficult to discern, but the court
believes that the defendant is challenging her conviction on the grounds that the court did not require
the jury to find that she was in privity with an investor in order to be convicted; in other words,

8

The court has addressed specific evidence in assessing the four separate securities fraud
counts, but there was evidence of a broader aspect to defendant's involvement with the program,
described generally in the Factual Context section, above, that the jury was entitled to consider as
a context to her dealings with each investor. The court believes that the jury could reasonably have
drawn conclusions from the evidence about the quality and extent of defendant's involvement in the
program that could have been taken into account, as well, in determining whether her specific
misstatements or omissions were willful and material.
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defendant appears to argue that privity between the agent and the buyer of a security is a necessary
element of the crime of sale of a security by an unlicensed agent. See id. at 29-30. Defendant's basis
for this position is her argument that section 61-1-22, which provides certain civil remedies for
violations of the Securities Act, has been found to require privity between an unlicensed agent and
the purchaser of a security in order to recover civilly against a person selling a security in violation
of section 61-1-3(1). See id at 29 (citing and quoting Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah
1996)). Defendant argues that, given the much higher burden of proof in criminal cases, the state
cannot be held to a lesser standard than in a civil case based on the same violation, and therefore
should be required to have proved that defendant was in privity with an investor in order to be found
guilty on this count. Id. at 30.
This argument is not persuasive. The criminal provision of the Securities Act and the civil
remedies provision have different purposes. The criminal provision is intended, in the case of section
61-1-3(1), to punish and therefore deter the activity of selling securities without being licensed as
required under the Act. It protects a societal and governmental interest in enforcement of the law by
punishing violators and thereby deterring and preventing future violations. The civil remedies section
is intended to provide victims of such unlawful activity with a mechanism to recover their purchase
price, i.e., to redress the economic loss of the violation. While such civil recovery may also support
the broader goal of encouraging obedience to the law, it is clearly designed to compensate particular
victims for actual losses. By providing that "[a] person who offers or sell a security in violation of
Subsection 61-1-3(1) is liable to the person . . . buying the security from him." Section 61-1-22
establishes a limitation on those from whom the victim can collect the civil remedy provided. This
comports with general notions of civil recovery and corresponds to a civil fraud concept of privity.
That it also serves to limit the scope of those against whom civil recovery is available when compared
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with those subject to criminal prosecution for the same unlawful activity is not a constitutional defect.
It is entirely rationale for the legislature to seek to punish and deter those who unlawfully offer a
security for sale, as well as those who manage to actually sell the security to someone, because both
acts are prohibited to the unlicensed under the Act. Defendant has provided no authority that suggests
that the legislature cannot do this.
There is simply no indication that, in enacting the civil remedies provision of section 61-1-22,
the legislature intended to impose a requirement of privity for a criminal conviction under section 611-21. Nor has the defendant provided any legal authority for her proposition that in order to
criminalize certain prohibited behavior, the law must include all elements of a civil action for
recovery of damages for such behavior. Criminal penalties and civil remedies serve different
purposes, and the legislature may require different elements for each; this does not make one
"stricter" than the other, merely different. In this case, sale or offer of securities without being
appropriately licensed is prohibited by section 61-1-3(1). Defendant has not shown that it is a
violation of due process to provide that a willful violation is a crime, whether or not there is privity,
but to require privity for civil recovery.
Defendant's motion to arrest judgment as to this count should be denied.
Nevertheless, the court's review of the jury instructions in connection with this count raised
a concern that it believes should be brought to the attention of the parties. As indicated above, the
Securities Act makes it unlawful for "for any person to transact business in this state as [an]... agent
unless the person is licensed under this chapter. U.C.A. § 61-1-3(1) (emphasis added). The meaning
of the term "agent" is specifically defined in the Act and is not as extensive as the term is generally
used in the law. See U.C.A. § 61-1-13(2). While the statutory definition of "agent" was set out in
paragraph 6 of Instruction 42, and elaborated on in Instruction 43, the instruction setting out the
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elements of the crime of "Sales by an Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent, as alleged in Count Nine"
did not require that the jury find that defendant was an agent in order to convict her. Instruction No.
35 states that "you must find from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime: (1) from
on or about August 1999 in the state of Utah (2) ReNae Bolson (3) willfully (4) in connection with
the offer or sale of a security (5) engaged in the offer or sale of a security without being licensed to
transact business in this state. Tr. at 1013-14, Instruction No. 35. No where in that instruction is the
jury informed that they must find that defendant acted as an "agent" as defined in the Securities Act.
This issue has not been raised by the parties, and the court realizes that there may have been
some discussion of this at the time of trial or that there may be some reason for the omission (for
example, the parties may have agreed that under the facts of the case, if defendant was found to have
"engaged in the offer or sale of a security," there was no question of fact that she did so as an agent).
The fact that the term "agent" was so extensively defined and did not apply to any other count,
however, suggests that the element was not omitted from Instruction no. 35 on purpose. If there is
no legally acceptable rationale, the court believes that omission of this element of the offense is
material and may amount to "plain error" even if no objection was noted and therefore raises the issue
sua sponte.
The court requests that the parties discuss the issue and respond in writing, either separately
or together within twenty (20) days of service of this decision.
D.

ENGAGING IN A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY (Count 10).
Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant (1) received any

proceeds from the Program, (2) engaged in a pattern of unlawful activity, (3) participated as a
principal, (4) was directly or indirectly employed by or associated with any enterprise and (5)

"24~

00:1374

conducted or participated in the conduct of MSF's financial affairs through a pattern of unlawful
activities.
Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (the "Act") provides, in pertinent part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived, whether
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the person has
participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that
income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from the investment
or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to
conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
U.C. A. § 76-10-1603. The court agrees with defendant that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
a conviction on subsections (1) and (2). First, as to subsection (1), there was no evidence that
defendant received any direct payment or commission for her efforts on behalf of the program, nor
that she received any commission from MSF on loans or that her salary was affected in any way by
her generation of loan brokerage fee or other income that came to MSF as a result of program-related
loans. Nor was there any evidence that the income from the program-related loans was a material
factor in MSF's ability to operate or pay expenses or salaries, such as defendant's. Even if the jury
could have concluded from the evidence that defendant's salary at amounts to proceeds from a pattern
of unlawful activity, there was no evidence that she used or invested those proceeds "in the
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of any enterprise" under the Act.
Similarly, there was no evidence that defendant "acquirfed] or maintained], directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise," as required for conviction under subsection
(2). There was no evidence that defendant had or acquired any interest in MSF or the program or in
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any combination of persons or entities associated with the program. There was therefore insufficient
evidence for the jury to convict her on either of the first two subsections. The issue then is whether
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to support a conviction
under subsection (3).
A prerequisite to criminal liability under subsection (3), as with the other subsections, is
prohibited activities through a pattern of unlawful activity. A "Pattern of unlawful activity" under
the Act requires:
[A]t least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated, but
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken
together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related
either to each other or to the enterprise.
U.C.A. § 76-10-1602(2). Each unlawful act in the pattern may not be separated in time from the last
act by more than five years. Id. The requisite "unlawful activity" includes "any act prohibited by the
criminal provisions of.., [the] Utah Uniform Securities Act." U.C.A. § 76-10-1602(h). The court
has previously concluded that the evidence supported defendant's conviction on four separate
episodes of securities fraud, taking place during a period of less than five years. As discussed at some
length, those episodes had similar purposes and results (investment in the program, accompanied by
the brokering of loans as a source of investment funds), participants (at least defendant and Stewart),
and methods of commission (for example, similar representations regarding the program and
brokering of loans to provide investment funds). The episodes are related to each other by the nature
of that pattern and by the involvement of the program, Stewart, defendant and MSF.
Defendant argues that the evidence could not support a finding of the necessary "continuity."
Defendant's Memorandum at 26-28. The court is persuaded by the State's analysis of the continuity
issue and concludes that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found the
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required pattern of unlawful activity involving defendant. See State's Response at 14-17; see also,
Resolution TrustCorp. v. Stone, 998 f.2d 1534,1543-45 (discussing and applying a number of factors
that "provide indicia by which the continuity of specified racketeering activity may be judged," many
of which can be found in the evidence here).
The court also believes that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that there was an enterprise involved here with which defendant was associated. The Act
defines an enterprise as "any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities." U.C.A. §76-10-1602(1). An enterprise,
as contemplated by the Act, has been described as "a group of persons associated together for a
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425,431
(Ut.Ct.App. 1997), quoting United States v. Turkette, 425 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). An enterprise may
also "consist of more than one entity, so long as those entities 'have been connected by a defendant's
participation in them through a pattern of racketeering activity.'" United States v. Butler, 954 F.2d
114, 120 (2nd Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The existence of such an enterprise "is proved by
evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates
function as a continuing unit." Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 431, quoting Turkette, 425 U.S. at 583.
The jury could have concluded from the evidence that there was an enterprise, centered around
the program, consisting of Stewart, Attorneys Title and/or McCallister, Al Anderson, and defendant
and perhaps MSF. Stewart created the program, put it into motion and kept it going through his
dealings with people like defendant at MSF, McCallister at Attorneys Title, investors and others, such
as investment contacts (if any). McCallister and Attorneys Title provided the facilities and trained
personnel to make possible many investor loan closings. More importantly they supplied an essential
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ingredient in gaining the confidence of program investors, the participation of an organized and
operating title company, whose natural business was, in part, the reliable holding of escrowed funds
and providing escrow services, so that investors could be assured that their invested money would
remain safe and untouched. Defendant, certainly among others,9 "sold" the program to the investors,
making representations about the nature of the investment program, what the program would do for
them, the financial strength and acuity of Stewart, the safety of invested funds deposited in escrow
at Attorneys Title, and the way the program made its returns. Through MSF, defendant provided
refinancing of loans, the means by which some of the investors were able to realize the cash necessary
to invest in the program. She put some investors in touch with buyers for their property or with
properties that they could buy, in order to facilitate their investments in the program. Again through
MSF, she conveyed mortgage and interest payments from Stewart and the program to the investors.
Defendant was often the intermediary or conduit for investor information from and to Stewart and the
program, and she spoke and acted on his behalf in talking to and negotiating with investors. Contacts
with and meetings between investors and Stewart, often taking place at MSF, were arranged by
defendant. After things went wrong, she continued to reassure concerned and angry investors that
all was well. The evidence thus supports a reasonable conclusion by the jury that there was an
ongoing, informal organization in which "the various associates functioned] as a continuing unit"
and with which defendant was associated. See Hatchings, 950 P.2d at 431.
The final requirement of subsection (3) is that, through the pattern of unlawful activity, the
defendant "conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's

9

While the program had many more investors than those who dealt with defendant or MSF,
there does not seem to be any requirement in the Act that a person's association with an enterprise
be comprehensive.
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affairs." While the court has found not Utah case interpreting this language, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a similar phrase in the federal RICO statute means that the defendant must have
participated in the operation or management of the enterprise. See US. v. Shifman, 124 F.3d 31, 3536 (1st Cir. 1997), citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993). Another court has
discussed this requirement as follows:
Thus, to be liable under [18 U.S.C.] § 1962(c), "one must have some part in directing
those affairs" of the enterprise, although it is not necessary for the participant to have
"significant" control. "The word 'participate' makes clear that RICO liability is not
limited to those with primary responsibility for the enterprise's affairs, just as the
phrase 'directly or indirectly' makes clear that RICO liability is not limited to those
with a formal position in the enterprise, but some part in directing the enterprise's
affairs is required."
Resolution Trust, 998 F.2d at 1543 (citations omitted). In Reves, the Court found "that an accounting
firm employed by the enterprise could not be held civilly liable under RICO for preparing an
inaccurate accounting statement [that inflated the value of the company and hurt investors] as it had
not 'participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself." Shifman, 124 F.3d at 36.
The First Circuit further analyzed the meaning of Reves, in language that may have some
application here:
Special care is required in translating Reves" concern with "horizontal"
connections-focusing on the liability of an outside adviser-into the "vertical" question
of how far RICO liability may extend within the enterprise but down the
organizational ladder. In our view, the reason the accountants were not liable in Reves
is that, while they were undeniably involved int eh enterprise's decisions, they neither
made those decisions nor carried them out; in other words, the accountants were
outside the chain of command through which the enterprise's affairs were conducted.
Id, quoting US v. Otrero, 37 F.3d 739, 750 (1st Cir. 1994). In addressing the question of how far
down the ladder liability may go, the court opined "that a defendant who is 'plainly integral to
carrying out' the enterprise's activities may be held criminally liable under RICO. Id, quoting
Otrero, 37 F.3d at 750 ("nothing in the [Reves] opinion precludes our holding that one may "take part
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in" the conduct of an enterprise by knowingly implementing decisions, as well as by making them.
Indeed, the Court said that "an enterprise is 'operated' not just by upper management but also by
lower-rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management."
(Citations omitted)). Shifman found that there was sufficient evidence to support a trial court
conviction under RICO where the defendant was "plainly integral to carrying out" another person's
loan sharking scheme by providing referrals of persons needing money, setting up other persons with
promises of financing and then referring them tathe loan shark when the illusory financing did not
come through, and giving the loan sharks phone number to many people, all when he knew the loan
shark operation was illegal. Id
Although the case is not on point in its factual details, Shifman's involvement in the loansharking enterprise suggests at least a broad correspondence to the defendant's relationship to the
enterprise in this case, as summarized above and in other sections of this decision. The court
believes that this evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that the defendant's
activities were "plainly integral to carrying out" the program's schemes.
Because there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support the jury's guilty verdict,
defendant's motion to arrest judgment as to this count should be denied.
ORDER
Based on the decision set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED, as follows:
L

Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is DENIED.
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2.

The parties have twenty (20) days after service of this decision to respond in writing

to the court's concerns about the jury instruction setting out the elements of Count 9, sale of a security
by an unlicensed agent, as discussed above.
DATED this 20th day of July, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

Stephen L. Roth
DISTRICT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM F
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
(JURY INSTRUCTION AS TO COUNT 9)

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION and
ORDER (Jury Instruction as to Count 9)
Case No. 021100413
Judge Stephen L. Roth

RENAE REID BOLSON,
Defendants.

In connection with its Memorandum Decision and Order, dated July 20, 2005, denying
defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment, the court sua sponte raised the issue whether the omission
of an element from the elements instruction on the offense of Sale of a Security by an Unlicensed
Agent (Count 9 of the Information), amounted to plain error warranting consideration of whether
defendant's conviction on that count ought to be vacated. The court asked the parties to submit
written responses to its concerns. The state filed a Response to Jury Instruction Issue on July 29,
2005; defendant filed her Response to the Court's Invitation to Address Jury Instruction No. 35 on
August 4, 2005; the state responded with a letter, dated August 26, 2005, attaching several Utah
cases as additional legal authority; and defendant then filed a sur-response on September 5, 2005,
Regarding the State's Submission on August 26,2005 of Additional Case Law Previously Omitted.
Neither side has requested oral argument, and the court believes that the briefing is sufficiently to
the point that oral argument would not be helpful to resolution of the issue.
The court concludes that neglecting to advise the jury that it must find that defendant acted
as an agent or broker-dealer, along with other enumerated elements of the offense, in order to convict

defendant of Sale of a Security by an Unlicensed Agent amounts to plain error that was not invited
by any affirmative act on defendant's part. The court further concludes that giving the instruction
without a required element amounts to manifest injustice that warrants vacation of the jury's verdict
of conviction on that count
DISCUSSION
The Securities Act makes it "unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as [an]
. . . agent unless the person is licensed" under Title 61. U.C.A. § 61-1-3(1). The meaning of the
term "agent" is specifically defined in the Act and is not as extensive as the term is generally used
in the law. An "agent" is defined as "any individual... who represents [ a n ] . . . issuer in effecting
or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities." U.C.A. § 61-1-13(2). Criminal liability
attaches if "[a] person... willfully violates any provision" of the Act. U.C.A. § 61-1-21(1). Thus,
in order to be convicted of a criminal violation of this statute, the State must prove that the defendant
acted as an agent under the Securities Act, i.e., that she represented an issuer in effecting or
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities, without being licensed to do so, and that she did
so willfully.
While the statutory definition of "agent" was set out in paragraph 6 of Instruction No. 42, and
elaborated on in Instruction No. 43, the instruction setting out the elements of the crime of "Sales
by an Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent, as alleged in Count Nine," Instruction No. 35, did not
require that the jury find that defendant was an agent in order to convict her. Instruction No. 35
states that "you must find from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime: (1) from on
or about August 1999 in the state of Utah (2) ReNae Bolson (3) willfully (4) in connection with the
offer or sale of a security (5) engaged in the offer or sale of a security without being licensed to
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transact business in this state. Tr. at 1013-14, Instruction No. 35. Nowhere in that instruction is the
jury explicitly informed that they must find that defendant acted as an "agent" as defined in the
Securities Act.
Defendant did not object to Instruction No. 35, but the court considers the omission of an
element of a crime from jury instructions to amount to plain error warranting reconsideration even
without timely objection. See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(d) ("Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the
attention of the court."). Nevertheless, "'a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial
when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'" State v. Guekgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,
t 9, quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996), quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). The Supreme Court has "recognized a number of ways in which a
defendant has led a trial court into committing error," e.g., where defendant's attorney stated on the
record that he had no objection to the instructions given, failed to object to an instruction when
specifically questioned about it by the court, affirmatively represented "that she had read the
instruction and had to objection to it," objected to use of a correct instruction and then later claimed
error as to the erroneous instruction given, or claimed error in an instruction that he had submitted.
See Guekgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 at ^j 10-11. The "invited error" doctrine is intended to "'discourage
[] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal
on a p p e a l . . . . " ' Id. at \ 12.
The court does not recall and has not been made aware of any affirmative act on the part of
defendant that led to the error in Instruction No. 35. The instruction appears to have been submitted
by the State, who concedes that the omission was inadvertent; and defendetnt simply did not object
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to it, also through inadvertence. The court therefore concludes that the problem with Instruction No.
35 was not invited by the defendant.
To warrant setting aside a conviction, the error must result in manifest injustice. See Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 19(e); State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602,608 (Ut.Ct.App. 1998).
Utah appellate courts have held that:
Failure to give an elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice
standard under [Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure] 19(c) [now 19(e)] and constitutes
reversible error as a matter of law. Further, because the general rule is that an
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential, failure to
provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless.

Stringham, 957 P.2d at 608 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; first alteration in the
original).
The State argues that, taken as a whole, the instructions adequately instruct the jury on the
elements of Count 9, pointing out that Instruction No. 5 (the charging instruction), Instruction No
27, and Instruction No. 35 (the elements instruction) all refer to the charged offense as "Sales by an
Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent." Instruction No. 35 instructed the jury that in order to find the
defendant "guilty of the crime SALES BY AN UNLICENSED BROKER-DEALER OR AGENT,"
they "must find from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime:," listing all the
elements except that defendant must have acted as an "agent." Instruction No. 35 (emphasis in the
original). Immediately following these elements, the jury was further instructed that "[i]f you believe
that the evidence establishes each and every one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
it shall be your duty to find the defendant guilty" of the charge and further, that "[i]f you believe that
the evidence has failed to establish one or more of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt,"
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it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not guilty of the crime charged." Id (emphasis added).
The court concludes that, given the specific, repeated instructions that the jury was to base
its decision as to the defendant's guilt on the specific elements listed, the omission of the "agent"
element of the crime from that list cannot be compensated for by references to the term "agent" in
othei locations in the instructions The court further concludes that omission of this element from
Instruction No. 35 resulted in manifest injustice warranting vacation of the conviction as to Count
9, Sales by an Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent.
ORDER
Based on the decision set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED, that defendant's conviction on Count 9 of the Information for Sales by an
Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent is hereby VACATED.
DATED this &A

day of October, 2005.
BX-THE COURT,

y

Stephen L. Roth
$%.
DISTRICT JUDGE V%
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